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Abstract
We study games of optimal stopping (Dynkin games). A Dynkin game is a mathe-
matical model involving several competing players, each of them interested in cap-
turing the moments when certain stochastic processes are at an extremum. Actions
of players are referred to as “stopping” (of an underlying process), and the outcome
for every player depends on the stopping decisions of the other players.
Our focus is on Dynkin games with asymmetric information. Asymmetry of in-
formation refers to the situation in which different players have different (possibly
incomplete) knowledge of the underlying world. Observations of the underlying
processes (or of a more general information flow) and of the actions of competitors
allow the players to make optimal stopping choices. An important aspect of our
framework is a possibility of randomising these choices: for example, in order to
avoid revealing private information to competitors.
We develop a general stochastic framework for studying Dynkin games with asym-
metric information. In particular, we provide conditions for the existence of the
value in such games. Separately, we study issues arising in games with mixed first-
mover advantage, in which sometimes it is beneficial for the players to act as soon
as possible, and sometimes to wait for another player to act.
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Optimal stopping is a stochastic problem of the following kind. Suppose an actor observes a
stochastic process and wishes to capture the moment when the process is at its maximum (or
minimum). Possible tasks include characterising this time in terms of parameters of the process,




where T is a set of stopping times, (Xt) is a stochastic process, and E denotes the mathematical
expectation.
A Dynkin game (or a game of optimal stopping, or an optimal stopping game) is an exten-
sion of an optimal stopping problem that allows for multiple actors (or players). Such games
originate from Dynkin (1969). A variation of the Dynkin game appeared shortly after in the
textbook Neveu (1975) and in the following years received attention of researchers worldwide
Bismut (1977b), Stettner (1982a), Stettner (1982b), Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984), Yasuda
(1985). More recently, Dynkin games have gained popularity due to their financial applications,
particularly game options Kifer (2000) and real options Steg & Thijssen (2015), De Angelis &
Ekström (2020). We provide a review of the most relevant literature in Chapter 3.
Dynkin games appear in the literature in numerous variations — as discrete-time games or
continuous-time games, in a zero-sum or a nonzero-sum framework, as two-player or multiple-
player games, under different assumptions on the set of stopping times and on the underlying
processes. We now outline a framework that is close to our research. Consider two stochastic
processes ( ft), (gt). Let there be two players, and denote by τ and σ the stopping times used by
the first and the second player, respectively. The game ends at time τ∧σ := min{τ,σ} with the
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first player delivering to the second player the random payoff
P(τ,σ) = fτI{τ≤σ}+gσI{σ<τ},
where I{τ≤σ} and I{σ<τ} denote the indicators of the events {τ≤ σ} and {σ < τ}. Since the first
player (the τ-player) is the one who pays the amount P, she is referred to as the minimiser in the
game. On the other hand, the second player (the σ-player) is the one who receives P, and hence
is the maximiser.
Let us mention a fundamental concept from game theory. A couple (τ∗,σ∗) is called a Nash
equilibrium, if for any other couple (τ,σ) the following holds:
E[P(τ∗,σ)]≤ E[P(τ∗,σ∗)]≤ E[P(τ,σ∗)]. (1.1)
One way to interpret these inequalities is that neither minimiser nor maximiser can obtain a more
desirable expected payoff by deviating from the Nash equilibrium.










provided that the second equality holds.
The reader might have noticed that we did not specify over which sets the supremum and
infimum are taken in (1.2), and what set τ∗, σ∗, τ, σ in (1.1) belong to. Traditionally, the set of
stopping times is the one that appears in these definitions. However, one can also consider the set
of randomised or mixed stopping times (rigorously introduced in Section 2.4). This set is larger
than the set of usual (pure) stopping times, and therefore, the existence of value and/or of Nash
equilibrium can be ensured for a broader class of games. Such relaxation is particularly useful
for games with incomplete/asymmetric information that we proceed to introduce.
So far, we implicitly assumed that both of the players observe both of the payoff processes
( ft), (gt), fully and without any noise, and their actions τ, σ are based on this observation. In
such situations, we say that the game is a game with full and symmetric information. However,
it is easy to think of situations when the information is incomplete and/or there is no symmetry
of information available to the players. For example, the payoff processes may depend on an
exogenous random variable which is only known to one of the players (the informed player) and
could be viewed as a scenario in which the game is played, or as insider information.
A possible way for randomised stopping times to appear in this framework is the following:
they are used by the informed player to gradually reveal the information to the uninformed player.
To give an intuition, imagine a game with two possible scenarios: in one of them, it is optimal for
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the informed player to stop at time 0, in the other one — at time 1. If the game is played in the
latter scenario, a “naive” informed player would wait until time 1 to stop. But then, immediately
after time 0, the uninformed player learns the true scenario (from the fact that the informed player
did not stop at 0). To avoid the information being revealed in such a way, the informed player
may want to include randomness in her choice of the stopping time, and to manipulate the beliefs
of the uninformed player in an optimal way.
Dynkin games with asymmetric information are the main object of our study. Chapter 4 is
devoted to our main results in this area. Particularly, the question of existence of the value in
such games is our focus. We specify conditions under which the supremum and infimum in (1.2)
can be interchanged. In general, both players in our framework use randomised stopping times.
Traditionally in the study of Dynkin games with asymmetric information Grün (2013), Lempa
& Matomäki (2013), Gensbittel & Grün (2019), De Angelis et al. (2021b), De Angelis et al.
(2021a), certain specific assumptions on the structure of information available to the players are
imposed. Moreover, the payoff processes ( ft), (gt) are assumed to be Markovian. In many cases,
they are specific deterministic functions of a single underlying Markov process. The advantages
of our approach in Chapter 4, compared to results in the literature, are that we allow for a gen-
eral structure of information in our game, and we do not impose any Markovian assumptions.
Chapter 4 is based on the joint paper with my PhD supervisors De Angelis et al. (2021c).
Initially, our research was focused on classical Dynkin games (with full and symmetric infor-
mation). For such games, one of the important conditions for existence of the value used to be
the Mokobodzki condition Bismut (1977b), Mokobodzki (1978), Stettner (1982a) on the payoff
processes ( ft), (gt). Mokobodzki condition states that there exist two supermartingales whose
difference lies between g and f . However, in Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) it was proven that
Dynkin games have a value under a weaker condition:
f ≥ g. (1.3)
This condition (that has no scientist’s name attached to it, so we call it the order condition) is, as
we will see, quite natural, and it was adopted in most of the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, the order condition was first challenged in Stettner (1982b),
and later studied in a more general set-up in Touzi & Vieille (2002) and Laraki & Solan (2005).
In the latter two papers, a relaxed Dynkin game (with randomised stopping times) is considered,
and the value is proven to exist without the order condition. In Chapter 5, we unify certain results
and ideas from the literature in order to show that the value exists under a condition weaker than
(1.3), in a setting when players only use pure stopping times.
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For the reader’s convenience, we clarify the content of the chapters we did not mention so
far — Chapter 2, Appendix A, and Appendix B. In the former two, we discuss several general
concepts and preliminary facts that are used throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 can be viewed as
a mathematical introduction to the main chapters of the thesis, while Appendix A collects the
textbook definitions and theorems. Finally, Appendix B is devoted to auxiliary proofs that may
be of interest at various stages of reading the thesis.
We conclude the introduction with a discussion of financial applications of Dynkin games.
The game options introduced by Kifer (2000) are option contracts which enable both the buyer
and the seller to stop them at any time before (and including) the time of expiration of the con-
tract. Thus, the game options extend the notion of American options (which only allow the buyer
to exercise the option). We also see that this financial situation is, mathematically, precisely a
Dynkin game.
A popular real-world instrument embodying the concept of a game option is a convertible
bond. Such contracts are issued by a firm, held by a bondholder and typically prescribe the
following: the bondholder is entitled to receiving the coupons while she holds the bond, and,
further, has the option to exchange (convert) the bond for the firm’s stocks. The firm, on the
other hand, has the right to call the bond, in which case the bondholder must surrender the bond
for a pre-specified price. Finally, at the maturity of the contract, if neither the conversion nor
the call have happened, the bondholder must sell the bond back to the firm, for a pre-specified
price or in exchange for the firm’s stocks. We see that such a convertible bond can be viewed
as a game option, or a Dynkin game between the firm and the bondholder, with specific payoff
processes tied to the value of the firm’s stock, to the coupon rate, and to the fixed prices agreed
in the contract.
The mathematical study of convertible bonds dates back to Brennan & Schwartz (1977),
Ingersoll (1977), but it was not until more recently Sirbu et al. (2004), Sirbu & Shreve (2006)
that researchers began to explore the connection with Dynkin games. For various extensions
of the model and properties of the value and the Nash equilibrium in this setting, we refer to
Bielecki et al. (2008), Crépey & Rahal (2011/2012), Chen et al. (2013), Yan et al. (2015), Liang
& Sun (2019).
Moving on to financial interpretations of the informational features of Dynkin games, certain
parameters of the underlying assets may be unknown to market players, giving rise to games
with incomplete and/or asymmetric information. For example, in Lempa & Matomäki (2013),
the Dynkin game is set on a random time horizon, and the occurence of the expiring event is only
observable by one of the two players. From the financial standpoint, this situation corresponds
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to one of the players having inside information about a default taking place. In De Angelis et al.
(2021b), the two players are trading a call option on an asset with the drift which is random
and only partially observable. De Angelis & Ekström (2020) introduce a Dynkin game with
both players not being certain about the existence of the competitor. This may be interpreted as
investors not wanting to publicly reveal their interest in a certain business opportunity. Another
interesting view on the information is provided in Ekström et al. (2017), where the two players
have heterogeneous beliefs, i.e. disagree about how to estimate the drift of the underlying asset.
This idea is justified by the following example: for the buyer of a call option, it is natural to




In this section, we agree on several general concepts that are used throughout the thesis, introduce
notation and give a number of preliminary facts we will refer to. Note that the textbook defini-
tions (e.g. of a stopping time) and theorems (e.g. Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem)
are given in Appendix A.
2.1 Probabilistic setting
Unless specified otherwise, random variables and stochastic processes we consider are defined on
the same probability space (Ω,F,P) and take values in R. We always assume that the probability
space is complete, that is, for any set A∈ F of P-measure zero, the sigma-algebra F includes also
all the subsets of A.
When we say “with probability one” or “almost surely”, it is implied that the probability
measure P is the one in question. Another synonym to describe the same concept is P-a.s. We
write E for the expectation EP with respect to measure P. We work in continuous time, and
T ∈ (0,∞] denotes the time horizon.
We call a stochastic process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] càdlàg (from the French “continu à droite, limites à
gauche”), if its trajectories t 7→ Xt are right-continuous with left limits everywhere, with proba-
bility one.
Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be a filtration (Definition A.1.1) on (Ω,F,P). The set of (Ft)-stopping times
(Definition A.1.2) is denoted T(Ft). We omit the mention of the filtration and simply write T
whenever it causes no ambiguity.
We consider situations when the time horizon T is infinite, as well as the situations when it is
finite. These two types of horizon can be treated similarly, as explained in the following remark.
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2.2 Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure and integral
Remark 2.1.1. If T = ∞, then ∞ is a one-point compactification of [0,∞) (c.f. (Dellacherie
& Meyer, 1982, Remark VI.53e)). There are bijections between any finite interval and [0,∞],
and, intuitively, the properties of stochastic processes should be preserved if such a bijection is
applied to the time. In particular, càdlàg processes on [0,∞] are understood as follows: a process
(Xt)t∈[0,∞] is càdlàg if it is càdlàg on [0,∞) and the limit X∞− := limt→∞ Xt exists. When we say
that the process (Xt)t∈[0,∞] is (Ft)t∈[0,∞]-adapted, it is also assumed that the random variable X∞
is F∞-measurable, where F∞ is potentially larger than F∞− := σ(∪t∈[0,∞)Ft).
For simplicity of notation, we often denote filtrations as (Ft) instead of (Ft)t∈[0,T ], and simi-
larly for processes: (Xt) instead of (Xt)t∈[0,T ].
2.2 Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure and integral
We will employ integrals with respect to processes with paths of finite variation (Definition
A.4.13). Such integrals will be understood in pathwise Lebesgue–Stieltjes sense. We recall the
relevant theory in this section.
Let F be a measurable function on a measure space (S,Σ,µ). We denote by
∫
S F(x)dµ(x) the
Lebesgue integral of the function F over the set S with respect to the measure µ. We sometimes
omit the variable of integration x and write
∫
S Fdµ.
Let us now focus on functions on the real line. As we mentioned, the results of this section
will be applied to paths of stochastic processes. It will be convenient to treat the value of these
paths at time zero as a jump from an “initial” value, and to think that the process takes this
“initial” value at time “just before zero”. This is why some of the functions below are defined on
[0−,∞).
Let F : [0−,∞) 7→ R be a right-continuous function of finite variation. The corresponding
Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure is denoted by µF . Note that, in general, it is a signed measure; it is
only a positive measure if the function F is non-decreasing. If the function F has values between
0 and 1, the positive measure µF is a probability measure.
Let G : [0,∞) 7→ R be a measurable function, F : [0−,∞) 7→ R a function of finite variation.
It is known (Proposition A.4.14) that F = F+−F−, where F+,F− are non-negative and non-














2.2 Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure and integral
where we assume that the terms on the right-hand side are finite. The Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral
on an open or a semi-open interval is defined in the analogous way. We remark that the value of
the integral does not depend on the choice of F+ and F−.
In our proofs, there are several important building blocks related to Lebesgue–Stieltjes inte-
grals. We state the corresponding propositions here.
Proposition 2.2.1 (Integration by parts). If F,G : [0−,∞) 7→R are two right-continuous functions









































where the first equality is due to the integration by parts formula on the semi-open interval (Revuz
& Yor, 1999, Prop. 0.4.5), and the second one is due to (2.1).
For a non-decreasing right-continuous function F : [0−,∞) 7→R, let us define a function F←
for s ∈ [0,∞) as
F←(s) = inf{t ∈ [0,∞) : F(t)> s},
with the convention inf /0 = ∞, and F←(0−) = 0. The function F← is called a generalised inverse
of the function F .
Proposition 2.2.2 (Change of variables). Let F : [0−,∞) 7→R be a non-decreasing right-continuous
function, and let F← be its generalised inverse. Let additionally F(t) = 1 for some t ∈ [0,∞). Let







2.3 Regular processes and projections
Proof. For s ∈ [0,∞), define Ĥ(s) = H(s)I{s<t}. Due to the right-continuity of the function F at




















Applying (Revuz & Yor, 1999, Prop. 0.4.9) to the function Ĥ, we obtain the desired equality.
Remark 2.2.3. The condition that F(t) = 1 for some t ∈ [0,∞) is convenient for our purposes
below, but it is not a key condition in the change of variables formula. Without it, we could make







which follows directly from (Revuz & Yor, 1999, Prop. 0.4.9).
2.3 Regular processes and projections
In this section, we focus on properties of stochastic processes in continuous time that play the
key role in Chapters 4 and 5, as well as in most literature on optimal stopping (Chapter 3). On
our complete probability space (Ω,F,P), consider a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] (recall that T ∈ (0,∞]
denotes the time horizon).
We say that the filtration (Ft) is right-continuous, if Ft = Ft+ for all t, where Ft+ := ∩s>tFs.
We say that it is complete if the probability space is complete (which we always assume) and if
the sigma-algebra F0 contains all sets of P-measure zero. When a filtration is both complete and
right-continuous, we say that it satisfies the usual conditions. The completeness condition is not
restrictive, since, given a filtration (Ft), one can add to Ft (for every t) all the P-measure zero sets
from F in order to obtain a complete filtration (this process is called the usual augmentation).
By a measurable process we mean a stochastic process (Xt) such that the mapping (t,ω) 7→
Xt(ω) is B([0,T ])×F-measurable. For a measurable process (Xt), we denote by (FXt ) its natural
filtration (i.e. the filtration such that FXt = σ(Xt) for all t ∈ [0,T ]). We assume that (FXt ) is
augmented in a usual way and therefore complete.









2.3 Regular processes and projections
Remark 2.3.1. In the general literature on stochastic processes (e.g. (Rogers & Williams, 2000,
Definition VI.29.5)), a class of processes larger than Lb is frequently considered: the class (D).
A measurable process (Xt) is said to belong to class (D), if the family of random variables
{Xη : η is a finite stopping time}
is uniformly integrable (i.e. limK→∞(supηE[|Xη|I{|Xη|≥K}]) = 0). We see that the class (D) is





E[I{|Xη|≥K}])≤ limK→∞(E(I{supt∈[0,T ] |Xt |≥K}]) = 0,
and therefore (Xt) belongs to class (D). In line with most literature on optimal stopping (see
Chapter 3), we choose to focus only on the processes from Lb.
The space Lb will be extensively used in Chapter 4, as well as the definition below that we
take from Meyer (1978). To avoid a terminological confusion, we remark that previsible stopping
times in the definition below are also known as predictable or announceable stopping times (see
Definition A.1.3).
Definition 2.3.2. A process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ Lb is called regular, if
E[Xη−Xη−|Fη−] = 0 P-a.s. for all previsible (Ft)-stopping times η.
Example 2.3.3. It is immediate from Definition 2.3.2 that a continuous process is regular, since
for such processes a stronger property P({ω : Xt(ω)−Xt−(ω) = 0 for all t ∈ [0,T ]}) = 1 holds.
Example 2.3.4. A process (Xt) is said to be quasi left-continuous (or left-continuous over stop-
ping times), if for all stopping times ηn, η such that ηn↗ η as n→ ∞ we have
Xηn → Xη P-a.s.




Xηn = Xη−, P-a.s.,
and therefore E[Xη−Xη−|Fη−] = 0, P-a.s. Thus, quasi left-continuous processes are regular.
Example 2.3.5. Let θ be a random variable with continuous distribution on [0,∞). Let Λt :=
I{t≥θ}, and let Ft := σ(Λs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). By (Rogers & Williams, 2000, Example VI.14.4), θ is a
totally inaccessible (Ft)-stopping time.
From Definition 2.3.2 and Lemma A.1.6 we see that regular processes can only jump in totally
inaccessible times. Therefore, processes that only jump at such (continuously distributed) θ are
regular.
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We will use the concepts of Ft-optional and Ft-previsible projection of a measurable stochas-
tic process (see Section A.5.1 for the formal definitions). Here, we state the non-standard results
that will play an important role in our proofs.
Theorem 2.3.6. (Bismut, 1978, Theorem 3) Let (Xt)∈Lb be a càdlàg, (Ft)-adapted, and regular
process. Then there exists (X̃t) ∈ Lb with continuous trajectories (not necessarily Ft-adapted)
such that (Xt) is an (Ft)-optional projection of (X̃t).
Theorem 2.3.7. (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Thm VI.57, Remark VI.58.d) Let (Xt) ∈ Lb, and












Following (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Remark VI.50.d), we note that there is an equivalent
definition of regularity: a process (Xt) is regular if its previsible projection is indistinguishable
from the left-limit process (Xt−). In the original (Bismut, 1978, Theorem 3), this equivalent
definition of regularity is used. It is also formulated for class (D) processes and thus is applicable,
in particular, in our case (see Remark 2.3.1).
Remark 2.3.8. Throughout, integrals of processes in Lb that appear in (2.3) are understood
in pathwise Lebesgue–Stieltjes sense. Formally, for integrals in (2.3) to be well-defined, we
consider ΩX := {ω∈Ω :
∫
[0,T ] |Xt(ω)|dρt(ω)<∞}, and similarly for ΩY , and take ω∈ΩX ∩ΩY .
However, by definition (2.2) of the space Lb, we have P(ΩX) =P(ΩY ) = 1. Therefore, we usually
omit a mention of ω and assume that integrals are finite in calculations (e.g. when applying
results of Section 2.2 to integrals of processes).
2.4 Randomised, mixed, distribution stopping times
In this section, we introduce several closely related concepts that extend the notion of a stopping
time. They will be important for studying optimal stopping problems and games, particularly the
games with asymmetric information (see Section 3.4 for the literature review, and Chapter 4 for
the main asymmetric information problem of the thesis).
Fix a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] that satisfies the usual conditions. Recall that T denotes the set of
(Ft)-stopping times, and λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. By a mixed stopping time, we mean
a measurable function µ : Ω× [0,1] 7→ [0,T ] such that for λ-almost every r ∈ [0,1], the mapping
ω 7→ µ(ω,r) belongs to T.
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It is clear that any “usual” (pure) stopping time τ ∈ T is a mixed stopping time. To be more
precise, to any τ ∈ T, there corresponds a mixed stopping time defined as µ(ω,r) := τ(ω) for any
r ∈ [0,1].
Now we introduce another concept that, as we will see below, is equivalent to the concept of
a mixed stopping time in a suitable sense. For a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), define the following set of
processes:
A◦(Gt) :={(ρt) : (ρt) is (Gt)-adapted with t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg,
non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω},
(2.4)
where we adopt a convention that G0− is the trivial sigma-algebra.
Remark 2.4.1. In the definition of the set A◦(Gt), we take the opportunity to require that the
stated properties hold for all ω ∈Ω. This leads to no loss of generality, if G0 contains all P-null
sets of Ω (in particular, if (Gt) satisfies the usual conditions). In this case, for any ω ∈ N ⊂ Ω
with P(N) = 0, we can simply set ρt(ω) = 0 for t ∈ [0,T ) and ρT (ω) = 1.
Let Z be a random variable with uniform distribution U([0,1]), independent of FT , and let
the process (ρt) ∈A◦(Gt). A random variable η defined as
η = η(ρ,Z) = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ρt > Z}, P-a.s.
is called a (Gt)-randomised stopping time. We call the variable Z the randomisation device for
the randomised stopping time η, and the process (ρt) the generating process. The set of (Gt)-
randomised stopping times will be denoted TR(Gt). In case (Gt) = (Ft), we will use a shorter
notation TR. Whenever we consider multiple randomised stopping times, we additionally assume
that their randomisation devices are independent.
Any pure stopping time is a randomised stopping time, in a sense that, to any τ ∈ T, there
corresponds the generating process defined as ρt(ω) := I{t≥τ(ω)} for any t ∈ [0,T ]. Indeed, note
that P({ω : Z(ω) = 0}) = P({ω : Z(ω) = 1}) = 0. In other words, Z ∈ (0,1) with probability
1. Therefore, with probability 1, we have η = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : I{t≥τ} > Z} = τ. We see that in
this case, with probability 1 the randomisation device Z does not affect the realised value of the
randomised stopping time η.
Note that in Shmaya & Solan (2014), the terminology is different: the generating process (ρt)
is called a randomised stopping time. However, given a randomisation device Z, the correspon-
dence between randomised stopping times and the generating processes is one-to-one. Therefore,
there is no conceptual difference between our approach and the one in Shmaya & Solan (2014).
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In a similar way one can identify our definition of a randomised stopping time with the ones used
in Meyer (1978) and Touzi & Vieille (2002). We clarify this further in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.5.
Shmaya & Solan (2014) introduce a concept that unifies the randomised and mixed stopping
times. Denote by M the set of probability measures on Ω× [0,T ]. For δ ∈M, t ∈ [0,T ], A ∈ F,
denote
δ
t(A) := δ(A× [0, t]).
We call a measure δ ∈M a distribution stopping time, if it satisfies the following properties:
• The marginal distribution of δ on Ω is P.
• For every t ∈ [0,T ], the Radon–Nikodym derivative of δt with respect to P is Ft-measurable.
Observe that any mixed stopping time µ naturally defines a measure δµ ∈M via
δµ(A× [0, t]) := (P⊗λ)({(ω,r) : ω ∈ A, µ(ω,r)≤ t}) (2.5)
for A ∈ F, t ∈ [0,T ]. Similarly, a randomised stopping time with the generating process (ρt)
defines a measure δρ ∈M via








for A ∈ F, t ∈ [0,T ].
In (Shmaya & Solan, 2014, Section 2.3), it is proven that the measures δµ, δρ defined above
are distribution stopping times. On the other hand, by (Shmaya & Solan, 2014, Corollary 2), for
any distribution stopping time δ, there exists a mixed stopping time µ and a randomised stopping
time with the generating process (ρt) such that δ = δµ = δρ. Moreover, the generating process
(ρt) is unique up to indistinguishability. In particular, we see that there exist a mapping H from
the set of mixed stopping times onto A◦(Ft). We clarify the importance of this correspondence
in Section 2.4.1.
2.4.1 Equivalence of functionals
We now clarify the relation between mixed and randomised stopping times using equivalence of
certain functionals. Let the filtration (Ft) satisfy the usual conditions. To a pure stopping time
τ ∈ T and a process (Xt) ∈ Lb, we associate the expected payoff as follows:
N p(τ,X) := EP[Xτ(ω)(ω)].
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To a mixed stopping time µ, we associate the expected payoff
Nm(µ,X) := EP×λ[Xµ(ω,r)(ω)],







All these functionals agree on pure stopping times in the following sense.
Proposition 2.4.2. Let τ ∈ T and (Xt) ∈ Lb. Let µ(ω,r) = τ(ω) for all r ∈ [0,1]. Let ρt(ω) =
I{t≥τ(ω)} for all t ∈ [0,T ]. Then,
N p(τ,X) = Nm(µ,X) = Nr(ρ,X).
Proof. For the first equality, we by definition of Nm and µ have
Nm(µ,X) = EP×λ[Xµ(ω,r)(ω)] = EP[Xτ(ω)](ω) = N p(τ,X).











=EP[Xτ(ω)](ω) = N p(τ,X).
Moreover, there is the following correspondence between an arbitrary mixed stopping time
and a generating process of a randomised stopping time.
Theorem 2.4.3. (Shmaya & Solan, 2014, Theorem 3) Let µ be a mixed stopping time. Let (Xt) ∈
Lb. Let H be the mapping from the set of mixed stopping times onto A◦(Ft). Then,
Nm(µ,X) = Nr(H(µ),X).
This result can be extended to a payoff functional that depends on two random stopping times.
Fix processes ( ft),(gt),(ht) ∈ Lb. For τ,σ ∈ T, define
Ñ p(τ,σ) = EP[ fτ(ω)(ω)I{τ(ω)<σ(ω)}+gσ(ω)(ω)I{σ(ω)<τ(ω)}+hτ(ω)(ω)I{σ(ω)=τ(ω)}].
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Proposition 2.4.4. (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, p. 1075) Let τ,σ ∈ T. Let ρt = I{t≥τ}, χt = I{t≥σ} for
all t ∈ [0,T ]. Then,
Ñ p(τ,σ) = Ñr(ρ,χ).
The functional Ñr plays the central role in Touzi & Vieille (2002) (see Section 3.5). The
proposition below provides a mapping from the set of mixed stopping times onto the set of
generating processes A◦(Ft). This mapping preserves the functional Ñr, therefore proving that
the concepts of mixed and randomised stopping time are equivalent in the setting of the paper.
Proposition 2.4.5. (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Proposition 7.1) There exists a mapping H̃ from the





Background and literature review
3.1 Optimal stopping theory
Before we can start the review of literature on optimal stopping games, we need to recall certain
facts and methods from the optimal stopping theory. We follow Karatzas & Shreve (1998) and
Peskir & Shiryaev (2006) to outline the martingale and the Markovian aspects of the theory. We
refer to Definition A.1.9 for the concept of a martingale (and also of a super- and submartingale),
and to Definition A.1.10 for the concepts of Markov and strong Markov process.
3.1.1 Martingale approach
Let a filtration (Ft)[0,T ] satisfy the usual conditions, and let (Xt) be an (Ft)-adapted stochastic
process. Assume that (Xt) ∈ Lb. In order to avoid some technical difficulties, we additionally
take (Xt) to be non-negative (and explain in Remark 3.1.8 how to treat the general case).




The problem involves two tasks: to characterise the value V , and to present an optimal stopping
time τ∗ at which the supremum is attained. In order to do this, we need the notion of essential
supremum/infimum of a family of random variables.
Definition 3.1.1. Let {Zα}α∈I be a non-empty family of random variables. The random variable
Z∗ is called the essential supremum of the family {Zα}α∈I (relative to the probability measure
P), if the following conditions are satisfied:
P(Zα ≤ Z∗) = 1 for each α ∈ I;
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if Z̃ is another random variable satisfying P(Zα ≤ Z̃) = 1 for each α ∈ I, then
P(Z∗ ≤ Z̃) = 1. (3.2)
The random variable Z∗ is called the essential infimum of the family {Zα}α∈I (relative to the
probability measure P), if the following conditions are satisfied:
P(Zα ≥ Z∗) = 1 for each α ∈ I;
if Z̃ is another random variable satisfying P(Zα ≥ Z̃) = 1 for each α ∈ I, then
P(Z∗ ≥ Z̃) = 1. (3.3)
The essential supremum and infimum are denoted esssupα∈IZα and ess infα∈IZα.
Remark 3.1.2. It is clear from (3.2), (3.3) that the essential supremum and infimum, when exist,
are unique up to P-a.s.
Definition 3.1.3. A family of random variables {Zα}α∈I is called upwards directed if it is closed
under pairwise maximisation, that is, if for any α,β ∈ I there exists γ ∈ I such that Zα∨Zβ ≤ Zγ,
P-a.s. A family of random variables is called downwards directed if it is closed under pairwise
minimisation.
Lemma 3.1.4. (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, Theorem A.3) Let {Zα}α∈I be a non-empty family of
non-negative random variables. Then esssupα∈IZα exists. Moreover, if the family {Zα}α∈I is






where Zα1 ≤ Zα2 ≤ . . . P-a.s.
Remark 3.1.5. For the essential infimum, the symmetric property holds: if the family {Zα}α∈I is






where Zα1 ≥ Zα2 ≥ . . . P-a.s.
Let us return to the optimal stopping problem (3.1). We will think of it in an extended sense
and will allow it to “start” not necessarily from time zero, but from an arbitrary stopping time.
More precisely, for θ ∈ T(Ft), we define
Tθ = {τ ∈ T(Ft) : τ≥ θ, P-a.s.}, (3.4)
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The family of random variables {Z(θ)}θ∈T gives rise to the so-called Snell envelope of (Xt) —
the process (Z0t ) from the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.6. (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, (D.6)), (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, Theorem D.7)
There exists a càdlàg (Ft)-supermartingale (Z0t ) such that
Z0
θ
= Z(θ), P-a.s. for every θ ∈ T;
(Z0t ) dominates (Xt) (Definition A.1.8).
Moreover, (Z0t ) is the smallest càdlàg supermartingale that dominates (Xt), i.e. if (Z̃t) is another
càdlàg (Ft)-supermartingale that dominates (Xt), then (Z̃t) dominates (Z0t ).
Note that to say that a stopping time τ∗ is optimal in (3.1) is equivalent to saying that
EXτ∗ = Z00 = sup
τ∈T
EXτ.
The following theorem further explains the link between the concept of the Snell envelope and
the optimal stopping problem (3.1).
Theorem 3.1.7. (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, Theorem D.9) The stopping time τ∗ is optimal in
(3.1), if and only if
• Z0
τ∗ = Xτ∗, P-a.s.,
• (Z0t∧τ∗)t∈[0,T ] is an (Ft)-martingale.
Due to the latter claim of Theorem 3.1.7 and to the supermartingale property of the Snell en-
velope, the approach to optimal stopping based on Snell envelopes is often referred as martingale
approach.
Remark 3.1.8. The results of this section can be extended beyond non-negative processes in the
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we can construct the corresponding Snell envelope (Theorem 3.1.6), and apply Theorem 3.1.7 to
characterise the optimal stopping time τ∗. Since the second term in (3.5) does not depend on τ,
the stopping time τ∗ would be optimal in the original problem (3.1) as well.
3.1.2 Markovian approach
The martingale approach of Section 3.1.1 is applicable for a large class of processes (Xt), but it
has a disadvantage of not providing an explicit solution to the optimal stopping problem (3.1).
One way to make the approach more explicit is to additionally assume that the Markov property
holds.
Let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] be a strong Markov process defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft),Px),
where X0 = x under the measure Px, and (Ft) satisfies the usual conditions. We assume that (Xt)
takes values in a measurable space (E,B). We assume that (Xt) is right-continuous and quasi
left-continuous. For the ease of presentation, we also assume that (Xt) is time-homogeneous.
Let a measurable function F : E 7→ R belong to the space LXb defined as






< ∞ for all x ∈ E}, (3.6)
where Ex denotes the expectation with respect to the measure Px.
Let T = ∞. Consider the optimal stopping problem
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The case of finite horizon T < ∞ can be treated similarly. Note that the process (t,Xt) is an
Rd+1-valued Markov process. In this case, we consider the optimal stopping problem
V (t,x) = sup
τ∈T:0≤τ≤T−t
ExF(t + τ,Xt+τ).
For simplicity of notation, in the sequel we assume that T = ∞, and additionally that F(X∞) = 0.
As with (3.1), the goal is to characterise the value function V (x) and the optimal stopping
time τ∗ that delivers the supremum in (3.7). For a subset D⊆ E, denote
τD = inf{t ∈ [0,∞] : Xt ∈ D}, (3.8)
where we adopt the convention inf /0 = ∞. We will need the following definition.
Definition 3.1.9. Let C ⊆ E be a measurable set, and let D = E \C. A measurable function
R : E 7→ R is said to be superharmonic in C if
ExR(Xτ∧τD)≤ R(x)
for all τ ∈ T and all x ∈ E.
R is said to be subharmonic in C if
ExR(Xτ∧τD)≥ R(x)
for all τ ∈ T and all x ∈ E.
R is said to be harmonic in C if
ExR(Xτ∧τD) = R(x)
for all τ ∈ T and all x ∈ E.
Remark 3.1.10. A measurable function R : E 7→ R is superharmonic in E if and only if
ExR(Xτ)≤ R(x)
for all τ ∈ T and all x ∈ E. Similarly for subharmonic and harmonic functions in E, the variable
τD ≡ ∞ disappears from the definition.
Proposition 3.1.11. (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, (2.2.8)) R is superharmonic in E if and only if
(R(Xt)) is a right-continuous supermartingale under Px for every x ∈ E.
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Introduce the continuation set
C = {x ∈ E : V (x)> F(x)}
and the stopping set
D = {x ∈ E : V (x) = F(x)}.
The sets C and D have such names due to (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, Theorem 2.4), which states
that, if there exists an optimal stopping time τ∗ in (3.7), then (under some additional continuity
assumptions) the stopping time τD is optimal in (3.7).
Remark 3.1.12. The algorithm of finding the value function of the Markovian optimal stopping
problem (3.7) can be summarised as follows. By (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, Theorem 2.7), (Peskir
& Shiryaev, 2006, Corollary 2.9), the problem reduces to finding the smallest superharmonic




where LX is the infinitesimal operator of (Xt) — an integro-differential operator acting on func-
tions G : E 7→ R given by (Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, (7.0.11)). This connection between the
optimal stopping in Markovian framework and partial integro-differential equations will be fur-
ther explored in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 in the context of optimal stopping games.
3.1.3 Approach based on functional analysis
Recall the functional Nr defined in Section 2.4.1. We will follow Meyer (1978), which extended
the earlier results of Baxter & Chacon (1977), and study certain compactness and continuity
properties of this functional. Our goal is to use these properties to show that the supremum of
this functional is attained, and then deduce the existence of an optimal stopping time in (3.1).
Recall that, for a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], by A◦(Ft) (2.4) we denote the set of generating pro-
cesses of (Ft)-randomised stopping times. Consider
A− :={(ρt) : t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg, non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω},
which is the same set of generating processes but without the adaptivity condition. Note that the
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With an abuse of notation, we denote this extended functional Nr(ρ,X). There is the following
result on convergence of such functionals.
Theorem 3.1.13. (Meyer, 1978, Theorem 8’) Assume that, for some (ρnt ),(ρt) ∈ A−, we have
Nr(ρn,X) n→∞→ Nr(ρ,X) for all continuous bounded processes (Xt). Then, Nr(ρn,X)
n→∞→ Nr(ρ,X)
for all càdlàg regular (Definition 2.3.2) processes (Xt) ∈ Lb.
In Chapter 4, the reader will see an extension of Theorem 3.1.13 to a functional depending
on two randomised stopping times. Due to an additional adaptivity assumption therein, we were
able to prove this in a more straightforward way. Results of this kind emphasise the importance
of regular processes in our study.
The proof of Theorem 3.1.13 relies on several ideas from topology, functional analysis, and
theory of projections of stochastic processes (Section A.5.1) which we proceed to overview.
Let D denote the space of bounded càdlàg processes, and C ⊂ D the space of bounded con-
tinuous processes. The following theorem provides a correspondence between linear functionals
on C and elements of A−.
Theorem 3.1.14. (Meyer, 1978, Theorem 2) For any linear functional H on C such that |H(X)| ≤
E [supt |Xt |], H(1) = 1, there exists a unique (up to indistinguishability) (ρt) ∈A− such that
Nr(ρ,X) =H(X).
Remark 3.1.15. Let us draw a parallel between the set A− and a certain set of probability mea-
sures. Meyer (1978) calls a probability measure ν on Ω× [0,T ] a randomised random variable
(variable aléatoire floue), if the projection of ν on Ω is P. For a randomised random variable ν





Disintegration theorem (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1978, pp. 78-80) provides a correspondence
between a randomised random variable ν and a unique (up to indistinguishability) càdlàg non-
decreasing process (ρt) with ρ0− = 0 via equality
ν(X) = Nr(ρ,X) (3.9)
that holds for all non-negative processes (Xt). Since the projection of ν on Ω is P, we see that
ρT = 1, and therefore (ρt) ∈A−.
The terminology of Meyer (1978) evolves around the set of randomised random variables,
but we will use the identification described above and proceed to study the set A−.
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Note that, according to (3.9), for any (ρt)∈A− there exists a linear functional on C satisfying
the properties listed in Theorem 3.1.14. Therefore, the correspondence between (ρt) ∈ A− and
such functionals H on C is one-to-one.
The weak topology (see Section A.3.1) on the set A− is introduced as the coarsest topology
such that the mapping ρ 7→ Nr(ρ,X) is continuous for any (Xt) ∈ C. Meyer (1978) establishes
weak compactness of the set A−, and further proves that the set A◦(Ft) is weakly closed. We see
that the set A◦(Ft) is a weakly closed subset of the weakly compact set A−. Therefore (Theorem
A.2.3), the following holds.
Theorem 3.1.16. (Meyer, 1978, Theorem 3) The set A◦(Ft) is weakly compact.
By definition, the weak convergence of (ρnt ) ∈ A− to (ρt) ∈ A− means that Nr(ρn,X)→
Nr(ρ,X) for processes (Xt) ∈C. It turns out that the convergence holds for a more general class
of processes. The following theorem is a step in the proof of Theorem 3.1.13.
Theorem 3.1.17. (Meyer, 1978, Theorem 5) Let (ρnt ) ⊂ A◦(Ft) be a sequence that converges
weakly to (ρt) ∈A−. Then, Nr(ρn,X)→ Nr(ρ,X) for any regular process (Xt) ∈ D.
The result of Theorem 3.1.17 can be applied as follows. The mapping ρ 7→ Nr(ρ,X) is
continuous on A◦(Ft) with respect to the weak topology on A−. We also know (Theorem 3.1.16)
that the set A◦(Ft) is compact with respect to the same topology. This allows to apply the extreme








Moreover, it can be shown that the supremum is attained at a pure stopping time. To clarify
this, we need a concept of extreme point. A point x of a vector space S is called an extreme
point, if it cannot be expressed as a convex combination of two points of S different from x. It
turns out that the generating processes of pure stopping times are extreme points of the set of
generating processes (Pennanen & Perkkiö, 2018, Lemma 2). Then, to prove that the supremum
in (3.10) is attained at a generating process of a pure stopping time, one needs to verify (Pennanen
& Perkkiö, 2018, Theorem 1) the assumptions of Bauer’s maximum principle (Choquet, 1969,
Theorem 25.9), which are the conditions for a function to attain its maximum at an extreme point.
23
3.2 Martingale approach to games
In Bismut (1977a), the ideas described in this section are used to prove the existence of a
solution to a certain mixed problem of optimal stopping and control. We also refer to Pennanen
& Perkkiö (2018) for a more recent generalisation of this approach. In the optimal stopping
problem of Pennanen & Perkkiö (2018), the process (Xt) is required to be neither càdlàg nor
regular for a solution to exist. However, in Pennanen & Perkkiö (2018), the notion of solution is
different: instead of optimal stopping times, the so-called optimal quasi-stopping times (or split
stopping times (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Appendix I.14)) are studied.
We note that the approach of Meyer (1978) is close to the one we take in Chapter 4. Albeit the
core functional studied therein (ρ,χ) 7→ N(ρ,χ) is bilinear, while the functional ρ 7→ Nr(ρ,X) is
linear, and despite the fact that in Chapter 4 we work in a different topology on A◦(Ft), the main
ideas are still applicable.
3.2 Martingale approach to games
In Section 3.1.1, we introduced an optimal stopping problem and outlined the martingale ap-
proach to finding an optimal stopping time that delivers the supremum therein. The main object
of our study is optimal stopping games, where there are several (in this thesis, usually two)
players and each of them chooses a stopping time in order to maximise or minimise a certain
functional. Some methods used in order to find “optimal” stopping strategies in this context have
a parallel in optimal stopping theory. In this section, we describe the martingale approach to
optimal stopping games.
3.2.1 Zero-sum game
We start by reviewing the set-up and results of Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984).
Consider the continuous-time setting of Section 2.3 with the time horizon T = ∞. Let a
filtration (Ft)t∈[0,∞] satisfy the usual conditions. Let ( ft)t∈[0,∞],(gt)t∈[0,∞] be right-continuous
processes optional with respect to (Ft). Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) additionally assume
that f∞ = g∞ = 0, and that the following order condition holds:
ft ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s. (3.11)
Let τ and σ be (Ft)-stopping times chosen by, respectively, the first and the second player.
We assume that at time τ∧σ, the first player delivers to the second player the random payoff
P(τ,σ) = fτI{τ<σ}+gσI{σ≤τ}. (3.12)
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Since the first player (or τ-player) is the one who pays this amount, she is the minimiser in the
game, while the second player (or σ-player) is the maximiser. The combined wealth of the two
players does not change, and for this reason such games are known as zero-sum games.
We denote the expected payoff as
N(τ,σ) = E[P(τ,σ)].
Remark 3.2.1. The game described above is a war-of-attrition due to the condition (3.11). War-
of-attrition refers to the fact that each player at each moment of time would benefit more from
the other player stopping the game rather than from stopping herself. This canonical class of
Dynkin games will appear multiple times below. Its complement are the so-called pre-emption
games, in which players have an incentive to stop first (see e.g. De Angelis & Ekström (2020),
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, Section 4.5.3), Boyarchenko & Levendorskii (2014)). In Chapter 5,
we study a “mixed” optimal stopping game that is neither a war-of-attrition nor a pre-emption
game.
Remark 3.2.2. In the literature, a more general payoff than (3.12) is sometimes considered (see
e.g. (3.18) below): one of a form
P(τ,σ) = fτI{τ<σ}+gσI{σ<τ}+hτI{τ=σ}, (3.13)
where the “middle” payoff process (ht) is commonly assumed to satisfy
ft ≥ ht ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s. (3.14)
In Section 3.3, we consider a game with such “middle” payoff (that additionally has a specific
Markovian structure).
Remark 3.2.3. In papers concerned with financial applications of Dynkin games (see e.g. Sec-
tions 3.4.2-3.4.4 below), one can often encounter the payoff of a form
P(τ,σ) = e−rτ fτI{τ<σ}+ e
−rσgσI{σ≤τ},
for some fixed constant r ∈ (0,∞). The exponential discounting term has a financial meaning
of money being worth more the sooner it is received, due to its capacity to earn interest. This
term does not cause any mathematical difficulties, as one can consider payoff processes (e−rt ft),
(e−rtgt).
The two concepts defined below play the key role in studying zero-sum optimal stopping
games.
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If they coincide, the game is said to have a value V = V∗ = V ∗. Existence of a value is also
sometimes called Stackelberg equilibrium.
Remark 3.2.5. It is clear from the definition of supremum and infimum that V∗ ≤V ∗.
Definition 3.2.6. A pair (τ∗,σ∗) ∈ T(Ft)×T(Ft) is called a Nash equilibrium point (NEP, or
simply a Nash equilibrium, or sometimes a saddle point), if the following holds
N(τ∗,σ)≤ N(τ∗,σ∗)≤ N(τ,σ∗)
for any τ,σ ∈ T(Ft).
Remark 3.2.7. Existence of a Nash equilibrium implies existence of a value. Indeed, if (τ∗,σ∗)
is a Nash equilibrium, then for arbitrary τ,σ ∈ T(Ft) we have














therefore V ∗ ≤ V∗. The opposite equality always holds (Remark 3.2.5), so the upper and the
lower values coincide, and the value V =V∗ =V ∗ = N(τ∗,σ∗) exists.
Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) study the existence of the value and of the Nash equilibrium
in the game using an extended Snell envelope approach described in Section 3.1.1 in the context
of optimal stopping problems. More precisely, they define two families of random variables










where Tθ is the set of stopping times that exceed θ as in (3.4).
The authors prove (Lepeltier & Maingueneau, 1984, Theorem 7) that there exist measurable
optional processes (Ŝ∗(t))t∈[0,∞] and (Ŝ∗(t))t∈[0,∞] such that
S∗(θ) = Ŝ∗(θ), S∗(θ) = Ŝ∗(θ), P-a.s. for all θ ∈ T.
Moreover, if we define, for ε > 0, the random times
D∗(ε) = inf{t ∈ [0,∞] : Ŝ∗(t)≥ ft− ε}, D∗(ε) = inf{t ∈ [0,∞] : Ŝ∗(t)≤ gt + ε},
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then it turns out (Lepeltier & Maingueneau, 1984, Theorem 11) that the stopped process (Ŝ∗(t ∧
D∗(ε)))t∈[0,∞] is a submartingale, while the stopped process (S∗(t ∧D∗(ε)))t∈[0,∞] is a super-
martingale (c.f. the supermartingale property of the Snell envelope of Theorem 3.1.6). This
allows to deduce (Lepeltier & Maingueneau, 1984, Corollary 12) that, for all stopping times θ,
Ŝ∗(θ) = Ŝ∗(θ), P-a.s., (3.16)
and, in particular (for θ = 0), that V∗ =V ∗, and hence the game has a value.
The equality (3.16) holds for stopping times θ, and, in particular, for any constant time t ∈
[0,∞] we have Ŝ∗(t) = Ŝ∗(t) := St . We already mentioned that (St)t∈[0,∞] is a measurable process.
Under an additional condition
lim
s↗t
gs ≤ pgt , limsup
s↗t
fs ≤ p ft ,
where the (p ft),(pgt) denote the previsible projections of ( ft),(gt), the process (St) yields the
saddle point of the game (Lepeltier & Maingueneau, 1984, Theorem 15) via
τ
∗ = inf{t ∈ [0,∞] : St = ft}; σ∗ = inf{t ∈ [0,∞] : St = gt}.
3.2.2 Nonzero-sum game
Ideas of Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) are extended in Hamadène & Zhang (2010) for a study
of a nonzero-sum game.
Let the time horizon T < ∞, and let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be a filtration that satisfies the usual condi-






t ) of class (D) (recall the
definition from Remark 2.3.1). As above, let there be the first and the second player who choose
(Ft)-stopping times τ and σ, respectively. Define the random payoffs
P1(τ,σ) = g1τI{τ≤σ}+ f
1
σI{σ<τ},






for i = 1,2. We assume that at time τ∧σ, the first player obtains the amount P1 and the second
player obtains P2. Therefore, unlike in the zero-sum of Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984), both
players in this nonzero-sum set-up are maximisers. We also assume that f it ≥ git (i = 1,2) for all
t ∈ [0,T ] P-a.s. In other words, if the player i is the leader (i.e. stops the game first), she receives
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the (smaller) payoff gi. If the player i is the follower (i.e. does not stop first), she receives the
(larger) amount f i. Thus, this game is a war-of-attrition (recall Remark 3.2.1).
Hamadène & Zhang (2010) impose additional assumptions on the processes ( f it ),(g
i
t) (i =
1,2): namely, the processes (git) have only positive jumps, and for any η ∈ T(Ft), there holds
P({g1η < f 1η} \ {g2η < f 2η}) = 0. Under these and the above assumptions, the authors study the
Nash equilibrium of the game, which in this setting is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.8. A pair (τ∗,σ∗) ∈ T(Ft)×T(Ft) is called a Nash equilibrium point, if
N1(τ,σ∗)≤ N1(τ∗,σ∗), N2(τ∗,σ)≤ N2(τ∗,σ∗)
for any τ,σ ∈ T(Ft).
The main result of Hamadène & Zhang (2010) is that a Nash equilibrium exists. The proof
relies on constructing a decreasing sequence of pairs of stopping times (τn,σn) whose limit is a
Nash equilibrium. The construction uses a sequence of Snell envelopes and iterative application
of Theorem 3.1.7 to the resulting sequence of optimal stopping problems.
More precisely, let τ1 = σ1 = T . Assume that for some n≥ 1, τn and σn are defined. Set for








τ̃n+1 = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : S1,nt = g1t }∧σn; τn+1 =
[
τ̃n+1 if τ̃n+1 < σn;









σ̃n+1 = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : S2,nt = g2t }∧ τn+1; σn+1 =
[
σ̃n+1 if σ̃n+1 < τn+1;
σn if σ̃n+1 = τn+1.
This iterative procedure yields a sequence of “best responses” for each player, in a sense that
(Hamadène & Zhang, 2010, Lemma 3.3), for any η ∈ T and any n≥ 1,
N1(η,σn)≤ N1(τn+1,σn), N2(τn+1,η)≤ N2(τn+1,σn+1).
This, together with a few auxiliary lemmata, proves (Hamadène & Zhang, 2010, Theorem 2.2),
that is, that the couple τ∗ := limn→∞ τn,σ∗ := limn→∞ σn forms a Nash equilibrium of the game.
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3.2.3 Backward stochastic differential equations
In this section, we again consider a zero-sum game. Cvitanic & Karatzas (1996) draw a con-
nection between its value and a solution of a certain system of stochastic differential equations
(Section A.7). First, we need to give a rigorous definition of such a solution.
Let T < ∞, and let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be a filtration that satisfies the usual conditions. Let ( ft)t∈[0,T ],















ft ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,T ] P-a.s.
Let h be an FT -measurable square-integrable random variable such that
gT ≤ h≤ fT , P-a.s.
Let R : [0,T ]×Ω×R×Rd 7→R be a P×B(R)×B(Rd)-measurable function, where P denotes





|R(t,ω,x,y)−R(t,ω,x′,y′)| ≤ k(|x− x′|+‖y− y′‖),
for all t ∈ [0,T ]; ω ∈Ω; x,x′ ∈ R; y,y′ ∈ Rd and for some k ∈ (0,∞).
Definition 3.2.9. Let the processes ( ft),(gt), the random variable h, and the function R be as
above. Let (Xt),(Kt) be R-valued and (Yt) an Rd-valued stochastic processes. Let (Xt),(Yt),(Kt)
be (Ft)-adapted. We say that the triple ((Xt),(Yt),(Kt)) is the solution of the backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE) with reflecting barriers ( ft),(gt), terminal condition h and driver
R, if

















( fs−Xs)dK−s = 0,
for all t ∈ [0,T ] P-a.s., where (Wt) is the standard d-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process, and where
the following additional properties hold:
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• (K+t ),(K
−









• (Yt) is an (Ft)-previsible process with
∫ T
0 E‖Ys‖2ds < ∞.
The process (Xt) is called the state process and (Yt) the noise process of the solution.
Assume that there exists a solution ((Xt),(Yt),(Kt)) of the BSDE above. Define for t ∈ [0,T ],
ω ∈Ω,
rt(ω) = R(t,ω,Xt(ω),Yt(ω)).






Here, similarly to the classical set-up of Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984), τ is the stopping
time chosen by the first player, σ is the stopping time chosen by the second player, and at time











According to (Cvitanic & Karatzas, 1996, Theorem 4.1),
S∗(t) = S∗(t) = Xt , P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0,T ],
where (Xt) is the state process (Definition 3.2.9) of the BSDE above.
3.3 Markovian approach to games
As with optimal stopping problems (see Section 3.1.2), optimal stopping games that have Marko-
vian structure are of special interest. Following Ekström & Peskir (2008), we provide the condi-
tions for existence of the value function and of Nash equilibrium in a Markovian optimal stopping
game.
Consider a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,∞] that satisfies the usual conditions. Consider a strong Markov
process (Xt), defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft),Px), with values in a measurable
space (E,B). Here, for x ∈ E, we assume that X0 = x under Px.
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Consider a zero-sum game with the payoff
P(τ,σ) = F(Xτ)I{τ<σ}+G(Xσ)I{σ<τ}+H(Xτ)I{τ=σ}, (3.18)
where F,G,H ∈ LXb (recall the integrability condition (3.6)). As before, we denote
Nx(τ,σ) = Ex[P(τ,σ)].
We assume that F,G,H are continuous functions that satisfy (c.f. the order condition (3.14))







Recall the non-Markovian Definition 3.2.4 of the lower and upper value. Since in the current
set-up, the probability measure depends on the starting point x of the underlying process, the
lower and upper value of the game become a function of x, as in the following.











V∗(x) =V ∗(x) for all x ∈ E,
we say that there exists a value (function) V (x) :=V∗(x) =V ∗(x) for x ∈ E.
Definition 3.3.2. A pair (τ∗,σ∗) ∈ T×T is called a Nash equilibrium, if
Nx(τ∗,σ)≤ Nx(τ∗,σ∗)≤ Nx(τ,σ∗)
for all τ,σ ∈ T and for all x ∈ E.
Let us quote the main result of Ekström & Peskir (2008).
Theorem 3.3.3. Consider the optimal stopping game (3.18). Let F,G,H ∈ LXb be continuous
functions satisfying (3.19) and (3.20). If the strong Markov process (Xt) is right-continuous, then
there exists a measurable value function V . If (Xt) is right-continuous and quasi left-continuous
(recall Example 2.3.4), then the Nash equilibrium holds with
τ
∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D1}; σ∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D2}, (3.21)
where D1 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = F(x)} and D2 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = G(x)}.
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The proof is closely related to the theory of Snell envelopes and the martingale approach to
optimal stopping. We provide a brief overview.
Fix arbitrary τ ∈ T, and consider the optimal stopping problem of the σ-player




Gτs = F(Xτ)I{τ≤s}+G(Xs)I{s<τ}, N̂x(τ,σ) = Ex[Gτσ].
Let (Ŝτt ) be the Snell envelope of the process (G
τ
t ) (recall Theorem 3.1.6). Using the Markov
property, the authors obtain a result stronger than in Section 3.1.1:
V̂ ∗τ (Xρ) = ExŜτρ, Px-a.s.,




is downwards directed for any ρ≤ τ. Roughly speaking, this allows to replace the infimum/supremum
with the the limit and swap them with the expectation in





We note the parallel with (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, Proposition D.2), and with our approach in
Section 4.5.3. Ultimately, this results in the equality V̂ ∗ = V ∗ = V∗, which in particular implies
existence of the value. We omit the details on the proof of existence of Nash equilibrium and
its characterisation (5.23), and only mention that it is as well related to Snell envelopes and
Theorems 3.1.6 and 3.1.7.
One advantage of the Markovian framework is that it enables to characterise the value func-
tion of the stopping game as a solution of a certain system of variational inequalities. This
approach was pioneered by Bensoussan & Friedman (1974). Let L be the infinitesimal generator
(see (Dynkin, 1965, Chapter III)) of the process (Xt). The value function of a Markovian optimal












Depending on the regularity assumptions on F and G, the exact definition of the solution of
(3.22) relies either on theory of solutions in Sobolev spaces or on theory of viscosity solutions to
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partial differential equations. We refer to (Brezis, 2010, Chapters 8-9), (Fleming & Soner, 2006,
Chapter II), respectively, for the details of these theories.
To finish this section, we mention that the superharmonic characterisation of the value func-
tion of an optimal stopping problem (Remark 3.1.12) is generalised in Peskir (2008) for the stop-
ping game described in this section. It turns out that the value function V , when it exists, admits
a so-called semiharmonic characterisation. Roughly speaking, it is the smallest superharmonic
function and the largest subharmonic function between G and F .
Our main results (Chapter 4) do not rely on the Markov property, and our approach is closer to
the martingale approach described in Section 3.2. For this reason, we omit further details on the
semi-harmonic characterisation of Peskir (2008), as well as a review of other important results
Ekström & Villeneuve (2006), Ekström (2006), Alvarez (2008) related to classical Markovian
optimal stopping games. On the other hand, in Chapter 4 we study a (non-Markovian) optimal
stopping game with asymmetric information, and the existing literature on such games tradition-
ally follows the Markovian approach. Therefore, we illustrate the other aspects of this approach
below in Section 3.4, in the framework of asymmetric information games.
3.4 Asymmetric information games
So far, we have only considered games with full information, where both players observe the
underlying filtration (Ft), and their strategies are (Ft)-stopping times. This section is devoted
to games with one or both players having incomplete information. The game itself in such a
situation is referred as a game with asymmetric information. Incompleteness of information
can be formalised via player(s) only having access to a subfiltration (Gt) of the full information
filtration (Ft). As we will see, the set of players’ strategies also changes in this situation.
Recall Section 2.4 and the concepts of mixed/randomised stopping times. As we will see,
these concepts are crucial for studying asymmetric information games. The value and Nash
equilibrium in such games may not exist in the classical sense of Definitions 3.2.4 and 3.2.6
(see, for instance, an example in (Grün, 2013, Section 2.1)). However, enlarging the set of
players’ strategies to include mixed/randomised stopping times allows to prove existence results
and study properties of the value/Nash equilibrium. This idea is not specific to Dynkin games
with asymmetric information and appears in more general game-theoretical frameworks - see
e.g. Cardaliaguet & Rainer (2009), Cardaliaguet et al. (2016), Gensbittel (2019).
In Section 2.4, we showed that equivalent stopping times induce the equivalent game payoffs.
Therefore, in the sequel, while reviewing papers on asymmetric information games, we omit the
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specifics of the definition of a mixed/randomised stopping time the authors use.
3.4.1 Game with partially observed scenarios
In this section, we review the results of Grün (2013). We demonstrate the methodology the author
uses to prove that the value of a certain asymmetric information game exists, and outline the link
between the value and the solution of a certain system of partial differential equations (PDEs).
Fix d ∈ N and t ∈ [0,T ]. Let (Wu)u∈[0,T ] be the standard Wiener process in Rd . For s ∈ [t,T ],
let Ht,s be the sigma-algebra generated by paths of (Wu) on [t,s]. Consider the diffusion process
that starts at time t from the point x ∈ Rd , i.e. the process (Xs)s∈[t,T ] with dynamics







where a= (ak,l)1≤k,l≤d and b : [0,T ]×Rd 7→Rd , ak,l : [0,T ]×Rd 7→R (1≤ k, l ≤ d) are bounded
and Lipschitz continuous functions (see Section A.7 for a justification of the latter assumption).
Let I ∈ N, and let the scenario random variable I take values {1, . . . , I} with probabilities
{p1, . . . , pI}. We require I to be independent of H0,T . The idea behind the asymmetric informa-
tion game is that I is observed by one of the players but not by her opponent. For i ∈ {1, . . . , I},
let Fi,Gi,Hi : [0,T ]×Rd 7→ R be bounded and Lipschitz continuous functions.
Let us denote by T(t) the set of (Ht,s)s∈[t,T ]-stopping times, and by TR(t) the set of (Ht,s)-
randomised stopping times. For i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and τi,σ ∈ TR(t), define the payoff





Denote by ∆(I) the simplex of RI . For vectors p := (p1, . . . , pI) ∈ ∆(I) (satisfying pi ≥ 0 for all






The lower and upper value of the game are defined as









To prove that the value of the game exists means to prove that, for every (t,x, p) ∈ [0,T ]×
Rd×∆(I),
V∗(t,x, p) =V ∗(t,x, p).
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+ 〈b(t,x), ∂(w(t,x, p))
∂x
〉
(recall that the trace of a matrix is the sum of the elements on its main diagonal). Define, for






where C = ∪λ>0(∆(I)− p)/λ is the tangent cone to ∆(I) at p.



















w(T,x, p) = 〈p,H(T,x)〉,
(3.23)
where, similarly to the above, F = (F1, . . . ,FI), G = (G1, . . . ,GI), H = (H1, . . . ,HI).
Roughly speaking, λmin appears in (3.23) as a condition of concavity of w with respect to p.
Let us clarify this using the example I = 2. If there are only two possible scenarios, then their
probabilities satisfy p2 = 1− p1. Then, (p1, p2) is a point of an interval on the plane, and C
is either a line or (if p1 = 0 or 1) a half-line. In this case, it can be proven that the directional
derivative λmin(p, ∂
2w
∂p2 ) reduces to the partial derivative
∂2w̃
∂p21
, where w̃(p1) := w(p1,1− p1).
By (Grün, 2013, Theorem 3.4), the value function of the game exists and is a solution of
(3.23) in a suitable viscosity sense (Grün, 2013, Definitions 3.1 and 3.2). This result is obtained
by first proving certain continuity and convexity properties of the functions V∗ and V ∗ (Grün,
2013, Propositions 5.1 and 5.2), and then by deriving the so-called dynamic programming prin-
ciples (see (Fleming & Soner, 2006, Section II.3)) for V∗ and V ∗ (Grün, 2013, Theorems 5.8 and
5.3). Finally, the comparison principle (see (Fleming & Soner, 2006, Section V.8)) (Grün, 2013,
Theorem 3.3) allows to combine the results for V∗ and V ∗ into (Grün, 2013, Theorem 3.4).
3.4.2 Game with two partially observed dynamics
In the set-up of Grün (2013), as well as in the papers considered below in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4,
the information parameters of the game do not evolve over time. In Gensbittel & Grün (2019),
they do: the information available to a player consists of observations of a Markov process, and
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the two players observe two different processes. The payoff of the game then depends on both
of the Markov processes. We specify the set-up and overview the results below.
Consider two independent time-homogeneous Markov processes (Xt), (Yt) with state spaces
{1, . . . , I}, {1, . . . ,J}, initial laws p∈∆(I), q∈∆(J) and infinitesimal generators R=(Ri,i′)i,i′∈{1,...,I},
Q = (Q j, j′) j, j′∈{1,...,J}, respectively.
The payoff processes are discounted functions F ≥ G of the underlying processes (Xt), (Yt).
That is, the expected payoff of the game, given a choice of random times τ and σ for the first and
the second player, reads
Np,q(τ,σ) = E[e−rτF(Xt ,Yt)I{τ<σ}+ e−rσG(Xt ,Yt)I{σ≤τ}].
The minimiser is assumed to have access to the information (FXt ) (recall Section 2.3) and
the maximiser is assumed to have access to the information (FYt ). The upper and lower value










The authors prove (Gensbittel & Grün, 2019, Theorem 3.3) that the game has a value V (p,q)












where ∇pV (p,q) and ∇qV (p,q) are the components of the gradient of V corresponding to vectors
p and q, respectively. As with the characterisation (3.23) of the value function in Grün (2013),
we omit the rigorous definition of the solution to (3.24) and the related constraints. Similarly
to (Grün, 2013, Theorem 3.4), the proof of (Gensbittel & Grün, 2019, Theorem 3.3) relies on
certain continuity and convexity properties of the function V ∗ (Gensbittel & Grün, 2019, Lemma
3.5) and on the dynamic programming principle (Gensbittel & Grün, 2019, Proposition 3.7). The
corresponding properties of V∗ follow by symmetry of the model, and the comparison principle
(Gensbittel & Grün, 2019, Theorem 3.12) finishes the proof.
3.4.3 Games with a single partially observed dynamics
In De Angelis et al. (2021b) and De Angelis et al. (2021a), the incomplete/asymmetric infor-
mation feature is modelled differently from Grün (2013) and Gensbittel & Grün (2019). The
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underlying dynamic (Xt) itself is not fully observable by one (De Angelis et al. (2021a)) or both
(De Angelis et al. (2021b)) of the players.
Let us start by describing the set-up of De Angelis et al. (2021b). Let the underlying process
be a geometric Brownian motion with a random drift that is unobservable by both players. More
precisely, let
dXt = (r−δ0I)Xtdt +σXtdWt , X0 = x > 0,
where (Wt) is the standard Wiener process in R, r,δ0,σ are positive constants, and I is a random
variable that takes values 0 or 1 with P(I= 1) = π and is independent of (Wt). The constant π is
assumed to be known to both players, but none of them observes I.
The payoff functions of the game are specified as follows: fix K,ε0 > 0 and consider
G(x) = (x−K)+, F(x) = (x−K)++ ε0.
Note that the integrability condition (3.6) is not satisfied for the functions G,F (De Angelis et al.,
2021b, Remark 2.1).
Let T= T(F̂Xt ), where (F̂
X
t ) is the filtration generated by (Xt) augmented in a certain way (we
omit further details as they are not essential to describe the problem). For τ,σ ∈ T, the expected
payoff of the game is defined as
Nx,π(τ,σ) = E[e−rτF(Xτ)I{τ<σ}+ e−rσG(Xσ)I{σ≤τ}].
Note that, since δ0 > 0, the speed of growth of trajectories of F(Xt) and G(Xt) is P-a.s. at most





e−rtG(Xt) = 0, P-a.s.
(observe the similarity with the condition at infinity for the full information game without dis-










Note that, due to the dependence on I, the process (Xt) is not Markovian. In (De Angelis
et al., 2021b, Section 2), the authors apply the filtering theory (Lipster & Shiryaev, 2001, Chapter
9) in order to increase the dimension of the state space and formulate an equivalent Markovian
problem. Informally speaking, filtering is used to progressively update the players’ estimate on I
based on their observation of (Xt). The existence of the value and Nash equilibrium (De Angelis
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et al., 2021b, Theorem 3.2) are then closely related to the classical results described in Section
3.3.
We emphasise that no randomisation is needed in this set-up: the strategies τ,σ are pure
stopping times. An intuitive reason is that the information available to players is incomplete but
symmetric (they both cannot observe I). On the contrary, in De Angelis et al. (2021a), one of the
players learns the true value of I as soon as the game starts. We proceed to describe the resulting
asymmetric information game.
The underlying dynamics of the game in De Angelis et al. (2021a) is a diffusion whose drift
depends on the realisation of the random variable I (I as above) in a general way, i.e. a process





I{I=i}µi(Xt)dt +σ(Xt)dWt , X0 = x,
where (Wt) is the standard Wiener process in R, and µ0, µ1, σ are positive continuous functions.
The payoff processes are continuous functions F,G of the underlying process. That is, the
expected payoff of the game, given a choice of random times τ and σ for the first and the second
player, reads
Nx,π(τ,σ) = E[F(Xτ)I{τ≤σ}+G(Xσ)I{σ<τ}].
We assume that F ≥ G≥ 0 (c.f. the order condition in the classical set-up (3.19)). Note that the
functions F,G used in De Angelis et al. (2021b) by definition satisfy this property.
As we already mentioned, one of the players (the minimiser) is assumed to have access to the
information I. Her information flow is therefore modelled as FX ,It := FXt ∨σ(I) (recall Section











The intuition behind τ being randomised is that the informed player uses randomisation in order
to “gradually reveal” the information to their opponent when optimal. We also note the parallel
with the set-up of Section 3.4.1, where the informed player uses a vector of randomised stopping
times as her strategy. This parallel is clear upon noticing that τ ∈ TR(FX ,It ) can be decomposed
as in Lemma B.1.2:
τ = τ0I{I=0}+ τ1I{I=1},
where τ0,τ1 ∈ TR(FXt ).
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An important step in solving the problem is to rewrite the game in terms of singular controls
- namely, the generating processes of the randomised stopping times τ0,τ1 (De Angelis et al.,
2021a, Proposition 3.1). We will heavily rely on this idea in Section 4.3. For the set-up of the
current section, it allows to characterise the value function of the game as a solution of a certain
quasi-variational inequality (De Angelis et al., 2021a, (42)-(43)) that comes with a set of non-
standard constraints related to the informational asymmetry (De Angelis et al., 2021a, Theorem
5.1).
3.4.4 Game with a random horizon
In Lempa & Matomäki (2013), the information asymmetry is introduced in yet another way.
Consider a classical Markovian stopping game (3.18). Assume additionally that it stops at an
exogenous random time θ (more formally, that its payoff is zero after the time θ). Assume that
only one of the players observes the occurrence of θ, and that only she is able to make a stopping
decision at the time θ. We formalise this description below.
The underlying dynamics of the game is a one-dimensional diffusion
dXt = µ(Xt)dt +σ(Xt)dWt , X0 = x.
The payoff functions F , G, H are assumed to be continuous, non-decreasing, and to satisfy







< ∞ for all x,
where the discounting rate r ∈R is fixed (c.f. the integrability condition for Markovian problems
without discounting (3.6)).
Let θ be an exponentially distributed random variable independent from (Xt). Let Λt :=
I{t≥θ}, and let F
X ,θ
t := FXt ∨σ(Λs,0≤ s≤ t). The occurrence of θ indicates the end of the game










Lempa & Matomäki (2013) do not fix which player is informed (has access to the filtration























The analysis of the two games is analogous. It relies on the specific structure of (FX ,θt ) thanks
to which, for any η ∈ T(FX ,θt ), there exists η̃ ∈ T(FXt ) such that η∧ θ = η̃∧ θ P-a.s. (Lempa
& Matomäki, 2013, Lemma 3.1). This allows to rewrite the lower/upper value of the games
in a way that only involves (FXt )-stopping times (Lempa & Matomäki, 2013, Proposition 3.2,
Proposition 4.1). These auxiliary expressions involve the different payoffs that are obtained,
roughly speaking, by integrating out the information θ from the payoff Nx. The existence of the
value then follows from the classical results of Section 3.3. Using the diffusion structure of the
problem, the authors provide explicit expressions for the value (Lempa & Matomäki, 2013, (3.9),
(4.6)), and study its asymptotic behaviour with respect to the parameter of the distribution of θ.
3.5 Approach based on functional analysis
In this section, we provide a review of Touzi & Vieille (2002) which largely influenced the
approach we take in Chapter 4. Touzi & Vieille (2002) apply the ideas discussed in Section 3.1.3
to Dynkin games (with full information).
3.5.1 Setting




t ∨Fht (recall Section 2.3). As in
(3.13), the payoff of the game is set to be
P(τ,σ) = fτI{τ<σ}+gσI{σ<τ}+hτI{σ=τ}. (3.25)
Recall that in Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984), the value of the game was proven to exist for the
infinite horizon game without the “middle” payoff (ht) (i.e. therein ht = ft for all t) and under
the order assumption
ft ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s.
Touzi & Vieille (2002) relax the order assumption and prove that the value of the game exists if
the players are allowed to use randomised stopping time as their strategies.
Recall the set A◦(Ft) of generating processes of randomised stopping times defined in (2.4).
Instead of studying the expected payoff functional (τ,σ) 7→ E[P(τ,σ)], consider a functional
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where ∆ξt = ξt − ξt− and ∆ζt = ζt − ζt−. From Section 2.4.1 we know that, for τ,σ ∈ TR(Ft)
with generating processes (ξt),(ζt), we have
N(ξ,ζ) = E[P(τ,σ)],
so the notation N that we commonly use for the expected payoff of a game comes at no surprise.







gt(1−ξt)dζt + h̃∆ξT ∆ζT
]
, (3.27)
where h̃ is an FT -measurable random variable. This payoff is a particular case of (3.26), to







ft(1−ζt−)dξt +hT ∆ξT ∆ζT
by definition of ∆ζt and ∆ξt , and the random variable hT becomes the same as the random
variable h̃ in (3.27). See Section 4.5.4 for a further connection between the payoffs (3.26) and
(3.27).










The main result of Touzi & Vieille (2002) is the that the game has a value in this extended sense
under the assumptions of the theorem below.
Theorem 3.5.2. (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Theorem 3.1) Let ( ft),(gt),(ht) ∈ Lb. Let ( ft), (gt) be
semimartingales with trajectories continuous at time T , P-a.s. Let ft ≥ ht for all t ∈ [0,T ] P-a.s.
Then,
V∗ =V ∗.
The proof of Theorem 3.5.2 involves an application of a general min-max theorem known as
Sion’s theorem.
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Theorem 3.5.3 (Sion’s theorem). (Sion, 1958, Corollary 3.3) Let A and B be convex subsets of
a linear topological space one of which is compact. Let ϕ(µ,ν) be a function A×B 7→ R that
is quasi-concave and upper semicontinuous in µ for each ν ∈ B, and quasi-convex and lower










Definitions of terms used in the theorem are listed in Section A.4.1. For its proof and related
examples, we refer to Section 3.6.
The difficulty arises from the fact that the set A◦(Ft) does not satisfy the assumptions of
Sion’s theorem (this will become clear in Section 3.5.3, after introducing the topology we work
in). In order to overcome this, we will consider auxiliary subsets of the set of players’ controls
(and quantities that can be viewed as lower/upper values of auxiliary games). We then prove
that these auxiliary games have the same lower and upper value V∗ and V ∗. This is achieved by
constructing a sequence of controls that approximate a general control from A◦(Ft) in a suitable
sense. The final step is to verify the conditions of Sion’s theorem and apply it to show that the
auxiliary games have a value.
More precisely, define
A1 = {(ξt) ∈A◦(Ft) : fT ∆ξT ≤ 0 P-a.s.}; A2 = {(ζt) ∈A◦(Ft) : (ζt) is continuous P-a.s.}.
These sets will act as the sets of players’ strategies in the auxiliary games for which, as we will
see, an application of Sion’s theorem yields existence of the value. The following are the main
steps in the proof of Theorem 3.5.2.

































3.5 Approach based on functional analysis



























The reverse inequality is a general property of the lower/upper value of a game (Remark 3.2.5),
and the statement of Theorem 3.5.2 follows.
3.5.2 Approximation with auxiliary controls
The proof of Proposition 3.5.4 relies on constructing, for arbitrary (ξt) ∈ A◦(Ft), a strategy
(ξ̂t) ∈A1 as
ξ̂T = ξT− on the event { fT > 0};
ξ̂ = ξ otherwise.












The opposite inequality follows from the fact that A1 ⊂A◦(Ft), and the statement of Proposition
3.5.4 follows.
The proof of Proposition 3.5.5 employs a similar idea but requires extra technical steps.
Define another subset of the set of players’ controls as
A3 = {(ζt) ∈A◦(Ft) : ∆ζT = 0 on { fT ≥ 0,gT > 0}}.
By (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 5.1), for any (ξt) ∈ A1 and (ζt) ∈ A◦(Ft), there exists a




The construction of the sequence (ζnt ) utilises Snell envelopes of the processes ( ft), (gt) and
relies on their continuity at the terminal time T .
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Further, in (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 5.2), for arbitrary strategy (ζt) ∈ A3, a sequence










The proof uses integration by parts of the integral terms in (3.26), and therefore relies on the
semimartingale assumption on ( ft), (gt) that ensures that the stochastic integrals with respect to
these processes are well-defined.










The opposite inequality is due to A2 ⊂A◦(Ft), and the statement of Proposition 3.5.5 follows.
3.5.3 Verification of the conditions of Sion’s theorem







< ∞, ∆ρT := ρT − liminf
t↑T
ρt , (3.29)
and consider the weak topology on S (see Section A.3.1). The weak topology is used to prove
the compactness and continuity results required to apply Sion’s theorem. The equivalence of
strong and weak closedness for convex sets (Theorem A.3.3) allows to work mainly in the strong
topology on S (induced by the norm (3.29)).
As we already mentioned, the set A◦(Ft) does not satisfy the assumptions of Sion’s theorem
(Theorem 3.5.3) — in particular, this set is not compact in the weak topology on S, and the
continuity properties of the functional N are violated on this set. However, both conditions can
be verified for sets A2, A1 in place of A, B in Sion’s theorem.
The first condition of Sion’s theorem is verified by (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 6.1) that
proves compactness of the set A1 in the weak topology. The proof goes through showing the
convexity of A1 and the sequential closedness of A1 in the strong topology on S, and applying
Theorem A.3.3.
In order to verify the continuity conditions of Sion’s theorem, (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma
6.3) shows continuity of the mapping ζ 7→ N(ξ,ζ) for all (ξt) ∈ A1 in the strong topology on
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S. The proof is sequential: for arbitrary (ξt) ∈ A1, take an arbitrary sequence (ζnt ) ⊂ A2 that




The proof again utilises integration by parts and hence relies on the semimartingale assumption.
After several technical steps, the convergence result is obtained by the dominated convergence
theorem.
Similarly, (Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 6.4) shows continuity of the mapping (ξt) 7→
N(ξ,ζ) for all (ζt) ∈ A2 in the strong topology on S. The proof is analogous to the proof of
(Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 6.3).
The convexity requirements of Sion’s theorem are fulfilled by bilinearity of the functional N.
They also allow to apply Theorem A.3.3 again to deduce from the continuity results of (Touzi
& Vieille, 2002, Lemma 6.3, 6.4) that hold in the strong topology the continuity properties of
the functional N in the weak topology. This, together with the weak compactness established in
(Touzi & Vieille, 2002, Lemma 6.1), finishes the verification of conditions of Sion’s theorem,
and its application finishes the proof of Proposition 3.5.6.
3.6 Sion’s theorem: proof and examples
Sion’s theorem (Theorem 3.5.3) is a key tool for proving the existence of the value not only
in Section 3.5, but also in the main chapter of the thesis — Chapter 4. The theorem was
originally proved in Sion (1958) using a topological result known as the Knaster–Kuratowski–
Mazurkiewicz theorem Knaster et al. (1929). In this section, we review a more straightforward
proof of Sion’s theorem Komiya (1988). In fact, below we work under assumptions symmetric
to Komiya (1988). Recall that in Sion’s theorem, one of the spaces in question is compact. In
Komiya (1988), the infimum is taken over a compact space, while for our purposes (see Theorem
4.4.5) it will be convenient to have the supremum taken over a compact space instead.
Lemma 3.6.1. (Komiya, 1988, Lemma 1) Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.5.3, for any
ν1,ν2 ∈ B and any real number α > supµ∈A min{φ(µ,ν1),φ(µ,ν2)}, there exists ν ∈ B such that
α > supµ∈A φ(µ,ν).
It is worth emphasising that the proof of Lemma 3.6.1 is elementary, in a sense that it only
uses definitions and basic properties of the conditions in Sion’s theorem (see Section A.4.1), and
does not use non-standard results, unlike the proofs in Sion (1958). From Lemma 3.6.1, one can
by induction deduce the following.
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Lemma 3.6.2. (Komiya, 1988, Lemma 2) Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.5.3, for any
ν1, . . . ,νn ∈ B and any real number α > supµ∈A min1≤i≤n{φ(µ,νi)}, there exists ν ∈ B such that
α > supµ∈A φ(µ,ν).
We now reproduce a proof from Komiya (1988) in order to show how Theorem 3.5.3 follows
from Lemma 3.6.2, as well as to introduce some notation that will be useful in the sequel. Recall
that we work under assumption that the space A in Theorem 3.5.3 is the one that is compact.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3. Fix α∈R such that α> supµ∈A infν∈B φ(µ,ν). For every ν∈ B, the level
set
Zα(ν) := {µ ∈ A : φ(µ,ν)≥ α}
is closed by the upper semicontinuity of φ(·,ν) (Theorem A.4.5). By the choice of α, we have
∩ν∈BZα(ν) = /0. In other words, sets {A \Zα(ν) : ν ∈ B} form an open cover of the compact
A. Hence, by Definition A.2.2, there exist ν1, . . . ,νn ∈ B such that ∩ni=1Zα(νn) = /0, i.e. α >
supµ∈A min1≤i≤n φ(µ,νi). By Lemma 3.6.2, there exists ν ∈ B such that α > supµ∈A φ(µ,ν), and










The reverse inequality is always true (Remark 3.2.5), which finishes the proof of Theorem 3.5.3.
Let us provide a lemma that allows to write max instead of sup in Theorem 3.5.3.
Lemma 3.6.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.5.3 with the space A compact, there exists








Proof. Consider the mapping φ̂ : A 7→ R defined as φ̂(µ) = infν∈B φ(µ,ν). Take arbitrary α ∈ R.
Consider the level set for φ̂:
Ẑα = {µ ∈ A : inf
ν∈B
φ(µ,ν)≥ α}.
Then, Ẑα = ∩ν∈BZα(ν). For any ν ∈ B, by the upper semicontinuity of φ(·,ν), the set Zα(ν) is
closed (Theorem A.4.5). Therefore, the set Ẑα is closed for arbitrary α ∈R, i.e. the function φ̂ is
upper semicontinuous. Since the space A is compact, by Theorem A.4.6 φ̂ attains its supremum
on A, which finishes the proof.
We conclude with the examples illustrating the necessity of conditions in Theorem 3.5.3.
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so the infimum and the supremum cannot be swapped. This is due to R not being a compact
space, so Theorem 3.5.3 does not apply.
Example 3.6.5. Consider φ : [0,1]× [0,1] 7→ R such that φ(µ,ν) = µ2−2µν+ν2. Consider, for
a fixed ν̂ ∈ [0,1], the task of maximising φ(µ, ν̂) over µ. The maximum
max
µ∈[0,1]
φ(µ, ν̂) = max
µ∈[0,1]
(µ2−2µν̂+ ν̂2)























Thus, the infimum and the supremum (which are the minimum and the maximum in this set-up)
cannot be swapped. This is due to φ not being quasi-concave (Definition A.4.2) in µ for each ν, so
Theorem 3.5.3 does not apply. Indeed, the quasi-concavity is violated because, for example, for
ν̂ = 12 the level set {µ ∈ [0,1] : µ




Value of asymmetric information games
In this chapter, we develop a framework for studying the existence of the value in zero-sum
Dynkin games with partial/asymmetric information. In contrast with most literature on such
games (see Section 3.4), our set-up is non-Markovian. The games are considered on both the
finite and infinite-time horizon and, as always in the thesis, the horizon is denoted by T . We
assume that the payoff processes are the sum of a regular process (in the sense of Meyer (1978);
recall Definition 2.3.2) and a pure jump process with mild restrictions on the direction of jumps
for one of the two players. The rigorous description of our set-up can be found in Section 4.1.
We allow for a general structure of the information available to the players. All processes
are adapted to an overarching filtration (Ft), whereas each player makes decisions based on her
own filtration, representing her access to information. Letting (F it ) be filtration of the i-th player,
with i = 1,2, we only assume that F it ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0,T ]. In particular, we cover the case in
which the players are equally (partially) informed, i.e. F1t = F
2
t , and the case in which they have
asymmetric (partial) information, i.e. F1t 6= F2t .
Under this generality we prove that Dynkin games in the form of war-of-attrition (recall
Remark 3.2.1) admit a value in randomised stopping times. We emphasise that, due to the asym-
metry of information, the value may not exist in pure stopping times (i.e. in the classical sense
of Definition 3.2.4). Our Definition 4.2.2 of the value is, instead, similar to the one used in the
literature on asymmetric information games (see, in particular, Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2).
Our framework encompasses all the examples of zero-sum Dynkin games (in continuous
time) with partial/asymmetric information that we could find in the literature. We will give a
detailed account of this fact in Section 4.6. As explained in Section 3.4 where we review this
literature, the methods traditionally employed to study asymmetric information games hinge on
variational inequalities and partial differential equations. The classical assumptions share two
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key features: (i) a specific structure of the information flow in the game and (ii) the Markovian
assumption. In our work, instead, we are able to analyse the games at a more abstract level that
allows us to drop the Markovian assumption and to avoid specifying an information structure.
We will also show by several counterexamples in Section 4.7 that our main assumptions cannot
be further relaxed, as otherwise a value for the game may no longer exist.
Our methodology draws on the idea presented in Touzi & Vieille (2002) (recall Section 3.5)
of using Sion’s min-max theorem Sion (1958). In Touzi & Vieille (2002), the authors study non-
Markovian zero-sum Dynkin games with full information, in which the first- and second-mover
advantage may occur at different points in time, depending on the stochastic dynamics of the
underlying payoff processes. This “order” feature is studied in Chapter 5. Since our set-up is
different, due to the partial/asymmetric information features and to relaxed assumptions on the
payoff processes, we encounter some non-trivial technical difficulties in following the arguments
from Touzi & Vieille (2002): for example, our class of randomised stopping times is not closed
with respect to the topology used in Touzi & Vieille (2002) (see Remark 4.4.17). For this reason,
we develop an alternative approach based on the general theory of stochastic processes (see
Sections 2.3 and A.5) combined with ideas from functional analysis (Sections A.3 and A.4).
4.1 Setting
We consider two-player zero-sum Dynkin games on the horizon T ∈ (0,∞]. Basic probabilistic
features of our problem are outlined in Section 2.1, and we will extensively use definitions of
regularity, projections, and of space Lb from Section 2.3. For notation, recall that we work
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft)t∈[0,T ],P). Actions of the first player are based on the
information contained in a filtration (F1t ) ⊆ (Ft) (the rigorous meaning of this will be clarified
later). Actions of the second player are based on the information contained in a filtration (F2t )⊆
(Ft). Each player selects a random time based on the information she acquires via her filtration;
the first player’s random time is denoted by τ while the second player’s random time is σ. The
game terminates at time τ∧σ∧T with the first player delivering to the second player the random
payoff
P(τ,σ) = fτI{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T}+gσI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T}+hI{σ=T}∩{τ=T}. (4.1)
The first player (or τ-player) is the minimiser in the game whereas the second player (or σ-player)
is the maximiser.
The payoff processes ( ft) and (gt), and the terminal payoff h satisfy the following conditions:
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(A1) ( ft),(gt) ∈ Lb,
(A2) ( ft),(gt) are (Ft)-adapted regular processes,
(A3) ft ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,T ] P-a.s.,
(A4) the random variable h is FT -adapted and satisfies
gT ≤ h≤ fT , P-a.s.,
(A5) the filtrations (Ft) and (Fit), i = 1,2, satisfy the usual conditions, i.e. they are right-
continuous and Fi0, i = 1,2, contain all sets of P-measure zero (see Section 2.3).
We elaborate on our assumptions (and relax one of them) in Section 4.1.1.
















where for now we do not specify the nature of players’ strategies (τ,σ). The mathematical
difficulty with establishing existence of a value lies in the possibility to swap the order of ‘inf’
and ‘sup’, and this is closely linked to the choice of the set of strategies that the players are
allowed to use (recall the discussion at the start of Section 3.4).
Remark 4.1.1. By (4.1), if the players stop simultaneously, they exchange the larger payoff ( ft).
This choice causes no loss of generality, since we do not make assumptions on the sign of ( ft),
(gt), h. Indeed, if the value exists for the game with payoff P(τ,σ), the same is true for the game
with payoff P′(τ,σ) =−P(τ,σ). However, in the latter game the τ-player is a maximiser and the










Defining f ′t :=− ft , g′t :=−g′t , we have f ′t ≤ g′t . So, in this case, if the players stop simultaneously,
they exchange the smaller payoff ( f ′t ).
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It has been indicated in the literature that games with asymmetric information may not have
a value if players’ strategies are stopping times for their respective filtrations. Indeed, in Section
4.7.2 we demonstrate that the game studied in this paper may not, in general, have a value if
the i-th player uses (Fit)-stopping times, i = 1,2 (that is, if infimum and supremum in (4.3) are
taken over the sets T(F1t ) and T(F
2
t )). It has been proven in certain Markovian set-ups that the
relaxation of player controls to randomised stopping times may be sufficient for the existence
of the value (see Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). Our goal is to show that this is indeed true in the
generality of our non-Markovian set-up for the game with payoff (4.1).
4.1.1 Overview of the assumptions
The integrability Assumption (A1) is natural in the framework of optimal stopping problems and
Dynkin games, as we saw in Section 3. Most of our proofs in Sections 4.3-4.5 rely on finiteness
of integrals in question, and the latter is ensured by Remark 2.3.8.
By the regularity Assumption (A2) we replace semimartingale assumptions on ( ft) and (gt)
from Touzi & Vieille (2002) (recall Section 3.5). In the optimal stopping framework, it dates
back to Meyer (1978) (Section 3.1.3). Regular processes encompass a large family of stochastic
processes encountered in applications. It is straightforward to see (Example 2.3.4) that quasi
left-continuous processes are regular. In the Markovian framework, strong and weak solutions
of stochastic differential equations (Section A.7) are continuous and therefore regular.
We subsequently relax Assumption (A2) by allowing the payoff processes to have previsible
jumps with nonzero (conditional) mean. In particular, in (A2’) we allow either jumps of ( ft)
in any direction and upward jumps of (gt) or, vice versa, jumps of (gt) in any direction and
downward jumps of ( ft). This ensures a certain closedness property (see Section 4.5.1).
(A2’) Processes ( ft) and (gt) have the decomposition f = f̃ + f̂ , g = g̃+ ĝ with
1. ( f̃t),(g̃t) ∈ Lb,
2. ( f̃t),(g̃t) are (Ft)-adapted regular processes,
3. ( f̂t),(ĝt) are (Ft)-adapted (right-continuous) piecewise-constant processes of inte-
grable variation with f̂0 = ĝ0 = 0, ∆ f̂T = f̂T − f̂T− = 0 and ∆ĝT = ĝT − ĝT− = 0,
4. either ( f̂t) is non-increasing or (ĝt) is non-decreasing.






t ) ∈ Lb starting from 0 such
that f̂ = f̂+− f̂− and ĝ = ĝ+− ĝ− (Definition A.5.5).
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Observe the similarity between the restriction on the direction of previsible jumps of one the
payoff processes (item (4) in (A2’)) and the assumption in the nonzero-sum game of Hamadène
& Zhang (2010) (recall Section 3.2.2). In zero-sum setting, this restriction is a new feature
introduced by the asymmetry of information, i.e. for classical zero-sum Dynkin games it is
not necessary, see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3. It is worth emphasising that further relaxation of
Assumption (A2’) is not possible in the generality of our setting, as demonstrated in Remark
4.5.7 and in Section 4.7.3.
The order conditions similar to (or stricter than) (A3)-(A4), on the contrary, do appear in
the full information setting as well (recall (3.11), (3.14), (3.19)). Although their necessity is
challenged in Touzi & Vieille (2002) and Chapter 5, we require it to hold in the current setting,
in order to focus on the specifics of the problem caused by the asymmetry of information.
Finally, Assumption (A5) on filtrations is technical and goes beyond the game applications
of theory of stochastic processes (c.f. Section 2.3).
4.2 Main definitions and results
Recall the notation from Section 2.4: given a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), we denote
A◦(Gt) :={(ρt) : (ρt) is (Gt)-adapted with t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg,
non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈Ω}.
We emphasise that these properties are required to hold for all ω ∈ Ω; recall Remark 2.4.1 for
why this requirement is not restrictive as long as (Gt) satisfies the usual conditions. In the infinite-
time horizon case T = ∞ (recall Remark 2.1.1), we understand ρT as an F∞-measurable random
variable, while ρT− := limt→∞ ρt (which exists by the assumption that (ρt) is a càdlàg process).
In Section 2.4, we encountered the concepts of a mixed/randomised/distribution stopping
time and discussed their equivalence. In our work, we choose to use randomised stopping times.
The main reason for this choice will be clear in Sections 4.3 and 4.4: randomised stopping times
provide a way of working in a space of processes with a convenient tolopogical structure. Since
randomised stopping times play the key role in our analysis, let us formalise the definition we
gave in Section 2.4.
Definition 4.2.1. Given a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), a random variable η is called a (Gt)-randomised
stopping time if there exists a random variable Z with uniform distribution U([0,1]), independent
of FT , and a process (ρt) ∈A◦(Gt) such that
η = η(ρ,Z) = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ρt > Z}, P-a.s. (4.4)
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The variable Z is called a randomisation device for the randomised stopping time η, and the pro-
cess (ρt) is called the generating process. The set of (Gt)-randomised stopping times is denoted
by TR(Gt). It is assumed that randomisation devices of different randomised stopping times are
independent.
To avoid unnecessary complication of notation, we assume that the probability space (Ω,F,P)
supports two independent random variables Zτ and Zσ which are also independent of FT and are
the randomisation devices for the randomised stopping times τ and σ of the two players.











The lower value and upper value of the game in randomised strategies are given by V∗ and
V ∗, respectively. If they coincide, the game is said to have a value in randomised strategies
V =V∗ =V ∗.
The following theorem states the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 4.2.3. Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5), the game has a value in randomised
strategies.
For the clarity of presentation of our methodology, we first prove a theorem under more
restrictive regularity properties of the payoff processes and then show how to extend the proof to
the general case of Theorem 4.2.3.
Theorem 4.2.4. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5), the game has a value in randomised strategies.
The proofs of the above theorems are given in Section 4.4. They rely on two key results: an
approximation procedure (Propositions 4.4.6 and 4.5.2) and an auxiliary game with ‘nice’ regu-
larity properties (Theorem 4.4.5 and 4.5.1) which enables the use of a known min-max theorem
(Theorem 3.5.3).
The sigma-algebra F0 is not assumed to be trivial. It is therefore natural to consider a game
in which players assess their strategies ex-post, i.e. after the observation available to them at time
0 when their first action may take place. Allowing for more generality, let G be a sigma-algebra
contained in F10 and in F
2
0, i.e. containing information available to both players at time 0. The




∣∣G]= E[ fτI{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T}+gσI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T}+hI{σ=T}∩{τ=T}∣∣G]. (4.5)
The proof of the following theorem is in Section 4.5.3.
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Theorem 4.2.5. Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) and for any G ⊆ F10 ∩F20, the G-
















4.3 Reformulation as a game of (singular) controls
In order to integrate out the randomisation devices for τ and σ and obtain a reformulation of the
payoff functional N(τ,σ) in terms of generating processes for randomised stopping times τ and
σ, we need the two auxiliary lemmata below.
Remark 4.3.1. If η is an (Gt)-randomised stopping time for (Gt)⊆ (Ft), then η is also an (Ft)-
randomised stopping time. Indeed, by definition of a randomised stopping time, the generating
process (ρt) of η belongs to A◦(Gt). Then (ρt) is (Gt)-adapted by definition of this set, therefore
it is (Ft)-adapted, and thus belongs to A◦(Ft). Applying the definition of a randomised stopping
time again, we see that η is an (Ft)-randomised stopping time. Therefore, the results below are
formulated for (Ft)-randomised stopping times.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let η ∈ TR(Ft) with the generating process (ρt). Then, for any FT -measurable
random variable κ with values in [0,T ],
E[I{η≤κ}|FT ] = ρκ, E[I{η>κ}|FT ] = 1−ρκ, (4.7)
E[I{η<κ}|FT ] = ρκ−, E[I{η≥κ}|FT ] = 1−ρκ−. (4.8)
Proof. The proof of (4.7) follows the lines of (De Angelis et al., 2021a, Proposition 3.1). Let
Z be the randomisation device for η. Since (ρt) is right-continuous, non-decreasing, and (4.4)
holds, we have the following inclusion of events:
{ρκ > Z} ⊆ {η≤ κ} ⊆ {ρκ ≥ Z}.
Using that ρκ is FT -measurable and Z is uniformly distributed and independent of FT , we com-
pute









This completes the proof of the first equality in (4.7). Since the events {η≤ κ} and {η > κ} are
complements of each other, the other equality is a direct consequence.
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To prove (4.8), we observe that, by (4.7), for any ε > 0 we have
I{κ>0}E[I{η≤(κ−ε)∨(κ/2)}|FT ] = I{κ>0}ρ(κ−ε)∨(κ/2).
Dominated convergence theorem implies





I{κ>0}ρ(κ−ε)∨(κ/2) = I{κ>0}ρκ− = ρκ−,
where in the last equality we used that ρ0− = 0. This proves the first equality in (4.8). The other
one is again a direct consequence.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let η,θ ∈ TR(Ft) with generating processes (ρt), (χt) and independent randomi-





















where we use the notation
∫
[0,T ) for the (pathwise) Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral (recall Section
2.2).
Proof. For y ∈ [0,1), define a family of random variables
q(y) = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ρt > y}.




















Since Xq(y)I{q(y)<T} is FT -measurable and the randomisation device Zθ is independent of FT , we




























4.3 Reformulation as a game of (singular) controls
where in the second equality we apply Lemma 4.3.2 with κ = q(y), and in the third equality we
change the variable of integration applying Proposition 2.2.2 ω-wise and using the fact that the
function y 7→ q(y)(ω) is the generalised inverse of t 7→ ρt(ω). The first statement of the lemma
is now proved.




























where in the last equality we used that χT = 1.
Applying Lemma 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 to (4.1) and (4.2) and noticing that
E[I{η=κ}|FT ] = E[I{η≤κ}− I{η<κ}|FT ] = ρκ−ρκ−
we obtain the following reformulation of the game.










where (ξt) and (ζt) are the generating processes for τ and σ, respectively, and ∆ξT = ξT −ξT−=
1−ξT− denotes the jump of (ξt) at T , and ∆ζT = 1−ζT−.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the right-hand side of (4.9) by N(ξ,ζ).
Remark 4.3.5. In the Definition 4.2.2 of the lower value, the infimum can always be replaced by
infimum over pure stopping times (c.f. Laraki & Solan (2005)). Same holds for the supremum in
the definition of the upper value.
Let us look at the upper value: take arbitrary τ ∈ TR(F1t ), σ ∈ TR(F2t ), and define the family
of stopping times
q(y) = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ζt > y}, y ∈ [0,1),









(recall that T(F2t ) denotes the set of pure (F
2
t )-stopping times). Since T(F
2







4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value






























as shown by an example in Section 4.7.
4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value
The proofs of Theorems 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, i.e. that the game with payoff (4.2) has a value in
randomised strategies, utilise Sion’s min-max theorem (Theorem 3.5.3) originally proved in Sion
(1958). We also refer to Komiya (1988) for a proof that is reviewed in Section 3.6. The idea of
relying on Sion’s theorem comes from Touzi & Vieille (2002) where the authors study zero-sum
Dynkin games with full and symmetric information (see Section 3.5). Here, however, we need
different key technical arguments as explained in e.g. Remark 4.4.17 below.
An important step in applying Sion’s theorem is to find a topology on the set of randomised
stopping times, or, equivalently, on the set of corresponding generating processes so that the






where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0,T ].
Given a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), in addition to the class of increasing processes A◦(Gt) intro-
duced earlier, here we also need
A◦ac(Gt) :={(ρt) ∈A◦(Gt) : t 7→ ρt(ω) is absolutely continuous on [0,T ) for all ω ∈Ω}.
We refer to Section A.4.5 for the definition and basic properties of absolutely continuous func-









(ω)ds < 1 = ρT (ω).
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As with A◦(Gt), in the definition of A◦ac(Gt) we require that the stated properties hold for all
ω ∈ Ω, which causes no loss of generality if G0 contains all P-null sets of Ω. It is clear that
A◦ac(Gt)⊂A◦(Gt)⊂ S.
For reasons that will become clear later (e.g. see Lemma 4.4.16), we prefer to work with
slightly more general processes than those in A◦(Gt) and A◦ac(Gt). Let us denote
A(Gt) :={(ρt) ∈ S : ∃ (ρ̂t) ∈A◦(Gt)such that ρ = ρ̂ for (λ×P)-a.e. (t,ω) ∈ [0,T ]×Ω},
Aac(Gt) :={(ρt) ∈ S : ∃ (ρ̂t) ∈A◦ac(Gt)such that ρ = ρ̂ for (λ×P)-a.e. (t,ω) ∈ [0,T ]×Ω}.
Definition 4.4.1. We call the process (ρ̂t) in the definition of the set A (and Aac) the càdlàg (and
absolutely continuous) representative of (ρt).
Although not unique, all càdlàg representatives are indistinguishable (Definition A.1.7), as
Lemma 4.4.7 below shows. Hence, all càdlàg representatives of (ρt)∈A define the same positive
Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure t 7→ ρ̂t(ω) on [0,T ] for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω. Then, given any bounded




Xs dρ̂s, t ∈ [0,T ],
does not depend on the choice of the càdlàg representative (ρ̂t) in the sense that it is defined up
to indistinguishability.
The next definition connects the randomised stopping times that we use in the construction
of the game’s payoff (Proposition 4.3.4) with processes from the classes A(F1t ) and A(F
2
t ). Note
that A(Gt)⊆A(Ft) whenever (Gt)⊆ (Ft), so the definition can be stated for A(Ft) without any
loss of generality.





Xs dρs, t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1−χs)dρs and t 7→
∫
[0,t]





Xs dρ̂s, t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χ̂s)dρ̂s and t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χ̂s−)dρ̂s t ∈ [0,T ],
for any choice of the càdlàg representatives (ρ̂t) and (χ̂t), uniquely up to indistinguishability.
With a slight abuse of notation, we define a functional N : A(F1t )×A(F2t )→ R by the right-
hand side of (4.9).
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Proof. By Proposition 4.3.4, for τ ∈ TR(F1t ), σ ∈ TR(F2t ), the functional N(τ,σ) equals the sum
of integrals (4.9) involving the generating processes (ξt) ∈ A◦(F1t ) and (ζt) ∈ A◦(F2t ) of τ and
σ, respectively. Therefore, taking supremum and infimum over the sets TR(F1t ) and T
R(F2t ) in
Definition 4.2.2 of the lower and upper value is equivalent to taking them over the sets A◦(F1t )
and A◦(F2t ). And the latter is, for the sum of integrals on the right-hand side of (4.9), equivalent
to taking supremum and infimum over the sets A(F1t ) and A(F
2
t ), thanks to Definition 4.4.2.
Remark 4.4.4. The mapping A(F1t )×A(F2t )3 (ξ,ζ) 7→N(ξ,ζ) does not satisfy the conditions of
Sion’s theorem. Indeed, taking ξnt = I{t≥ T2 + 1n}, we have ξ
n
t → I{t≥ T2 } =: ξt for λ-a.e. t ∈ [0,T ], so
that by dominated convergence (ξn) also converges to (ξt) in S. Then, fixing ζt = I{t≥ T2 } in A(F
2
t )
we have N(ξn,ζ) = E[g T
2
] for all n≥ 1 whereas N(ξ,ζ) = E[ f T
2
]. So the lower semicontinuity of





Due to the issues indicated in the above remark, as in Touzi & Vieille (2002) (Section 3.5),
we “smoothen” the control strategy of one player in order to introduce additional regularity in
the payoff. We will show that this procedure does not change the value of the game (Proposition
4.4.6). We choose to consider an auxiliary game in which the first player can only use controls










Here, the first player is chosen arbitrarily and with no loss of generality. In Section 4.5.2, we
explain why we could instead consider a game in which the second player can only use controls
from Aac(F2t ).
Note that we work under the regularity assumption on the payoff processes (A2). Relaxation
of this assumption is conducted in Section 4.5.1.
The main steps in the proof of our main Theorem 4.2.4 are the following:
Theorem 4.4.5. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5), the game (4.11) has a value, i.e.
W∗ =W ∗ :=W.






4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value
Proposition 4.4.6. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5), for any (ζt) ∈A(F2t ) and (ξt) ∈A(F1t ), there




The proofs will be conducted in the following subsections: Section 4.4.1 contains a number
of technical results which we then use to prove Theorem 4.4.5 (in Section 4.4.2) and Proposition
4.4.6 (in Section 4.4.3). With the results from Theorem 4.4.5 and Proposition 4.4.6 in place we
can provide the proof of Theorem 4.2.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.4. Recall that Aac(F1t ) ⊆ A(F1t ). Since the infimum in the defintions of
W∗ and W ∗ is taken over a smaller set than the infimum in the definitions of V∗ and V ∗, we have






for any (ζt) ∈A(F2t ), so V∗ ≥W∗. Therefore, V∗ =W∗. Then, thanks to Theorem 4.4.5, we have
a sequence of inequalities which complete the proof
W =W∗ =V∗ ≤V ∗ ≤W ∗ =W.
4.4.1 Technical results
In this section we give a series of results concerning the convergence of integrals when either the
integrand or the integrator converges in a suitable sense. We start with a technical lemma.
Lemma 4.4.7. Let (Xt) and (Yt) be càdlàg measurable processes such that Xt =Yt , P-a.s. for all
t ∈ D, where D is a countable and dense subset of [0,T ), and X0− = Y0−, XT = YT , P-a.s. Then
(Xt) is indistinguishable from (Yt).
Proof. Define
Ω0 = {ω ∈Ω : (Xt(ω)),(Yt(ω)) are càdlàg and Xt(ω) = Yt(ω) for all t ∈ D}.
We have P(Ω0) = 1. Fix ω ∈ Ω0. Since the set D is dense in [0,T ), and the processes (Xt) and
(Yt) are càdlàg, for any t0 ∈ (0,T ), there exists a sequence {tn}n∈N in D such that
Xt0(ω) = limn→∞ Xtn(ω), Yt0(ω) = limn→∞Ytn(ω).
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Further, for any n∈N we have Xtn(ω) =Ytn(ω) by assumption. Therefore, Xt0(ω) =Yt0(ω). Since
t0 and ω are arbitrary, we obtain
P{ω ∈Ω : Xt(ω) = Yt(ω) for all t ∈ (0,T )}= 1.
This, together with the assumption X0− =Y0−, XT =YT , P-a.s., proves the indistinguishability of
(Xt) and (Yt).
Definition 4.4.8. Given a càdlàg measurable process (Xt), for each ω ∈Ω we denote
CX(ω) := {t ∈ [0,T ] : Xt−(ω) = Xt(ω)}.
Our next result tells us that the convergence (λ×P)-a.e. of processes in A(Gt) can be lifted to
P-a.s. convergence at all points of continuity of the corresponding càdlàg representatives (recall
Definition 4.4.1).
Lemma 4.4.9. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let (ρnt )n≥1 ⊂ A(Gt) and (ρt) ∈ A(Gt) with ρn→ ρ
(λ×P)-a.e. as n→ ∞. Then for any càdlàg representatives (ρ̂nt ) and (ρ̂t) we have
P
({




t (ω) = ρ̂t(ω) for all t ∈Cρ̂(ω)
})
= 1. (4.12)
Proof. The (λ×P)-a.e. convergence of (ρnt ) to (ρt) means that the càdlàg representatives (ρ̂nt )
converge to (ρ̂t) also (λ×P)-a.e. Hence, there is a set D⊂ [0,T ] with λ([0,T ]\D) = 0 such that
ρ̂nt → ρ̂t P-a.s. for t ∈D. Since λ([0,T ]\D) = 0, there is a countable subset D0 ⊂D that is dense
in [0,T ]. Define
Ω0 := {ω ∈Ω : ρ̂nt (ω)→ ρ̂t(ω) for all t ∈ D0}.
Then P(Ω0) = 1.
Now, fix ω ∈Ω0 and let t ∈Cρ̂(ω)∩ (0,T ). Take an increasing sequence (t1k )k≥1 ⊂ D0 and a
















where the first equality holds because t ∈Cρ̂(ω), and in the final inequality we use that ρ̂nt2k
(ω)≥
















Combining the above, we obtain (4.12) (apart from t ∈ {0,T}) by recalling that ω ∈ Ω0 and
P(Ω0) = 1. The convergence at t = T , irrespective of whether it belongs to Cρ̂(ω), is trivial
as ρ̂nT (ω) = ρ̂T (ω) = 1. If 0 ∈ Cρ̂(ω), then ρ̂0(ω) = ρ̂0−(ω) = 0. Inequality (4.13) reads 0 =
ρ̂0(ω)≥ limsupn→∞ ρ̂n0(ω). Since ρ̂n0(ω)≥ 0, this proves that ρ̂n0(ω)→ ρ̂0(ω) = 0.
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Lemma 4.4.10. For a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), let (ρnt )n≥1⊂A◦(Gt) and (ρt)∈A◦(Gt) with ρn→ ρ




E[X∆ρnt ]≤ E[X∆ρt ].
Proof. Fix t ∈ (0,T ). Arguing by contradiction, assume there exists a subsequence nk such that
lim
k→∞
E[X∆ρnkt ]> E[X∆ρt ].








dt = T ,









= ρt+δm , P-a.s.
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem,
































where the last inequality is due to t 7→ ρnkt being non-decreasing. This contradiction finishes
the proof for t ∈ (0,T ). The proof for t ∈ {0,T} is a simplified version of the argument above.
Indeed, for t = T we have


























































4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value
We need to consider a slightly larger class of processes Ã◦(Gt)⊃A◦(Gt) defined by
Ã◦(Gt) :={(ρt) : (ρt) is (Gt)-adapted with t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg,
non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω)≤ 1 for all ω ∈Ω}.
Proposition 4.4.11. For a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), let (ρnt )n≥1⊂ Ã◦(Gt) and (ρt)∈ Ã◦(Gt). Assume
P
({




t (ω) = ρt(ω) for all t ∈Cρ(ω)∪{T}
})
= 1.














Proof. Let us first assume (with a slight abuse of notation compared to the statement of the









Xt(ω)dρt(ω), for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω, (4.15)
then the result in (4.14) will follow by the dominated convergence theorem. By assumption there
is Ω0 ⊂Ω with P(Ω0) = 1 and such that ρnt (ω)→ ρt(ω) at all points of continuity of t 7→ ρt(ω)
and at the terminal time T for all ω ∈ Ω0. Let us also assume that supt∈[0,T ] |Xt(ω)| < ∞ for
all ω ∈ Ω0, which is justified by the assumption (Xt) ∈ Lb. Since dρnt (ω) and dρt(ω) define
positive measures on [0,T ] for each ω∈Ω0, the convergence of integrals in (4.15) can be deduced
from the weak convergence of finite measures (see Section A.6). Indeed, if ω ∈ Ω0 is such that










|Xt(ω)|ρnT (ω) = 0,
where we used that supt∈[0,T ] |Xt(ω)|< ∞. If, instead, ω ∈Ω0 is such that ρT (ω)> 0, then for all
sufficiently large n’s, we have ρnT (ω) > 0 and t 7→ ρnt (ω)/ρnT (ω) define cumulative distribution
functions converging pointwise to ρt(ω)/ρT (ω) at the points of continuity of ρt(ω). Since t 7→





























4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value
Now we drop the continuity assumption on (Xt). We turn our attention to càdlàg, (Ft)-
adapted and regular (Xt)∈Lb. By Theorem 2.3.6, there is (X̃t)∈Lb with continuous trajectories
such that (Xt) is an (Ft)-optional projection of (X̃t) (Definition A.5.3). From the first part of the
proof we know that (4.14) holds for (X̃t). To show that it holds for (Xt) it is sufficient to notice






















Remark 4.4.12. Theorems 2.3.6 and 2.3.7, even though they may seem to only have appeared in
the proof of Proposition 4.4.11 for technical reasons, enabled us to generalise one of our main
results — Theorem 4.2.4. Originally, we assumed that the payoff processes ( ft) and (gt) are
continuous. The current setting of the chapter assumes no continuity from the beginning — only
regularity (A2). This is only possible because in the proof of Proposition 4.4.11 we are able to
extend the convergence result from continuous processes to regular and adapted ones.
Proposition 4.4.13. For a filtration (Gt)⊆ (Ft), let (χt) ∈A◦(Gt) and (ρt) ∈Aac(Gt), and con-
sider (Xt) ∈ Lb which is (Ft)-adapted and regular. If (ρnt )n≥1 ⊂Aac(Gt) converges (λ×P)-a.e.


































With no loss of generality (thanks to the Definition 4.4.2) we can consider the absolutely contin-
uous representatives of (ρt) and (ρnt ) from the class A
◦
ac(Gt) in the definition of all the integrals
above (which we still denote by (ρt) and (ρnt ) for simplicity). In light of this observation we
see that (Rnt )n≥1 ⊂ Ã◦(Gt) and (Rt) ∈ Ã◦(Gt), since 1−χs− ≤ 1 for any s ∈ [0,T ]. We indend to
apply Proposition 4.4.11 to the integrals with (Rnt ) and (Rt) in (4.18). Let us verify the conditions
of Proposition 4.4.11.
Thanks to Lemma 4.4.9 and recalling that ρnT = ρT = 1, the set
Ω0 =
{




t (ω) = ρt(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]
}
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has full measure, i.e. P(Ω0) = 1. For any ω ∈ Ω0 and t ∈ [0,T ], integrating by parts as in
















ρsd(1−χs) = Rt . (4.19)
Hence (Rnt ) and (Rt) satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 4.4.11 and we can conclude that
(4.17) holds.
We close this technical section with a similar result to the above but for approximations which
are needed for the proof of Proposition 4.4.6. The next proposition is tailored for our specific
type of regularisation of processes in A(F1t ). Notice that the left hand side of (4.21) features χt−
while the right hand side has χt .
Proposition 4.4.14. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let (χt),(ρt) ∈ A◦(Gt), (ρnt )n≥1 ⊂ A◦(Gt) and
consider (Xt) ∈ Lb which is (Ft)-adapted and regular. Assume the sequence (ρnt )n≥1 is non-

























t−(ω) = ρt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]. (4.22)
Proof. Denote by Ω0 the set on which the convergence (4.20) holds. The first observation is that














ρu−(ω) = ρt−(ω), (4.23)
where the order of limits can be swapped by monotonicity of the process and of the sequence
(see Lemma B.2.1). The convergence at t = 0 is obvious as ρn0− = ρ0− = 0. This proves (4.22).








and extend both processes to t = T in a continuous way by taking RnT := R
n
T− and RT := RT−.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 4.4.13, by construction we have (Rnt )n≥1 ⊂ Ã◦(Gt) and
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(Rt) ∈ Ã◦(Gt), and the idea is to apply Proposition 4.4.11. First we notice that for all ω ∈Ω and
any t ∈ [0,T ) we have
∆Rt(ω) = (1−χt(ω))∆ρt(ω)
so that we can write the set of points of continuity of (Rt) as (recall Definition 4.4.8)
CR(ω) =Cρ(ω)∪{t ∈ [0,T ] : χt(ω) = 1}.
For any t ∈ [0,T ) and all ω ∈ Ω0, integrating Rnt (ω) by parts (Proposition 2.2.1) and then
taking limits as n→ ∞, we obtain
lim
n→∞














=Rt(ω)− (1−χt(ω))∆ρt(ω) = Rt−(ω),
where the second equality uses dominated convergence and (4.20), and the third equality is inte-
gration by parts. We can therefore conclude that
lim
n→∞
Rnt (ω) = Rt(ω), for all t ∈CR(ω)∩ [0,T ) and all ω ∈Ω0.
It remains to show the convergence at T (which belongs to CR(ω) by our construction of (Rt)).
Since the function t 7→ ρt(ω) is non-decreasing and the sequence (ρnt (ω))n is non-decreasing, the
sequence (Rnt (ω))n is as well non-decreasing (a proof of this fact is contained in Lemma B.2.2).
As in (4.23), we show that limn→∞ RnT−(ω) = RT−(ω) for ω ∈ Ω0. By construction of (Rnt ) and
(Rt), this proves convergence of RnT to RT .
Then, the processes (Rnt ) and (Rt) fulfil all the assumptions of Proposition 4.4.11 whose
application allows us to obtain (4.21).
From the convergence (4.25), an identical argument as in (4.23) (with (Rnt ), (Rt) in place of
(ρnt ), (ρt)) proves convergence of left-limits of processes (R
n) at any t ∈ [0,T ]. The following
corollary formalises this observation. It will be used in Section 4.5.1.




Rnt−(ω) = Rt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ].
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4.4.2 Verification of the conditions of Sion’s theorem
For the application of Sion’s theorem, we will consider the weak topology on Aac(F1t ) and A(F
2
t )
inherited from the space S. In our arguments, we will often use notions and theorems from
Section A.3. In particular, we will use that for convex sets the weak and strong closedness
are equivalent (Theorem A.3.3), and that any S-converging sequence admits a (λ× P)-a.e. -
converging subsequence (Theorem A.3.7).
Lemma 4.4.16. For any filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft) satisfying the usual conditions, the set A(Gt) is
weakly compact in S.
Proof. We write A for A(Gt) and A◦ for A◦(Gt). The set A is a subset of the unit ball in S. Since
S is a reflexive Banach space (Corollary A.3.9), this ball is weakly compact (Kakutani’s Theorem
A.3.5). Therefore, we only need to show that A is weakly closed (then the weak compactness is
implied by Theorem A.2.3). Since A is convex, it is enough to show that A is strongly closed
(Theorem A.3.3).
Take a sequence (ρnt )n≥1⊂A that converges strongly in S to (ρt). We will prove that (ρt)∈A
by constructing a càdlàg non-decreasing adapted process (ρ̂t) such that ρ̂0−= 0, ρ̂T = 1, and ρ̂ =
ρ (λ×P)-a.e. With no loss of generality we can pass to the càdlàg representatives (ρ̂nt )n≥1 ⊂A◦














ds = t, for all t ∈ [0,T ],
we can find D̂⊂ [0,T ] with λ([0,T ]\ D̂) = 0 such that P(Ωt) = 1 for all t ∈ D̂, where




t (ω) = ρt(ω)}.






t (ω) = ρt(ω), for all (t,ω) ∈ D×Ω0.
Since ρ̂nk are non-decreasing, so is the mapping D 3 t 7→ ρt(ω) for all ω ∈Ω0. Let us extend this
mapping to [0,T ] by defining ρ̂t(ω) := ρt(ω) for t ∈ D and
ρ̂t(ω) := lim
s∈D:s↓t
ρs(ω), ρ̂0−(ω) := 0, ρ̂T (ω) := 1, for all ω ∈Ω0,
where the limit exists due to monotonicity. For ω ∈N := Ω\Ω0, we set ρ̂t(ω) = 0 for t < T and
ρ̂T (ω) = 1. Notice that N ∈ G0 since P(N) = 0 so that ρ̂t is Gt-measurable for t ∈ D. Moreover,
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(ρ̂t) is càdlàg by construction and ρ̂t is measurable with respect to ∩s∈D,s>t Gs = Gt+ = Gt for
each t ∈ [0,T ] by the right-continuity of the filtration (Assumption (A5)). Hence, (ρ̂t) is (Gt)-
adapted and (ρ̂t) ∈A◦.
It remains to show that ρ̂nk → ρ̂ in S so that ρ̂ = ρ (λ×P)-a.e. and therefore (ρt) ∈ A. It
suffices to show that ρ̂nk → ρ̂ (λ×P)-a.e. and then conclude by dominated convergence that
ρ̂nk → ρ̂ in S. For each ω ∈ Ω0 the process t 7→ ρ̂(ω) has at most countably many jumps (on
any bounded interval) by monotonicity (Proposition A.4.15), i.e. λ([0,T ] \Cρ̂(ω)) = 0 (recall





t (ω) = ρ̂t(ω), for all t ∈Cρ̂(ω) and all ω ∈Ω0.
Since (λ×P)({(t,ω) : t ∈Cρ̂(ω)∩B,ω ∈ Ω0})=λ(B) for any bounded interval B ⊆ [0,T ], then
ρ̂nk→ ρ̂ in S. Thus, A is strongly closed in S.
Remark 4.4.17. Our space A(Gt) is the space of processes that generate randomised stopping
times, and for any (ρt) ∈ A(Gt) we require that ρT (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. In the finite horizon
problem, i.e. T < ∞, such specification imposes a constraint that prevents a direct use of the
topology induced by the norm considered in Touzi & Vieille (2002). Indeed, in Touzi & Vieille







< ∞, ∆ρT := ρT − liminf
t↑T
ρt .
The space of generating processes A(Gt) is not closed in the topology induced by ‖ ·‖ above: for








, t ∈ [0,T ].
Then ||ρn|| → 0 as n→ ∞ but ρ ≡ 0 /∈ A(Gt) since it fails to be equal to one at T (and it is not
possible to select a representative from A(Gt) with the equivalence relation induced by ‖ · ‖).
Lemma 4.4.18. Given any (ξ,ζ) ∈ Aac(F1t )×A(F2t ), the functionals N(ξ, ·) : A(F2t )→ R and
N(·,ζ) : Aac(F1t )→ R are, respectively, upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous in the
strong topology of S.











4.4 Sion’s theorem and existence of value
Upper semicontinuity of N(ξ, ·). Fix (ξt) ∈ Aac(F1t ) and consider a sequence (ζnt )n≥1 ⊂




Assume, by contradiction, that limsupn→∞ N(ξ,ζ
n) > N(ξ,ζ). There is a subsequence (nk)
over which the limit on the left-hand side is attained. Along a further subsequence we have
(P× λ)-a.e. convergence of (ζnt ) to (ζt) (Theorem A.3.7). With an abuse of notation we will
assume that the original sequence posesses those two properties, i.e. the limit limn→∞ N(ξ,ζn)
exists and it strictly dominates N(ξ,ζ), and there is (P×λ)-a.e. convergence of (ζnt ) to (ζt).



























gt(1−ξt−)dζnt +(h−gT )∆ξT ∆ζnT
]
,
where the first equality is by (absolute) continuity of (ξt) and for the second one we used that
1− ξT− = ∆ξT . From Lemma 4.4.9 and the boundedness and continuity of (ξt) we verify the



























Combining above convergence results contradicts limn→∞ N(ξ,ζn) > N(ξ,ζ), hence, proves the
upper semicontinuity.
Lower semicontinuity of N(·,ζ). Fix (ζt)∈A(F2t ) and consider a sequence (ξnt )n≥1⊂Aac(F1t )
converging to (ξt) ∈ Aac(F1t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction as above, we assume that
there is a subsequence of (ξnt ) which we denote the same, such that ξ
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t (ω) = ξt(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ).























ft(1−ζt−)dξnt +(h− fT )∆ξnT ∆ζT
]
.









(h− fT )∆ξT ∆ζT
]
,













by Proposition 4.4.13. The above results contradict (4.27), therefore, proving the lower semicon-
tinuity.
We are now ready to prove that the game with continuous randomisation for the first player
(τ-player) has a value.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. We will show that the conditions of Sion’s theorem hold (recall the
notation in Theorem 3.5.3) with (A,B) = (A(F2t ),Aac(F
1
t )) on the space S× S equipped with
its weak topology. For the sake of compactness of notation, we will write A for A(F2t ) and Aac
for Aac(F1t ). A straightforward proof of the fact that the sets A and Aac are convex is contained
in Lemma B.2.3. Compactness of A in the weak topology of S follows from Lemma 4.4.16. It
remains to prove the convexity and semicontinuity properties of the functional N with respect to
the weak topology of S. This is equivalent to showing (see Theorem A.4.5) that for any a ∈ R,
(ξ̂t) ∈Aac and (ζ̂t) ∈A the level sets
Ka(ζ̂) = {(ξt) ∈Aac : N(ξ, ζ̂)≤ a} and Za(ξ̂) = {(ζt) ∈A : N(ξ̂,ζ)≥ a}
are convex and closed in Aac and A, respectively, with respect to the weak topology of S. For
any λ ∈ [0,1] and (ξ1t ),(ξ2t ) ∈ Aac, (ζ1t ),(ζ2t ) ∈ A, using the expression in (4.9) it is immediate
(by linearity) that
N(λξ1 +(1−λ)ξ2, ζ̂) = λN(ξ1, ζ̂)+(1−λ)N(ξ2, ζ̂),
N(ξ̂,λζ1 +(1−λ)ζ2) = λN(ξ̂,ζ1)+(1−λ)N(ξ̂,ζ2).
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This proves the convexity of the level sets. Their closedness in the strong topology of S follows
from Lemma 4.4.18 (an attentive reader may have noticed that only sequential closedness was
proven, but then an application of Lemma A.2.5 proves the topological closedness). The latter
two properties imply, by Theorem A.3.3, that the level sets are closed in the weak topology of S.
Sion’s theorem (Theorem 3.5.3) yields the existence of the value of the game: W∗ =W ∗.
The second part of the statement results from using Lemma 3.6.3 which allows to write max












where (ζ∗t ) ∈A delivers the maximum.
4.4.3 Approximation with continuous controls
We now prove Proposition 4.4.6 by constructing a sequence (ξnt )n of Lipschitz continuous pro-
cesses with the Lipschitz constant for each process bounded by n for all ω. This uniform bound
on the Lipschitz constant is not used below, as we only need that each of the processes (ξnt )
has absolutely continuous trajectories with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0,T ) so that it
belongs to Aac(F1t ).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.6. Fix (ζt)∈A(F2t ). We need to show that for any (ξt)∈A(F1t ), there




We will explicitly construct absolutely continuous (ξnt ) that approximate (ξt) in a suitable
sense. As N(ξ,ζ) does not depend on the choice of càdlàg representatives, by Definition 4.4.2,
without loss of generality we assume that (ξt) ∈ A◦(F1t ) and (ζt) ∈ A◦(F2t ). Define a function




t−sdξs for t ∈ [0,T ), and ξnT := 1. We shall show that (ξnt ) are
n-Lipschitz, hence (Lemma A.4.21) absolutely continuous on [0,T ). Note that φnt ≡ 0 for t ≤ 0,





















n|(t1− s)− (t2− s)|dξs =
∫
[0,T ]
n|t1− t2|dξs = n|t1− t2|,
where the first inequality is a generic estimate of the absolute value of an integral, and the second
inequality follows by the definition of φn.
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We will verify the assumptions of Proposition 4.4.14. Clearly the sequence (ξnt ) is non-
decreasing in n, as the measure dξ(ω) is positive for each ω ∈ Ω and the sequence φn is non-
decreasing. By the construction of (ξnt ) we have ξ
n
0 = 0→ ξ0− as n→ ∞. Moreover, for any













where the first equality uses that φn0 = 0, so that jumps of (ξt) at time t give zero contribution,





n(t− s)dξs ≤ ξt−−ξt−1n
→ 0,



















T = ∆ξT , (4.30)
since ξnT = 1 for all n ≥ 1. The dominated convergence theorem (applied to the second integral




















































where the last inequality is due to Assumption (A3). Combining this with (4.31) completes the
proof of (4.28).
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Remark 4.4.19. Recall the similar approximating construction (3.28) of (Touzi & Vieille, 2002,
Lemma 5.2). The advantage of our construction in the proof of Proposition 4.4.6 is that it allows
to avoid integrating with respect to the payoff processes ( ft), (gt). Hence, unlike Touzi & Vieille
(2002), we do not have to impose a semimartingality assumption on the payoff processes.
4.5 Extensions and complimentary results
4.5.1 Relaxation of Assumption (A2)
Assumption (A2), which requires that the payoff processes are regular, can be relaxed to allow
for previsible jumps. In this section, we extend Theorem 4.4.5 and Proposition 4.4.6 to the
case of Assumption (A2’) with the payoff process (gt) having non-negative previsible jumps,
i.e. (ĝt) from the decomposition in (A2’) being non-decreasing. Arguments when ( f̂t) is non-
increasing (the payoff process ( ft) has non-positive previsible jumps) are analogous. However,
in that case, we define the analogue of problem (4.11) where the second player (maximiser) uses
absolutely continuous generating processes (ζt) ∈Aac(F2t ) and the first player (minimiser) picks
(ξt) ∈ A(F1t ). We give more details on this symmetric problem below in this section and in
Section 4.5.2.
Theorem 4.5.1. Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) (with (ĝt) non-decreasing), the game
(4.11) has a value, i.e.
W∗ =W ∗ :=W.





Proposition 4.5.2. Under assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) (with (ĝt) non-decreasing), for any




We remark that, in order to treat the case of Assumption (A2’) with the payoff process ( f̂t)










and to state the following theorem analogous to Theorem 4.5.1.
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Theorem 4.5.3. Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) (with ( f̂t) non-increasing), the game
(4.33) has a value, i.e.
W̃∗ = W̃ ∗ := W̃ .




N(ξ∗,ζ) = W̃ .
Similarly, Proposition 4.5.2 has the following counterpart.
Proposition 4.5.4. Under assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) (with ( f̂t) non-increasing), for any




Proof of Theorem 4.2.3. The proof is identical to the proof Theorem 4.2.4 but with references to
Theorem 4.4.5 and Proposition 4.4.6 replaced by the above results: more precisely, by Theorem
4.5.1 and Proposition 4.5.2 in case when (ĝt) is non-decreasing, and by Theorem 4.5.3 and
Proposition 4.5.4 in case when ( f̂t) non-increasing.
Section 4.5.2 is devoted to proving Theorem 4.5.3 and Proposition 4.5.4. In the rest of this
section we prove Theorem 4.5.1 and Proposition 4.5.2.
By Assumption (A2’), the processes ( f̂t),(ĝt) have integrable variation (in the sense of Defi-
nition A.5.5), and, in particular, finite variation (Definition A.5.4). By Corollary A.5.7, we then
have the following decomposition: there exist (Ft)-stopping times (η
f







-measurable random variables X fk , k≥ 1, and non-negative Fηgk -measurable random















k > 0 for all k≥ 1. Since ( f̂t),(ĝt) have integrable
variation, the infinite sequences in (4.34) are dominated by integrable random variables X f and
Xg: for any t ∈ [0,T ]










To handle convergence of integrals of piecewise-constant processes, we need to extend the
results of Proposition 4.4.11.
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t (ω) = ρt(ω), for all t ∈Cρ(ω)∪{T}
})
= 1.
































Proof. Let Ω0 be the set of ω ∈ Ω for which ρnt (ω)→ ρt(ω) for all t ∈Cρ(ω)∪{T}. We have
P(Ω0) = 1 by assumption. Fix ω ∈ Ω0. Take an arbitrary t ∈ Cρ(ω) such that t < θ(ω) (such
t always exists, since θ(ω) > 0 and since t 7→ ρt(ω) has at most countably many jumps on any














































where the last inequality is by (4.38). Combining the above completes the proof of (4.36).
Assume now that θ(ω) ∈ Cρ(ω) or X(ω) = 0 for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω0. This and the dominated
convergence theorem yield





where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of (ρnt ). This estimate and (4.36) prove
(4.37).
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Remark 4.5.6. The inequality (4.36) in Proposition 4.5.5 can be strict even if ρnt → ρt for all
t ∈ [0,T ], because this condition does not imply that ρnt−→ ρt−. One needs further continuity
assumptions on (ρt) to establish equality (4.37).
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1. Compared to the proof of the analogue result under the more stringent
condition (A2) (i.e. Theorem 4.4.5), we only need to establish lower and upper semicontinuity
of the functional N, while all the remaining arguments stay valid.
Indeed, in the proof of Theorem 4.4.5, we verify that the sets A and Aac are convex; com-
pactness of A in the weak topology of S is proven in Lemma 4.4.16. In the proof of Theorem
4.4.5, we also show that for any a ∈ R, (ξ̂t) ∈Aac and (ζ̂t) ∈A the level sets
Ka(ζ̂) = {(ξt) ∈Aac : N(ξ, ζ̂)≤ a} and Za(ξ̂) = {(ζt) ∈A : N(ξ̂,ζ)≥ a}
are convex in Aac and A, respectively. What remains to prove before applying Sion’s theorem is
that these level sets are closed with respect to the weak topology of S. This, due to the convexity
and Theorem A.3.3, follows from their closedness in the strong topology of S, which we establish
below by extending arguments of Lemma 4.4.18.
Upper semicontinuity of N(ξ, ·). Fix (ξt) ∈ Aac(F1t ) and consider a sequence (ζnt )n≥1 ⊂
A(F2t ) converging to (ζt) ∈ A(F2t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction, we assume that
there is a subsequence of (ζnt )n≥1, denoted the same with an abuse of notation, that converges




Without loss of generality, we can further require that (ζnt )n≥1 ⊂ A◦(F2t ) and (ζt) ∈ A◦(F2t ).























gt(1−ξt−)dζnt +(h−gT )∆ξT ∆ζnT
]
.
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(1−ξs−)dζns , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1−ξs−)dζs, for t ∈ [0,T ], (4.42)
with Rn0− = R0− = 0; then we are going to apply Proposition 4.5.5 with (R
n
t ) and (Rt) in place
of (ρnt ) and (ρt). In order to do that, we need to check that R
n
t (ω) → Rt(ω) as n → ∞ for
t ∈CR(ω) =Cζ(ω)∪{t ∈ [0,T ] : ξt(ω) = 1}, for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω. The latter is indeed true. Setting
Ω0 = {ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞ ζnt (ω) = ζt(ω) ∀ t ∈Cζ(ω)}, we have P(Ω0) = 1 by Lemma 4.4.9. For
















ζsdξs = Rt ,
where the convergence of the second term is due to the dominated convergence theorem and the














ζsdξs = Rt ,
where we again applied the dominated convergence.










































































































4.5 Extensions and complimentary results
where the last inequality is due to (4.43) and the final equality follows by monotone convergence
and the decomposition of (ĝt). This completes the proof of (4.41).
















Hence we have a contradiction with limn→∞ N(ξ,ζn) > N(ξ,ζ), which proves the upper semi-
continuity.
Lower semicontinuity of N(·,ζ). The proof follows closely the argument of the proof of
Lemma 4.4.18: we fix (ζt) ∈ A(F2t ), consider a sequence (ξnt )n≥1 ⊂ Aac(F1t ) converging to




and reach a contradiction. We focus on how to handle the convergence for ( f̂t) as all other terms
are handled by the proof of Lemma 4.4.18.
By Lemma 4.4.9 and the continuity of (ξt) we have P
(











with Rn0− = R0− = 0. Due to the continuity of (ξ
n
t ) and (ξt) for t ∈ [0,T ), processes (Rnt ) and
(Rt) are continuous on [0,T ) with a possible jump at T . From (4.19) in the proof of Proposition
4.4.13 we conclude that for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω
lim
n→∞
Rnt (ω) = Rt(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ].




for all k. Recalling that (Rt) is continuous on [0,T ), we can apply (4.37) in Proposition 4.5.5:
















Combining the latter with decomposition (4.34) and the dominated convergence theorem (with
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and the rest of the proof of lower semicontinuity from Lemma 4.4.18 applies.
Remark 4.5.7. Item (4) in Assumption (A2’) implies in particular that the payoff process (gt)
does not have previsible jumps that are P-a.s. negative. This assumption cannot be further re-
laxed as this may cause the proof of the upper semicontinuity in Theorem 4.5.1 to fail. Recall
that the process (gt) corresponds to the payoff of the second player and her strategy (ζt) is
not required to be absolutely continuous. For example, fix t0 ∈ (0,T ) and take gt = 1− I{t≥t0},
ζt = I{t≥t0} and ξt = I{t=T}. Let us consider the sequence ζ
n
t = I{t≥t0− 1n}, which converges to (ζt)
pointwise and also strongly in S. We have∫
[0,T ]




hence (4.41) fails and so does (4.45).
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2. Here, we show how to extend the proof of Proposition 4.4.6 to the
more general setting. Fix (ζt) ∈ A◦(F2t ) and (ξt) ∈ A◦(F1t ). Construct a sequence (ξnt ) ⊂
A◦ac(F
1

































with Rn0− = R0− = 0. Corollary 4.4.15 implies that for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω
lim
n→∞
Rnt−(ω) = Rt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]. (4.50)
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By the decomposition of ( f̂t) in (4.34) and the dominated convergence theorem for the infinite

































We further apply dominated convergence (with respect to the product of the counting measure








































where the second equality uses (4.50) and the final one the decomposition of ( f̂t). Recalling that


























It remains to notice that, by (4.32), the right-hand side is dominated by N(ξ,ζ), which completes
the proof of (4.48).
4.5.2 Regularising the control of the other player
Recall that initially in Section 4.4, we regularised the control (ξt) of the first player to belong to
Aac(F
1
t ) (see (4.11)). In this subsection, we show that the choice of the player caused no loss of
generality, by adjusting our proofs to the situation when, instead, the control (ζt) of the second
player belongs to Aac(F2t ).
We note that the ideas of the proofs are similar to Section 4.5.1. Again, we will have to verify
semicontinuity of the functional N in order to prove Theorem 4.5.3, and we will approximate a
control by a sequence of Lipschitz-continuous ones to prove Proposition 4.5.4. Some arguments
are the same as in Theorem 4.5.1 and Proposition 4.5.2, up to swapping the roles of (ξt) and (ζt).
Note, however, that the decomposition (4.54) below is different from (4.35), and this causes
certain differences in the proofs. In particular, in (4.65) we apply the usual Fatou’s lemma and
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not its reverse counterpart as we did in (4.44). Another example is that the inequality (4.32) is
written for the functional N(ξ,ζ), while the symmetric version (4.68) bounds the value of its
approximation N(ξ,ζn).
Semicontinuity
Recall Assumption (A2) and its generalisation (A2’) — in particular, the last bullet point of
the latter. In Section 4.5.1, we covered the case when Assumption (A2’) holds with the payoff
process (gt) having only non-negative previsible jumps, i.e. (ĝt) from the decomposition in
(A2’) being non-decreasing. In the current symmetric set-up, we assume that, instead, ( f̂t) is
non-increasing (the process ( ft) has only non-positive previsible jumps).
The processes ( f̂t),(ĝt) have the following decomposition (see Section 4.5.1 for the explaina-





k)k≥1 and F-measurable, non-negative random variables (X
f
k )k≥1 and (X
g











and the infinite sequences in (4.53) are dominated by integrable random variables X f and Xg: for
any t ∈ [0,T ]










Proof of Theorem 4.5.3. As explained in the proof of Theorem 4.5.1, in order to prove Theorem
4.5.3 we only need to establish lower and upper semicontinuity of the functional N. We do so by
extending arguments of Lemma 4.4.18.
Upper semicontinuity of N(ξ, ·). Fix (ξt)∈A(F1t ) and consider a sequence (ζnt )n≥1⊂Aac(F2t )
converging to (ζt) ∈Aac(F2t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction, we assume that there is a
subsequence of (ζnt )n≥1, denoted the same with an abuse of notation, that converges (P×λ)-a.e.




Without loss of generality, we can further require that (ζnt )n≥1 ⊂ A◦ac(F2t ) and (ζt) ∈ A◦ac(F2t ).
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gt(1−ξt−)dζnt +(h−gT )∆ξT ∆ζnT
]
.
By Lemma 4.4.9 and the continuity of (ζt) we have P
(
limn→∞ ζnt (ω) = ζt(ω) ∀ t ∈ [0,T )
)
= 1.

































(1−ξs−)dζns , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1−ξs−)dζs, for t ∈ [0,T ],
with Rn0− = R0− = 0.
Due to the continuity of (ζnt ) and (ζt) for t ∈ [0,T ), processes (Rnt ) and (Rt) are continuous
on [0,T ) with a possible jump at T . It follows from (4.19) from the proof of Proposition 4.4.13
that for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω
lim
n→∞
Rnt (ω) = Rt(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Since ∆ĝT = 0 (see Assumption (A2’)), there is a decomposition such that X
g
k I{ηgk=T} = 0
P-a.s. for all k. Recalling that (Rt) is continuous on [0,T ), we can apply (4.37) in Proposition
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Hence we have a contradiction with (4.55), which proves the upper semicontinuity.
Lower semicontinuity of N(·,ζ). Fix (ζt) ∈ Aac(F2t ) and consider a sequence (ξnt )n≥1 ⊂
A(F1t ) converging to (ξt) ∈A(F1t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction as above, we assume
that there is a subsequence of (ξnt ) which we denote the same, with an abuse of notation, such



























ft(1−ζt−)dξnt +(h− fT )∆ξnT ∆ζT
]
,
where we used that 1− ζT− = ∆ζT . Let us first focus on the regular part ( f̃t) of the process
( ft). From Lemma 4.4.9 and the boundedness and continuity of (ζt) we verify the assumptions




































with Rn0− = R0− = 0.
In the proof of Theorem 4.5.1, we verify that (Rnt ), (Rt) defined as (4.42) satisfy the con-
ditions of Proposition 4.5.5. Note that in the current proof, (Rnt ) and (Rt) are the same up to













































































E[X fk ]< ∞.









































where the last inequality is due to (4.64) and the final equality follows by monotone convergence
and the decomposition of ( f̂t). This completes the proof of (4.63).









(h− fT )∆ξT ∆ζT
]
. (4.66)
Combining the above convergence results (4.61), (4.62), (4.63), (4.66) contradicts (4.60), hence,
proves the lower semicontinuity.
Approximation with continuous controls
Proof of Proposition 4.5.4. Fix (ξt)∈A(F1t ). We need to show that for any (ζt)∈A(F2t ), there




Without loss of generality we assume that (ζt) ∈A◦(F2t ) and (ξt) ∈A◦(F1t ). Recall the function




t−sdζs for t ∈ [0,T ), and
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ζnT = 1. By the argument identical to the proof of Proposition 4.4.6 (for (ξ
n
t ) therein), we see that
(ζnt ) are absolutely continuous on [0,T ), and that ζ
n






























where the last inequality is due to Assumption (A3). In order to prove (4.67), we will use the
decomposition (A2’) of ( ft) and (gt) and show that each of the terms on the right-hand side of
(4.68) converges to a corresponding term of N(ξ,ζ).
Let us consider the regular parts ( f̃t), (g̃t) or the processes ( ft), (gt). An argument identical to
the one that was used in the proof of Proposition 4.4.6 (for (ξnt ) therein) to verify the assumptions




















T = ∆ζT (4.70)
since ζnT = 1 for all n≥ 1. Recalling that ζnt → ζt− by construction, the dominated convergence






























with Rn0− = R0− = 0. Corollary 4.4.15 implies that for P-a.e. ω ∈Ω
lim
n→∞
Rnt−(ω) = Rt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]. (4.72)
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By the decomposition of (ĝt) and the dominated convergence theorem for the infinite sum






























We further apply dominated convergence with respect to the product of the counting measure



































where the second equality uses (4.72) and the final one the decomposition of (ĝt).
On the other hand, recalling that ζnt → ζt− by construction, we can apply the dominated


























which completes the proof of (4.67).
4.5.3 Value of G-conditioned game
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.2.5. Let us copy the statement for the ease of
reference.
Theorem. Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5) and for any G⊆F10∩F20, the G-conditioned
















By definition, randomisation devices Zτ and Zσ associated to a pair (τ,σ)∈ TR(F1t )×TR(F2t )
are independent of FT and, in particular, of G. Denoting by (ξt) ∈A◦(F1t ) and (ζt) ∈A◦(F2t ) the
generating processes for τ and σ, respectively, the statement of Proposition 4.3.4 (the alternative
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Remark 4.5.8. Similarly to Remark 4.3.5, the “internal” essential infimum/supremum can be

































Indeed, take arbitrary τ ∈ TR(F1t ), σ ∈ TR(F2t ), and define the family of stopping times

































while the reverse inequality is obvious since T(F2t )⊂ TR(F2t ). This proves (4.77), and the proof
of (4.78) is analogous.
Notice that V ≥V , P-a.s. We will show that
E[V ] = E[V ] (4.79)
so that V =V , P-a.s.






∣∣G], for τ ∈ TR(F1t )
and





∣∣G], for σ ∈ TR(F2t ).
87
4.5 Extensions and complimentary results
These are two standard optimal stopping problems and the theory of Snell envelope applies
(see Section 3.1). We adapt some results from that theory to suit our needs in the game setting.
Recall Definition 3.1.3 of a downwards/upwards directed family of random variables.
Lemma 4.5.9. The family {M(τ), τ∈ TR(F1t )} is downwards directed and the family {M(σ), σ∈
TR(F2t )} is upwards directed.




t ) ∈ A◦(F1t ) be the corresponding generating
processes. Fix the G-measurable event B = {M(τ(1))≤M(τ(2))} and define another randomised
stopping time as τ̂ = τ(1)IB + τ(2)IBc (the fact G ⊂ F10 ensures that τ̂ ∈ TR(F1t )). The generating
process of τ̂ reads ξ̂t = ξ
(1)
t IB + ξ
(2)
t IBc for t ∈ [0,T ]. Using the linear structure of (ξ̂t) and



































≤IBM(τ(1))+ IBcM(τ(2)) = M(τ(1))∧M(τ(2)),
where the inequality is by definition of essential supremum and the final equality by definition
of the event B. Thus, taking essential supremum over σ ∈ T(F2t ) we get
M(τ̂)≤M(τ(1))∧M(τ(2)),
hence the family {M(τ), τ ∈ TR(F1t )} is downwards directed. A symmetric argument proves that
the family {M(σ), σ ∈ TR(F2t )} is upwards directed.
By of Lemma 4.5.9 and Lemma 3.1.4, there exist sequences (σn)n≥1⊂ TR(F2t ) and (τn)n≥1⊂
TR(F1t ) such that P-a.s.
V = lim
n→∞
M(τn) and V = lim
n→∞
M(σn), (4.80)
where the convergence is monotone in both cases.
Analogous results hold for the optimisation problems defining M(τ) and M(σ).




, τ ∈ T(F1t )} is downwards directed for each σ ∈




, σ ∈ T(F2t )} is upwards directed for each τ ∈ TR(F1t ).
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t ) ∈ A◦(F1t ) be the corresponding generating








} and define an-
other (F1t )-randomised stopping time as τ̂ = τ





t IBc for t ∈ [0,T ]. Using the linear structure of (ξ̂t) and recalling (4.76), for any

















































, τ ∈ TR(F1t )} is downwards directed. A symmetric argument




, σ ∈ T(F2t )} is upwards directed.
Remark 4.5.11. There is no inequality in (4.81), so, considering τ̂ = τ(1)IBc + τ(2)IB, the same




, τ ∈ TR(F1t )} is upwards directed. One can com-
pare this result to a similar one for usual stopping tmies (Karatzas & Shreve, 1998, Lemma
D.1).
As with (4.80), Lemma 4.5.10 implies that for each τ ∈ TR(F1t ) and σ ∈ TR(F2t ), there are














where the convergence is monotone in both cases. Equipped with these results we can prove the
following lemma which will quickly lead to (4.79). Recall V∗ and V ∗ from Definition 4.2.2.
Lemma 4.5.12. We have
E[V ] =V ∗, and E[V ] =V∗. (4.83)






The opposite inequality follows from the fact that M(τ)≥ E[P(τ,σ)|G] for any σ ∈ T(F2t ) by the
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From (4.80), an analogous argument proves that
E[V ] = inf
τ∈TR(F1t )
E[M(τ)]. (4.85)
Combining (4.84) and (4.85) completes the proof that E[V ] = V ∗. The second part of the state-
ment requires symmetric arguments.
With Lemma 4.5.12 proved, Theorem 4.2.5 follows almost immediately.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.5. By (4.83) and Theorem 4.2.3, we obtain (4.79), which is equivalent to
the statement of Theorem 4.2.5.
4.5.4 Generalised payoff and Nash equilibrium
In the joint paper with my PhD supervisors De Angelis et al. (2021c), we extend the results of
the present chapter to the case of a payoff more general than (4.1). Consider
P̃(τ,σ) = fτI{τ<σ}+gσI{σ<τ}+ h̃τI{τ=σ}, (4.86)
where τ ∈ TR(F1t ), σ ∈ TR(F2t ). Recall that the same payoff (3.25) was studied in Section 3.5,
but the game therein is a full-information one, which in the notation of this chapter corresponds
to the case (F1t ) = (F
2
t ) = (Ft).
The payoff processes ( ft), (gt) are assumed to be as above, i.e. to satisfy (A1), (A2’). Further,
the “middle” payoff process (h̃t) in De Angelis et al. (2021c) satisfies the following:
(A3’) ft ≥ h̃t ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0,T ], P-a.s.,
(A4’) (h̃t) is an (Ft)-adapted, measurable process.
Note that we do not assume that (h̃t) is càdlàg. The filtrations (F1t ),(F
2
t )⊆ (Ft) are assumed to
be as above, i.e. to satisfy (A5). Let us also define the expected payoff functional
Ñ(τ,σ) = E[P̃(τ,σ)].
Note that the current setting reduces to the setting of Section 4.1 if h̃t(ω) = ft(ω) for all
t ∈ [0,T ) and all ω ∈Ω. The random variable h̃T in this case plays the same role as the random
variable h in Section 4.1.
The value in randomised strategies of the asymmetric information game with the payoff
(4.86) is defined as in Definition 4.2.2. The classical definition of a Nash equilibrium 3.2.6
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in the current framework needs to be adjusted as follows: a pair (τ∗,σ∗) ∈ TR(F1)×TR(F2) is
said to be a Nash equilibrium, if
Ñ(τ∗,σ)≤ Ñ(τ∗,σ∗)≤ Ñ(τ,σ∗),
for all pairs (τ,σ) ∈ TR(F1)×TR(F2).
The main result of De Angelis et al. (2021c) extends Theorem 4.2.3.
Theorem 4.5.13 (De Angelis et al. (2021c), Theorem 2.4). Under Assumptions (A1), (A2’),
(A3’), (A4’), (A5), the game with the payoff (4.86) has a value in randomised strategies. More-
over, if f̂ and ĝ in (A2’) are non-increasing and non-decreasing, respectively, there exists a Nash
equilibrium (τ∗,σ∗).
To avoid a terminological confusion, we mention that in De Angelis et al. (2021c) a Nash
equilibrium is called a pair of optimal strategies (c.f. the term used in Theorem 4.4.5 to describe
a strategy of one of the players).
There is also the following extension of Theorem 4.2.5 on the value of the G-conditioned
game.
Theorem 4.5.14 (De Angelis et al. (2021c), Theorem 2.6). Under the assumptions of Theorem
















Moreover, if f̂ and ĝ in (A2’) are non-increasing and non-decreasing, respectively, there exists a




∣∣G]≤ E[P̃(τ∗,σ∗)∣∣G]≤ E[P̃(τ,σ∗)∣∣G], P-a.s.
for all pairs (τ,σ) ∈ TR(F1t )×TR(F2t ).
The proofs of Theorems 4.5.13 and 4.5.14 go through deriving, similarly to Proposition 4.3.4,
an alternative representation for the functional Ñ involving the generating processes (ξt), (ζt) of












Note that the right-hand side is the same as in (3.26) in Section 3.5, i.e. it does not depend on
the information features of the game but only on the form of the payoff. In De Angelis et al.
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(2021c), (4.87) is written with integrals over [0,T ), which is equivalent since ξT = ζT = 1. The
rest of the argument in De Angelis et al. (2021c) is similar to the current chapter, and the main
steps of the proof of Theorem 4.5.13 (namely, (De Angelis et al., 2021c, Theorem 5.21) and
(De Angelis et al., 2021c, Proposition 5.22)) are up to notation the same as Theorem 4.5.1 and
Proposition 4.5.2. However, we decided to present the results of the current chapter for the less
general payoff (4.1), because the majority of the work on the extension to the payoff (4.86) was
done by my PhD supervisors.
4.6 Examples
In this section, we illustrate some of the specific games for which our general results apply.
We draw from the existing literature on two-player zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time
(Chapter 3) and show that a broad class of these fits within our framework. Indeed, when (F1t ) =
(F2t ) = (Ft), the game (4.2) is the classical Dynkin game with full information for both players
(see Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.5). The case (F1t ) = (F
2
t ) ( (Ft) corresponds to a game with partial
but symmetric information about the payoff processes (Section 3.4.3, De Angelis et al. (2021b)),
whereas (F1t ) 6= (F2t ) is the game with asymmetric information. One can have (F1t ) = (Ft),
i.e. only the second player is uninformed (Section 3.4.1, Grün (2013)), or (F1t ) 6= (Ft) and
(F2t ) 6= (Ft), i.e. both players access different information flows and neither of them has full
knowledge of the underlying world (Section 3.4.2, Gensbittel & Grün (2019)).
Remark 4.6.1. Recall that in the classical non-Markovian full information framework of Section
3.2, the value of the game exists in pure strategies. On the other hand, our main Theorem 4.2.4
proves the existence of the value in randomised strategies. However, recall Section 3.1.3 where
we mention that the generating processes of pure stopping times are extreme points of the set
of generating processes (Pennanen & Perkkiö, 2018, Lemma 2). In our notation, we see that
the set T(Ft) consists of extreme points of the set TR(Ft). In the full information framework
(F1t ) = (F
2
t ) = (Ft), this fact could be possible to apply to deduce the existence of the value in
pure strategies. However, it is technically more difficult than the similar result for an optimal
stopping problem (Pennanen & Perkkiö, 2018, Theorem 1), since, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no min-max analogue of Bauer’s maximum principle. Since our contribution is mainly
to the theory of games with partial/asymmetric information, we leave further details on the full
information case to the future research, and below focus on the examples corresponding to the
papers reviewed in Section 3.4.
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4.6.1 Game with partially observed scenarios
Our first example extends the setting of Section 3.4.1. On a discrete probability space (Ωs,Fs,Ps),
consider two random variables I and J taking values in {1, . . . , I} and in {1, . . . ,J}, respectively.
Denote their joint distribution by (πi, j)i=1,...,I, j=1,...,J so that πi, j = Ps(I= i,J= j). The indices
(i, j) are used to identify the scenario in which the game is played and are the key ingredient to
model the asymmetric information feature. Consider another probability space (Ωp,Fp,Pp) with
a filtration (Fpt ) satisfying the usual conditions, (F
p
t )-adapted payoff processes ( f
i, j
t ) and (g
i, j
t ),
and FT -measurable terminal payoffs hi, j, with (i, j) taking values in {1, . . . , I}×{1, . . . ,J}. For
all i, j, we assume that ( f i, jt ), (g
i, j
t ), hi, j satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4).
The game is set on the probability space (Ω,F,P) := (Ωp×Ωs,Fp∨Fs,Pp⊗Ps). The first
player is informed about the outcome of I before the game starts but never directly observes J.
Hence, her actions are adapted to the filtration F1t = F
p
t ∨σ(I). Conversely, the second player
knows J but not I, so her actions are adapted to the filtration F2t = F
p
t ∨σ(J). Given a choice of
random times τ,σ for the first and the second player the payoff is




Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (4.2). The structure of the game
is common knowledge, i.e. both players know all processes ( f i, jt ), (g
i, j
t ) and all random variables
hi, j involved; however, they have partial and asymmetric knowledge on the couple (i, j) which is
drawn at the start of the game from the distribution of (I,J).
In the framework of Section 4.1, the above setting corresponds to ft = f
I,J
t , gt = g
I,J
t , and
h = hI,J with the filtration Ft = F
p
t ∨σ(I,J). The observation flows for the players are given by
(F1t ) and (F
2
t ), respectively.
We note that the set-up of Section 3.4.1 corresponds to the case J = 1, so the observation flow
of the second player contains no scenario information, i.e. (F2t ) = (F
p
t ). Moreover, the payoff
processes ( ft), (gt) and h in Section 3.4.1 are deterministic functions of a diffusion process (Xt)
on Rd (Section A.7), i.e. ft = F(t,Xt), gt = G(t,Xt) and h = H(XT ).
The particular structure of players’ filtrations (F1t ) and (F
2
t ) allows for the following decom-
position of randomised stopping times, see Lemma B.1.2.








where τ1, . . . ,τI ∈ TR(Fpt ), with generating processes (ξ1t ), . . . ,(ξIt ) ∈ A◦(F
p
t ) and a common
randomisation device Zτ. An analogous representation holds for σ ∈ TR(F2t ) with σ1, . . . ,σJ ∈
TR(F
p




t ), and a common randomisation device Zσ.
Corollary 4.6.3. Any (F1t )-stopping time τ has a decomposition (4.88) with τ1, . . . ,τI being (F
p
t )-
stopping times (and analogously for (F2t )-stopping times).
Hence, given a realisation of the scenario variable I (resp. J), the first (second) player chooses
a randomised stopping time whose generating process is adapted to the common filtration (Fpt ).










f i, jτi I{τi≤σ j}∩{τi<T}+g
i, j




4.6.2 Game with two partially observed dynamics
Here we show how the setting of Section 3.4.2 also fits in our framework. On a probability
space (Ω,F,P), consider two strong Markov processes (Xt) and (Yt) (in Section 3.4.2 these are
time-homogenous continuous-time Markov chains). The first player only observes the process
(Xt) while the second player only observes the process (Yt). In the notation of Section 4.1,




t ) = (F
Y
t ) and (Ft) = (F
X
t ∨FYt ) (recall that (FXt ) and (FYt ) denote
the filtrations generated by sample paths of (Xt) and (Yt), respectively, and augmented with P-
null sets, see Section 2.3). The payoff processes are deterministic functions of the underlying
dynamics, i.e. ft = F(t,Xt ,Yt), gt = G(t,Xt ,Yt) and h = H(XT ,YT ), and they satisfy conditions
(A1)-(A4). Given a choice of random times τ ∈ TR(F1t ) and σ ∈ TR(F2t ) for the first and the
second player, the payoff of the game reads
P(τ,σ) = F(τ,Xτ,Yτ)I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T}+G(σ,Xσ,Yσ)I{σ<τ}∩{σ<T}+H(XT ,YT )I{σ=T}∩{τ=T}.
Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (4.2).
We recall that the proofs of existence of the value in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are based on
variational inequalities. Further, the “scenario” interpretation in Section 3.4.2 is only possible
due to the finiteness of the state spaces of both underlying processes. Therefore, the existence
result cannot be extended to our general non-Markovian framework.
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4.6.3 Game with a single partially observed dynamics
Our next example generalises the set-up of Section 3.4.3. Recall that therein the underlying
dynamics of the game is a diffusion whose drift depends on the realisation of an independent
random variable I ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Formally, on a probability space (Ω,F,P) we have a Wiener
process (Wt) on Rd , an independent random variable I∈{1, . . . , I}with distribution πi =P(I= i),





I{I=i}µi(Xt)dt +σ(Xt)dWt , X0 = x,
where σ, (µi)i=1,...I are given functions (known to both players) that guarantee existence of a
unique strong solution of the SDE (see Section A.7). The payoff processes are deterministic
functions of the underlying process, i.e. ft = F(t,Xt), gt = G(t,Xt) and h = h(XT ), and they are
known to both players. We assume that the payoff processes satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4).
To draw a parallel with the notation from Section 4.1, here we take Ft =FWt ∨σ(I) (recall also
Section 2.3). Both players observe the dynamics of (Xt), however they have partial/asymmetric
information on the value of I. If neither of the two players knows the true value of I, we have
(F1t ) = (F
2
t ) = (F
X
t ) (notice that F
X
t ( Ft). If, instead, the first player (minimiser) observes the
true value of I, then (F1t ) = (Ft) and (F
2
t ) = (F
X
t ), so that F
2
t ( F1t . Recall that both situations
are considered in Section 3.4.3. However, therein only two scenarios are possible (I = 2), and
the payoff processes are particular time-homogeneous functions of a particular one-dimensional
diffusion.
Using the notation XI to emphasise the dependence of the underlying dynamics on I, and
given a choice of random times τ and σ for the first and the second player, the payoff of the game
reads





Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (4.2).
Recall that in Section 3.4.3, the value exists in a smaller class of strategies. If neither of
the players is informed, they both use (FXt )-stopping times, with no need for additional ran-
domisation. If one of the players is informed, she uses (Ft)-randomised stopping times, but
the uninformed player uses (FXt )-stopping times. We emphasise that in our general setting the
randomisation is necessary for both players, as shown in Section 4.7.2.
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4.6.4 Game with a random horizon
Here we consider a non-Markovian extension of the framework of Section 3.4.4, where the time
horizon of the game is random and independent of the payoff processes. On a probability space
(Ω,F,P) we have a filtration (Gt)t∈[0,T ] satisfying the usual conditions and a positive random
variable θ which is independent of GT and has a continuous distribution. Let Λt := I{t≥θ} and
take Ft = Gt ∨σ(Λs, 0≤ s≤ t).
The players have asymmetric knowledge of the random variable θ. The first player observes
the occurrence of θ, whereas the second player does not. We have (F1t ) = (Ft) and (F
2
t ) = (Gt)(
(Ft). Given a choice of random times τ ∈ TR(F1t ) and σ ∈ TR(F2t ) for the first and the second









where we assume that ( f 0t ), (g
0
t ), h
0 satisfy the conditions (A1)-(A4), and that f 0t ≥ 0 for all
t ∈ [0,T ].
Note that the problem above does not fit directly into the framework of Section 4.1: As-
sumption (A1) is indeed violated, because the processes (I{t≤θ} f 0t ),(I{t≤θ}g
0
t ) are not càdlàg.
However, we now show that the game can be equivalently formulated as a game satisfying con-
ditions of our framework. The expected payoff can be rewritten as follows




















where the second equality holds because θ is continuously distributed and independent of F2T , so
P(σ = θ) = 0 for any σ ∈ TR(F2t ). Fix ε > 0 and set
f εt := f
0
t I{t<θ+ε}, gt := g
0
t I{t<θ}, h := h
0I{T<θ}, t ∈ [0,T ]. (4.90)
We see that conditions (A1), (A3), (A4) hold for ( ft), (gt), h (for conditions (A3), (A4) we
use that f 0 ≥ 0). Condition (A2) (regularity of payoffs ( ft) and (gt)) is also satisfied, because
( f 0t ), (g
0
t ) are regular and θ has a continuous distribution, so it is a totally inaccessible stopping
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has a value.
We now show that the game with expected payoff N0 has the same value as the one with




















T, τ > θ.
Then, using that Pε(τ,σ) = P(τ,σ) on {τ ≤ θ} and Pε(T,σ) = g0σI{σ<θ} = P(τ,σ) on {τ > θ},
















Since the value of the game with expected payoff Nε exists, combining (4.92) and (4.93) we
see that the value of the game with expected payoff N also exists.
Recall that in Section 3.4.4 the setting is Markovian with T = ∞, f 0t = e
−rtF(Xt), g0t =
e−rtG(Xt) (F , G continuous deterministic functions and r ≥ 0), h0 = 0, θ is exponentially dis-
tributed, and (Xt) is a one-dimensional linear diffusion. Under specific requirements on the
functions F and G, Lempa & Matomäki (2013) find that a Nash equilibrium for the game exists
when the first player uses (F1t )-stopping times and the second player uses (F
2
t )-stopping times,
with no need for randomisation. Their methods rely on the theory of one-dimensional linear
diffusions, hence do not admit an extension to a non-Markovian case.
4.7 Necessity of assumptions
In the subsections below we show that: (a) relaxing condition (A4) may lead to a game with-
out a value, (b) in situations where one player has all the informational advantage, the use of
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randomised stopping times may still be beneficial also for the uninformed player, and (c) As-
sumption (A2’) is tight in requiring that either ( f̂t) is non-increasing or (ĝt) is non-decreasing.
In order to keep the exposition simple we consider the framework of Section 4.6.1 with I = 2,
J = 1, and impose that (Fpt ) be the trivial filtration (hence all payoff processes are deterministic,
since they are (Fpt )-adapted). Furthermore we restrict to the case in which f 1,1 = f 2,1 = f
and g1,1 = g2,1 = g. Only the terminal payoff depends on the scenario, i.e. h1,1 6= h2,1 (both
deterministic since (FpT )-measurable). For notational simplicity we set h
1 := h1,1 and h2 := h2,1.
Note that only the first player (minimiser) observes the true value of I, so she has a strict
informational advantage over the second player (maximiser). The second player will be referred
to as the uninformed player while the first player as the informed player.
We denote by TR = TR(Fpt ) the set of (F
p
t )-randomised stopping times. The informed player
chooses two randomised stopping times τ1,τ2 (one for each scenario, recall Lemma 4.6.2) with
the generating processes (ξ1t ),(ξ
2
t ) which, due to the triviality of the filtration (F
p
t ), are deter-
ministic functions. Pure (Fpt )-stopping times are constants in [0,T ]. Similarly, the uninformed
player’s randomised stopping time σ has a deterministic function (ζt) as the generating process.
4.7.1 Necessity of Assumption (A4)
Let us consider specific payoff functions
f ≡ 1, gt =
1
2
t, h1 = 2, h2 = 0,
and let us also set T = 1, π1 = π2 = 12 .








so the game does not have a value.
Proof. First we show that V∗ ≤ 12 , i.e. that for any σ ∈ T
R, there exist τ1,τ2 ∈ TR such that










so we can take τ1,τ2 ∈ [0,1] deterministic in the arguments below. Take any σ ∈ TR and the
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where we used Lemma 4.3.2, the fact that σ is bounded above by 1, and that I is independent of









This proves that V∗ ≤ 12 .
Now we turn our attention to demonstrating that V ∗ > 12 , i.e. that for any τ1,τ2 ∈ T
R, there
exists σ ∈ TR such that N((τ1,τ2),σ)> 12 . Noting again that









we can restrict our attention to constant σ ∈ [0,1]. Take any τ1,τ2 ∈ TR and the corresponding
generating processes (ξ1t ),(ξ
2
t ) which are also deterministic functions.
Take any δ ∈ (0, 12). If ξ
1










































































On the other hand, if ξ11− ≤ δ, taking σ = 1 yields
sup
σ∈[0,1]
N((τ1,τ2),σ)≥ N((τ1,τ2),1)≥ E[2 · I{τ1=1}I{I=1}] = 1−ξ
1




where the equality is due to Lemma 4.3.2. This completes the proof that V ∗ > 12 .
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4.7 Necessity of assumptions
Figure 4.1: Payoff functions: ( ft) in blue, (gt) in orange.
4.7.2 Necessity of randomisation
Here we argue that randomisation is not only sufficient in order to find the value in Dynkin games
with asymmetric information but, in many cases, it is also necessary. In De Angelis et al. (2021a)
(see Sections 3.4.3 and 4.6.3), there is a rare example of explicit construction of equilibrium
strategies for a zero-sum Dynkin game with asymmetric information in a diffusive set-up. The
peculiarity of the solution in De Angelis et al. (2021a) lies in the fact that the informed player uses
a randomised stopping time whereas the uninformed player sticks to a pure stopping time. An
interpretation of that result suggests that the informed player uses randomisation to “gradually
reveal information” about the scenario in which the game is being played, in order to induce
the uninformed player to act in a certain desirable way. Since the uninformed player has “no
information to reveal” one may be tempted to draw a general conclusion that she should never
use randomised stopping rules. However, Proposition 4.7.2 below shows that such conclusion
would be wrong in general and even the uninformed player may benefit from randomisation of
stopping times.
We consider specific payoff functions ( ft) and (gt) plotted on Figure 4.1. Their analytic
formulae read
ft = (10t +4)I{t∈[0, 110 )}+5I{t∈[ 110 ,1]}, gt = (15t−6)I{t∈[ 25 , 12 )}+(9−15t)I{t∈[ 12 , 35 )}
with
h1 = 0 = g1−, h2 = 5 = f1−.
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We also set T = 1, π1 = π2 = 12 . As always, we identify randomised strategies with their gener-
ating processes. In particular, we denote by (ζt) the generating process for σ ∈ TR.
By Theorem 4.2.4, the game has a value in randomised strategies, i.e. V ∗ =V∗. Restriction of
the uninformed player’s (player 2) strategies to pure stopping times affects only the lower value,











where the equality is again due to Remark 4.3.5 (we are using that (Fpt )-stopping times are
deterministic, because (Fpt ) is trivial). As the following proposition shows, V̂∗ <V∗, so the game
in which the uninformed player does not randomise does not have a value. This confirms that the
randomisation can play a strategic role beyond manipulating/revealing information.
Proposition 4.7.2. In the example of this subsection, we have
V∗ > V̂∗.





τ̂(σ) = (τ1(σ),τ2(σ)) =
(1,1), for σ ∈ [0,1),(1,0), for σ = 1.
We see that supσ∈[0,1]N(τ̂(σ),σ) = N(τ̂(1),1)∨ supσ∈[0,1)N(τ̂(σ),σ) = 2.
We will show that the σ-player can ensure a strictly larger payoff by using a randomised
strategy. Define ζt = aI{t≥ 12}+(1− a)I{t=1}, i.e. the corresponding σ ∈ T
R prescribes to ‘stop
at time 12 with probability a and at time 1 with probability 1− a’. The value of the parameter
a ∈ [0,1] will be determined below. We claim that
inf
τ1,τ2∈[0,1]
N((τ1,τ2),ζ) = N((1,0),ζ)∧N((1,1),ζ). (4.94)








Picking a = 27 , the above quantities are equal to
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4.7 Necessity of assumptions
It remains to prove (4.94). Recall that ζt = aI{t≥ 12}+(1−a)I{t=1} is the generating process













It is clear that on the event {I= 1} the infimum is attained for τ1 = 1, irrespective of the choice
of (ζt). On the event {I = 2} the informed player would only stop either at time zero, where
the function ( ft) attains the minimum cost f0 = 4, or at time t > 12 , since (ζt) only puts mass at
t = 12 and at t = 1 (the informed player knows her opponent may stop at t =
1
2 with probability
a). The latter strategy corresponds to a payoff 5− 72a and can also be achieved by picking τ2 = 1.
Then, the informed player needs only to consider the expected payoff associated to the strategies
(τ1,τ2) = (1,0) and (τ1,τ2) = (1,1), so that (4.94) holds.
4.7.3 Necessity of Assumption (A2’)
Our final counterexample shows that violating Assumption (A2’) by allowing both previsible
upward jumps of ( ft) and previsible downward jumps of (gt) may also lead to a game without a
value.
Consider the payoffs
ft = 1+2I{t≥ 12}, gt =−I{t≥ 12}, h
1 = 3, h2 =−1,
so that h1 = f1− and h2 = g1−, and let us also set T = 1, π1 = π2 = 12 . Assumption (A2’) is
violated as (gt) has a previsible downward jump and ( ft) has a previsible upward jump at time
t = 12 .
Proposition 4.7.3. In the example of this subsection we have
V∗ ≤ 0, and V ∗ > 0,
so the game does not have a value.
Proof. First we show that V∗ ≤ 0. For this step, it is sufficient to restrict our attention to pure
stopping times τ1,τ2 ∈ [0,1] for the informed player (c.f. Remark 4.3.5). Let σ ∈ TR with a
(deterministic) generating process (ζt) and fix ε ∈ (0, 12). For τ1 =
1
2 − ε and τ2 = 1 we obtain
N((τ1,τ2),σ) = E
[
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−ζ( 12−ε)−) = 0.
Since the result holds for all σ ∈ TR, we have V∗ ≤ 0.
Next, we demonstrate that V ∗> 0. For this step it is again sufficient to consider pure stopping
times σ ∈ [0,1] for the uninformed player (Remark 4.3.5). Let τ1,τ2 ∈ TR and let ξ1,ξ2 be the





for some δ ∈ (0,1), and fix ε ∈ (0, 12). For σ =
1
2 − ε we have
N((τ1,τ2),σ) = E
[




























































≥ 1−δ > 0.
(4.96)





In this chapter, we study a Markovian zero-sum game with full information. Our framework is
similar to Section 3.3. Our focus is on the order condition (3.19), which is commonly imposed
in order to prove that the game has a value. Recall that a similar condition appears also in non-
Markovian and nonzero-sum settings (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). We unify certain ideas from
the literature in order to relax the order condition. The exact framework we work in is described
below.
Consider a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,∞] that satisfies the usual conditions. Let (Xt) be a Markov
process defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft),Px), with values in a measurable space
(E,B). Here, for x ∈ E, we assume that X0 = x under Px. We will assume for simplicity that
E = Rd for some d ∈ N.
We consider an optimal stopping game with the following payoff:
P(τ,σ) = F(Xτ)I{τ<σ}+G(Xσ)I{σ<τ}+H(Xτ)I{τ=σ}, (5.1)
where F,G,H : E 7→ R. As usual, we assume that the τ-player is the minimiser in the game and
the σ-player is the maximiser.
Refer to Section 3.3 for results in the literature specific to the payoffs of such form (see
in particular Ekström & Peskir (2008) and Theorem 3.3.3). Recall that one of the commonly
imposed conditions for existence of the value and Nash equilibrium (Definitions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2)
in the game (5.1) is the order condition
G(x)≤ H(x)≤ F(x) ∀x ∈ E (5.2)
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5.1 Setting
(c.f. the order condition in a non-Markovian setting (3.14)). In Section 5.2, we show that the
game (5.1) has the value and Nash equilibrium under a condition weaker than (5.2).
Recall that Touzi & Vieille (2002) (Section 3.5) relax the assumption (5.2) by extending
the set of strategies to randomised stopping times (Section 2.4). In our Markovian set-up, such
extension is not required, and we show the existence of the value and Nash equilibrium in pure
(non-randomised) strategies, i.e. with τ,σ ∈ T(Ft) =: T.
We will also consider a special case of the payoff (5.1):
P′(τ,σ) = F(Xτ)I{τ≤σ}+G(Xσ)I{σ<τ}. (5.3)
This is indeed a special case because P(τ,σ)≡ P′(τ,σ) if in (5.1) we have H ≡ F . For the game
(5.3), the order condition (5.2) translates into
G(x)≤ F(x) ∀x ∈ E. (5.4)
The reason behind (5.4) becomes intuitively clear if one considers a situation when it is violated.
Let, at some t ≥ 0, the payoffs be ordered differently: G(Xt)> F(Xt). If the minimiser decides to
stop the game at time t, she obtains the smaller payoff F , and if the maximiser stops the game at
time t, she obtains the larger payoff G. Thus, both players “like their payoffs” and would prefer
to stop the game immediately. We will show this more rigorously below.
Recall also one of the financial applications of the theory of optimal stopping games — the
game options Kifer (2000). A game option is an option contract which enables both its buyer
and seller to stop it at any time. If the seller is the one to cancel the contract, it is natural that they
will pay to the buyer more than if the buyer exercises the contract (recall e.g. De Angelis et al.
(2021b) in Section 3.4.3 where such “penalty” is a constant ε0 > 0). Hence, for game options,
the order condition (5.4) is not restrictive.
In Section 5.3, we show that the order condition (5.4) is, in fact, not necessary for the exis-
tence of the value and Nash equilibrium in the game (5.3).
We conclude this section by formally listing our assumptions on the underlying Markov pro-
cess (Xt) and on the payoff functions F,G,H in (5.1).
(A1) (Xt) is a càdlàg quasi left-continuous strong Markov process,
(A2) F,G,H : E 7→ R are continuous and bounded functions,





(F ∨H)(Xt), Px-a.s. ∀x ∈ E.
105
5.2 Existence of value and Nash equilibrium






F(Xt), Px-a.s. ∀x ∈ E.
5.2 Existence of value and Nash equilibrium






where Ex is the expectation with respect to the measure Px, and τ,σ ∈ T.
The following lemma allows us to bound the lower and upper value of the game by the value
of the payoff functions.
Lemma 5.2.1. For every x ∈ E we have
G(x)∧H(x)≤V∗(x)≤V ∗(x)≤ F(x)∨H(x). (5.5)
Proof. Let us substitute τ= 0 and σ= 0 in the expressions for the upper/lower value in Definition
























Recall that V∗(x)≤V ∗(x) by definition (Remark 3.2.5). Thus, (5.6) and (5.7) imply (5.5).
Define the set
A = {x ∈ E : G(x)≥ H(x)≥ F(x)}. (5.8)
The following corollary of Lemma 5.2.1 enables us to determine the value on A.
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Corollary 5.2.2. For every x ∈ A, we have
V∗(x) =V ∗(x) = H(x). (5.9)
Consider an auxiliary game with the payoff
P̃x(τ,σ) = F̃(Xτ)I{τ<σ}+ G̃(Xσ)I{σ<τ}+ H̃(Xτ)I{τ=σ}, (5.10)






and let Ṽ∗ and Ṽ ∗ be the lower and upper value of the game (5.10).
Remark 5.2.3. For x ∈ A, we have F̃(x) = G̃(x) = H(x) = Ṽ∗(x) = Ṽ ∗(x), where the first two
equalities are by definition of F̃, G̃ and the last two are due to Corollary 5.2.2.
The auxiliary game (5.10) is linked to the original game (5.1) as follows.
Theorem 5.2.4. Suppose that H(x) always lies between G(x) and F(x), i.e.
G(x)∧F(x)≤ H(x)≤ G(x)∨F(x) ∀x ∈ E. (5.11)
Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium (̃τ∗, σ̃∗) of the game with the payoff (5.10) such that
τ̃
∗ ≤ ηA, σ̃∗ ≤ ηA, P-a.s., (5.12)
where ηA = inf{t : Xt ∈ A} for the set A⊂ E defined in (5.8). Then, there exists the value function
V of the game with the payoff (5.1), and V ≡ Ṽ , where Ṽ is the value of the game with the payoff
(5.10). Further, the couple (̃τ∗, σ̃∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the game (5.1).
























5.2 Existence of value and Nash equilibrium
Observe that, by (5.11), on the event {τ̃∗ < ηA} we have F(Xτ̃∗) ≥ H(Xτ̃∗), and, since τ̃∗ ≤ ηA,




















where in the last inequality we used (5.13). On the event {σ > ηA}, again using (5.11), we have




















where in the last inequality we used (5.14). Combining the above, we see that
Nx(̃τ∗,σ)≤ Ñx(̃τ∗, σ̂). (5.15)







Ñx(̃τ∗,σ) = Ṽ (x), (5.16)
where the third inequality is due to the supremum on the right-hand side of it being taken over a
larger set, and the final equality is the general relation between a Nash equilibrium and the value
(Remark 3.2.7).
We now provide a symmetric argument for the lower value of the game (5.1). For arbitrary
τ ∈ T, let us define τ̂ := τ∧ηA. We have
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Combining the above, we see that
Nx(τ, σ̃∗)≥ Ñx(τ̂, σ̃∗), (5.17)





Ñx(τ̂, σ̃∗)≥ Ṽ (x). (5.18)
From (5.16) and (5.18), we obtain
V∗(x) =V ∗(x) = Ṽ (x) ∀x ∈ E, (5.19)
i.e. the initial game has a value V ≡ Ṽ .
For the second claim of the theorem, using the inequalities (5.15), (5.17), and the fact that
(̃τ∗, σ̃∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game (5.10), we obtain, for arbitrary τ,σ ∈ T,
Nx(̃τ∗,σ)≤ Ñx(̃τ∗, σ̂)≤ Ñx(̃τ∗, σ̃∗)≤ Ñx(τ̂, σ̃∗)≤ Nx(τ, σ̃∗). (5.20)
Recall that σ̃∗∧ηA = σ̃∗, P-a.s. by assumption. Using this and (5.15) we obtain
Nx(̃τ∗, σ̃∗)≤ Ñx(̃τ∗, σ̃∗).
The opposite inequality follows from the fact that τ̃∗ ∧ηA = τ̃∗ and (5.17). Using (5.20), we
conclude that the couple (̃τ∗, σ̃∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the game (5.1).
Remark 5.2.5. In the proof of Theorem 5.2.4, we do not use the Markov property of the process
(Xt). An analogous result could be established in a non-Markovian framework of e.g. Section
3.2.1 or Chapter 4. For further details, see Section 5.4.
The following theorem gives the sufficient conditions for existence of the value and the Nash
equilibrium of the game (5.1).
109
5.2 Existence of value and Nash equilibrium
Theorem 5.2.6. Let the assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3) hold. Suppose further that
G(x)∧F(x)≤ H(x)≤ G(x)∨F(x) ∀x ∈ E. (5.21)
Then, there exists the value function V of the optimal stopping game with the payoff (5.1). More-
over, the Nash equilibrium holds with
τ
∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D1∪A}; σ∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D2∪A}, (5.22)
where D1 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = F(x)}, D2 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = G(x)}, A = {x ∈ E : G(x) ≥ H(x) ≥
F(x)}.
Remark 5.2.7. Under condition (5.21) we have
E = A∪{x ∈ E : G(x)< H(x)< F(x)}.
In other words, the state space E is partitioned into the region A (where the lower and upper
value are known to coincide, see Corollary 5.2.2) and the region in which the “classical” order
condition G < H < F holds (and where, under additional conditions, the value exists due to
Theorem 3.3.3).
Proof of Theorem 5.2.6. For the auxiliary game (5.10), we have G̃(x)≤ H̃(x)≤ F̃(x) ∀x∈ E due
to (5.21), i.e. the order condition (5.2) holds. Let us show that the other conditions of Theorem
3.3.3 are satisfied for the game (5.10). Indeed, the strong Markov process (Xt) is càdlàg and
quasi left-continuous by (A1); the functions F,G,H ∈LXb as in (3.6) since they are bounded, and
they are continuous by (A2); (3.20) holds due to (A3). Applying Theorem 3.3.3, we see that the
game (5.10) has the value Ṽ and a Nash equilibrium (̃τ∗, σ̃∗) such that
τ̃
∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D̃1}; σ̃∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D̃2}, (5.23)
where D̃1 = {x ∈ E : Ṽ (x) = G̃(x)} and D̃2 = {x ∈ E : Ṽ (x) = F̃(x)}.
By Remark 5.2.3, we have
A⊂ D̃i, i = 1,2, (5.24)
and thus τ̃∗ ≤ ηA, σ̃∗ ≤ ηA. In other words, the condition (5.12) is satisfied, and we can apply
Theorem 5.2.4 to deduce that the initial game (5.1) has the value V ≡ Ṽ , and the couple (̃τ∗, σ̃∗)
is a Nash equilibrium in game (5.1). It remains to note that, by definitions of functions F̃ , G̃ and
of the set A, we have
D̃i = Di∪A, i = 1,2.
Thus, τ∗ = τ̃∗, σ∗ = σ̃∗, and the couple (τ∗,σ∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the game (5.1).
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5.3 The case H ≡ F
Remark 5.2.8. The condition (5.21) is only a condition on H, unlike the classical order condition
(5.2) which bounds all the three payoff functions.
Example 5.2.9. If the condition (5.21) is violated, the value of the game (5.1) may not exist.









In this situation, H is the smallest payoff, so the minimiser “would like to stop together with the












and for the upper value we have











Therefore, V ∗ >V∗ and there is no value.
5.3 The case H ≡ F
Consider now a game with H ≡ F , i.e. with the payoff (5.3). With a slight abuse of notation of






Further, the lower and upper value of the game (5.3) are denoted as V∗ and V ∗. We emphasise
that this is only for notational convenience, and V∗ and V ∗ are not necessarily equal to the lower
and upper value of the general game considered in Section 5.2.
Similarly to Section 5.2, the order condition (5.4) can be relaxed (in fact, removed). The
following lemma is a direct corollary of Lemma 5.2.1.
Lemma 5.3.1. For the game (5.3), for every x ∈ E we have
F(x)∧G(x)≤V∗(x)≤V ∗(x)≤ F(x). (5.25)
The set A from (5.8) reads
A = {x ∈ E : G(x)≥ F(x)}.
Corollary 5.3.2. For the game (5.3), for every x ∈ A, we have
V∗(x) =V ∗(x) = F(x). (5.26)
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Remark 5.3.3. Consider the game (5.3) in case when A = E, i.e. G(x) ≥ F(x) ∀x ∈ E. In line
with Laraki & Solan (2005), such game stops at time 0, and τ∗=σ∗≡ 0 form a Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, for arbitrary x ∈ E, τ,σ ∈ T, we have
Nx(0,σ) = F(x) = Nx(0,0)≤ Nx(τ,0), (5.27)
so the couple (0,0) satisfies the Definition 3.3.2 of a Nash equilibrium.
The following theorem for the game (5.3) holds true. Note that there are no additional re-
quirements on the relations between F and G.
Theorem 5.3.4. Under assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3’), there exists the value function V of the
optimal stopping game with the payoff (5.3), and the Nash equilibrium holds
τ
∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D1∪A}; σ∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D2∪A}, (5.28)
where D1 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = F(x)}, D2 = {x ∈ E : V (x) = G(x)}, A = {x ∈ E : G(x)≥ F(x)}.
Since V (x) = F(x) ∀x ∈ A (Corollary 5.3.2), we have A⊂D1. Hence, the stopping time τ∗ in
(5.28) has a shorter representation τ∗ = inf{t : Xt ∈ D1}.
Remark 5.3.5. In the game with the payoff (5.3), the “middle” payoff H equals the payoff F of
the τ-player: that is, on the event {τ = σ}, the payoff is F(Xτ). Consider a similar game, but
with the opposite behaviour on the event {τ = σ}, i.e. with the payoff
P̂(τ,σ) = F(Xτ)I{τ<σ}+G(Xσ)I{σ≤τ}. (5.29)
Such game fits the framework of (5.1) with H ≡ G, and therefore a result symmetric to Lemma
5.3.1 holds:
G(x)≤ V̂∗(x)≤ V̂ ∗(x)≤ F(x)∨G(x), (5.30)
where V̂∗ and V̂ ∗ are the lower and the upper value of the game (5.29). In particular, similarly
to Corollary 5.3.2, for the game (5.29) we have V̂∗(x) = V̂ ∗(x) = G(x) ∀x ∈ A.
In the case H ≡ G, the following theorem holds true.
Theorem 5.3.6. Under assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3’), there exists the value function V of the
optimal stopping game with the payoff (5.29), and the Nash equilibrium holds with (τ∗,σ∗) as in
Theorem 5.3.4.
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5.4 Possible non-Markovian extension
Theorems 5.3.4 and 5.3.6 are a special case of the Theorem 5.2.6. Indeed, (A3’) is a special
case of (A3), and the condition (5.21) is automatically satisfied if H ≡ F (as in the payoff (5.3))
or if H ≡ G (as in the payoff (5.29)). We also remark the similarity between Theorem 5.3.6 and
the following fact from the literature.
Theorem 5.3.7. (Stettner, 1982b, Theorem 3) The game (5.29) has the same value and Nash
equilibrium as the auxiliary game with the function F ∨G instead of F in (5.29).
However, in Theorem 5.3.7, the assumptions on the process (Xt) ensuring the existence of
the value in the auxiliary game are different from ours.
Remark 5.3.8. So far in this section, we worked under assumption that there is no “middle”
payoff H, and in the infinite-horizon case. It is possible to consider a similar framework but
with finite horizon T , and with the “middle” payoff reducing to the terminal-time payoff — a
Markovian analogue of the payoff studied in Chapter 4. That is, consider
P̊(τ,σ) = F(Xτ)I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T}+G(Xσ)I{σ<τ}∩{σ<T}+ H̊(XT )I{τ=T}∩{σ<T}.
The order condition (5.21) in this case is no longer automatically satisfied, and we would need
its weaker analogue
G(XT )∧F(XT )≤ H̊(XT )≤ G(XT )∨F(XT ), P-a.s.
in order to claim, as in Theorem 5.3.4, that the value and the Nash equilibrium exist.
5.4 Possible non-Markovian extension
In Remark 5.2.5, we mentioned that the proof of Theorem 5.2.4 does not use the Markovian
properties of the game. In fact, the main reason for assuming Markovianity was to fit the auxiliary
game (5.10) into the framework of Theorem 3.3.3 and use the latter to prove Theorem 5.2.6.
Instead, one could consider the non-Markovian payoff
P̌(τ,σ) = fτI{τ<σ}+gσI{σ<τ}+hτI{τ=σ},
as in (3.13) in Section 3.2.1. Using the non-Markovian Definition 3.2.4 of the lower and upper
value V̌∗ and V̌ ∗ of the game with the payoff P̌, we can establish a non-Markovian counterpart of
Lemma 5.2.1:
E[g0∧h0]≤ V̌∗ ≤ V̌ ∗ ≤ E[ f0∨h0]. (5.31)
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5.4 Possible non-Markovian extension
The proof of this chain of inequalities is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.2.1 and goes through
substituting τ = 0 and σ = 0 in Definition 3.2.4. Note that (5.31) only addresses the behaviour
of the payoff processes at time 0, while Lemma 5.2.1 holds on the whole state space E. Let us
introduce a counterpart of the set A (5.8), i.e. the set on which the payoff processes are in the
“wrong” order:
Ǎ = {t ∈ [0,∞] : gt ≥ ht ≥ ft}.
In order to study the game on the (random) set Ǎ, one may need to extend the ideas related to Snell
envelopes in optimal stopping theory (see Section 3.1.1) to the game framework and introduce
lower/upper value processes of the game, similarly to Section 3.2.1 (see in particular (3.15) and




In the main chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4), we study Dynkin games with asymmetric infor-
mation. In Theorem 4.2.3, we prove that the value of games exists under general assumptions
on payoff processes, and without specific assumptions on the information structure. This result
generalises previous results from the literature on Dynkin games with asymmetric information
(see Section 4.6). In Section 4.5.4, we explain that in fact the value exists for a more general
payoff, and under a further condition on the jumps of the payoff processes the Nash equilibrium
also exists.
Our methodology enables us to work in a general non-Markovian framework, but this gen-
erality also limits us to the existence results. A possible next step is to introduce Markovian
assumptions in the framework in order to provide more explicit results. Indeed, recall Theorem
3.3.3 that characterises the Nash equilibrium of a classical full-information Markovian Dynkin
games as a couple of stopping times that are hitting times. In that setting, it is optimal for the
minimiser (resp. the maximiser) to stop as soon as the underlying process enters the set D1 (resp.
D2). However, in the setting of Chapter 4, the stopping decisions of the players are randomised.
If the Nash equilibrium (τ∗,σ∗) exists for the asymmetric information game of Chapter 4, the
natural question is the behaviour of the corresponding generating processes (ξ∗,ζ∗). It is of in-
terest to try and deduce a similarly explicit “rule”, to specify when it is optimal for the minimiser
(resp. the maximiser) to increase the value of her strategy ξ∗ (resp. ζ∗).
Another possible direction of future research is developing financial applications of our
model. In Chapter 1 we briefly introduced convertible bonds, which are real-world instruments
that can be viewed as a Dynkin game (with specific payoff processes) between a firm issuing
the bond and a bondholder. The payoff (4.1) studied in Chapter 4 can be reduced to the payoff
of a convertible bond, if the minimiser is interpreted as the firm, the maximiser is interpreted as
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the bondholder, the time horizon T is the time of maturity of the bond, the payoff process ( ft)
is a constant, and the payoff process (gt) and the terminal payoff h are functions of the value of
the firm’s stock (St). Indeed, the process ( ft) is the payoff delivered by the minimiser (i.e. the
firm) to the maximiser (i.e. the bondholder) on the event {τ ≤ σ}∩ {τ < T} (i.e. if the bond
is called before the maturity T ). Similarly, the process (gt) is the payoff delivered by the firm
to the bondholder if the bond is converted before the maturity T . Finally, the terminal payoff h
(i.e. the payoff at the maturity T of the bond) is delivered by the firm to the bondholder if none
of the players have stopped before the time T (i.e. if neither the conversion nor the call have
happened before T ), and thus the bondholder chooses between receiving a pre-specified price
or a function of the value of the firm’s stock ST . With such an interpretation, the framework of
Chapter 4 can be used to study a convertible bond traded in a situation of asymmetry of informa-
tion between the firm and the bondholder. A natural example would be the bondholder not being
able to accurately estimate the value of the firm’s stock.
In Chapter 5, we study a different Dynkin game — the Markovian game with full information.
We focus on the order condition on the payoff processes, and, drawing on the existing literature,
provide a way to relax this condition. Possible future steps in studying this problem include the
extension to non-Markovian set-up (see Section 5.4). Another direction is to apply the ideas from
Chapter 5 to relax the order conditions (A3)-(A4) in the non-Markovian asymmetric information




A.1 Probability and stochastic processes
In this section, we follow Rogers & Williams (2000) and Blumental & Getoor (1968) to give
some important definitions used in the thesis and discuss relations between them. Recall that
T ∈ (0,∞] denotes the time horizon.
Definition A.1.1. A family of sigma-algebras (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is called a filtration on the probability
space (Ω,F,P), if for every t1, t2 ∈ [0,T ] such that t1 ≤ t2, we have Ft1 ⊆ Ft2 ⊆ F.
Definition A.1.2. Given a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], a random variable η : Ω 7→ [0,T ] is called an
(Ft)-stopping time, if the event {η≤ t} belongs to the sigma-algebra Ft for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Definition A.1.3. An (Ft)-stopping time η is called previsible (or sometimes predictable or an-
nounceable), if there exists a sequence of (Ft)-stopping times {ηn}n∈N that announces η, i.e.
such that ηn < η on the event {η > 0}, and ηn→ η.
Definition A.1.4. An (Ft)-stopping time η is called accessible, if there exists a sequence of
previsible (Ft)-stopping times {ηn}n∈N such that P({exists n ∈ N such that η = ηn}) = 1.
Every previsible stopping time is accessible — to see that one needs to take ηn = η for all n
in the above definition.
Definition A.1.5. An (Ft)-stopping time η is called totally inaccessible, if for every previsible
stopping time χ there holds P({η = χ}∩{χ < ∞}) = 0.
Every stopping time can be decomposed into an accessible and a totally inaccessible “parts”,
as the following lemma formalises.
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Lemma A.1.6. (Rogers & Williams, 2000, Lemma VI.13.4) For any finite stopping time η, there
exist an accessible stopping time η1, a totally inaccessible stopping time η2, and two disjoint
events A1,A2 such that A1∪A2 = Ω, for which the following holds:
η = η1IA +η2IB.
Properties of random variables usually do not hold for all ω ∈Ω, but rather with probability
one. For example, when we say that two random variables are equal, we almost always mean
that they are equal P-a.s. (and usually we do specify this to avoid confusion). For stochastic
processes, there is a similar notion of being “morally equal” — indistinguishability.
Definition A.1.7. Two stochastic processes (Xt)t∈[0,T ] and (Yt)t∈[0,T ] are called indistinguishable,
if
P({ω ∈Ω : Xt(ω) = Yt(ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]}) = 1.
A similar definition can be given to address the issue of ordering of stochastic processes.
Definition A.1.8. Let (X1t )t∈[0,T ], (X2t )t∈[0,T ] be measurable processes. We say that the process
(X1t ) dominates the process (X
2
t ), if
P({ω ∈Ω : X1t (ω)≥ X2t (ω) for all t ∈ [0,T ]}) = 1.
Let us also define some fundamental types of stochastic processes.
Definition A.1.9. For a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], a process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is called an (Ft)-martingale, if
(1) (Xt) is (Ft)-adapted,
(2) E[|Xt |]< ∞ for every t ∈ [0,T ],
(3) for every t1, t2 ∈ [0,T ] such that t1 ≤ t2 we have E[Xt2|Ft1] = Xt1 , P-a.s.
A process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is called an (Ft)-supermartingale (resp. (Ft)-submartingale), if it satisfies
(1) and (2) above, and in (3), the equality = is replaced by the inequality ≤ (resp. ≥).
Definition A.1.10. Let (E,B) be a measurable space, (Ω,F,Px) a probability space for all x∈E,
and (Ft)t∈[0,T ] a filtration of sub-sigma-algebras of F. A stochastic process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] with values
in E is called Markov (with respect to the filtration (Ft)), if
(1) (Xt) is (Ft)-adapted,
(2) the map x 7→ Px(Xt ∈ B) is in B for every t ∈ [0,T ] and B ∈B,
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(3) Px(Xt+s ∈ B|Ft) = PXt (Xs ∈ B) for all x ∈ E, B ∈B, 0≤ t ≤ s≤ T .
A Markov process (Xt) is called strong Markov, if for every (Ft)-stopping time η and every
bounded measurable function F : E 7→ R, the following holds:
(4) Xη is Fη-measurable,
(5) Ex(F(Xt+η)|Fη) = EXη(F(Xt)) for all x ∈ E, t ∈ [0,T ],
where Ex is the expectation with respect to the measure Px.
Remark A.1.11. In the literature, definitions related to continuous-time Markov processes often
differ from Definition A.1.10. For example, it is possible to define a Markov process without
introducing the measures Px, by stating that “given the present, the past and the future are
independent” (for the rigorous definition, see (Blumental & Getoor, 1968, Definition I.1.1)).
Another example is adding a “cemetery state” to the space E and postulating that the process
(Xt) never leaves this state (for details, see (Blumental & Getoor, 1968, Definition I.3.1)). There
are also concept related to time-homogeneity of Markov processes, of translation operators and
infinitesimal generators corresponding to a Markov process. Since our main results in Chapter 4
do not rely on Markovianity and do not benefit from this theory, we omit further details and refer
to (Dynkin, 1965, Chapters II-III).
A.2 General topology
The fact that a continuous function on a compact set attains its maximum and minimum (some-
times referred as extreme value theorem) holds true for functions on a general topological space.
We provide the background necessary to prove the extreme value theorem. The definitions of
topological space, topology, open sets and neighbourhoods, convergence, continuity are omitted;
we refer to (Armstrong, 1983, Chapters 1-3).
A (topologically) closed set is defined as a complement of an open set. To define topological
compactness, we need a concept of cover.
Definition A.2.1. Let B be a set in a topological space, and O a collection of open sets. We say
that O is a cover of B, if B = ∪A∈OA.
Definition A.2.2. A set B in a topological space is called compact, if every open cover of B has
a finite subcover.
There is the following general relation between topological closedness and compactness.
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Theorem A.2.3. (Armstrong, 1983, Theorem 3.5) A closed subset of a compact set is compact.
We now can formally state the extreme value theorem.
Theorem A.2.4 (Extreme value theorem). (Armstrong, 1983, Theorem 3.10) A continuous real-
valued function defined on a compact space is bounded and attains its bounds.
An alternative way of introducing closedness and compactness is via converging sequences.
A set is called sequentially closed, if every converging sequence of its elements converges to an
element of this set. A set is called sequentially compact, if every sequence of its elements has a
converging subsequence.
In the proof of Theorem 4.4.5, we claim that closedness of certain sets follows from Lemma
4.4.18. In fact, in Lemma 4.4.18 only sequential closedness of these sets is proven. But, as the
following theorem explains, these concepts are equivalent in metric spaces.
Theorem A.2.5. (Willard, 1970, Theorem 10.4) In a metric space M, sequential closedness is
equivalent to topological closedness.
Proof. First, take a closed set C ⊂M, and take a sequence {xn} in C such that xn→ x ∈M. We
need to show that x ∈C. Assume otherwise, i.e. x ∈M \C. Then, since the set M \C is open,
there exists a neighbourhood O of x such that O⊂M\C. But, by the definition of convergence,
∃N : ∀n > N xn ∈ O ⊂M \C, which contradicts the fact that xn ∈C. This contradiction proves
that the set C is sequentially closed.
For the other direction, take a sequentially closed set C. Consider its closure C̄ (the smallest
closed set containing C). Take an arbitrary x ∈ C̄. Consider the open balls B(x, 1n) for n ∈ N. We
claim that the sets B(x, 1n)∩C are non-empty. Indeed, assume otherwise: that there exists n such
that B(x, 1n)∩C = /0. But, by the definition of closure, the set M \ C̄ is the largest open set that
does not intersect with C. Then, B(x, 1n)⊂M\C̄, which contradicts the fact that x ∈ C̄.
Let us for each n select an arbitrary point xn ∈ B(x, 1n)∩C. By construction, xn→ x, and, by
sequential closedness of C, it implies x ∈ C. Since this was proven for arbitrary x ∈ C̄, we see
that C = C̄, hence C is closed.
Note that, in general, closedness and sequential closedness are not equivalent. However, we
can see from the proof of Theorem A.2.5 that a closed set is always sequentially closed (indeed,
we did not use the metric to conduct the proof in this direction). Spaces in which the opposite
implication holds true (i.e. any sequentially closed set is closed) are called sequential spaces.
Thus, Theorem A.2.5 proves that metric spaces are sequential.
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In the proof we have used another property — metric spaces are first-countable, that is, each
point x ∈M has a countable neighbourhood basis: there exists a sequence of neighbourhoods of
x such that any neighbourhood of x contains an element of this sequence. From the proof we see
that, in a metric space, the balls B(x, 1n) form a countable neighbourhood basis of a point x. One
can use a similar argument to show that any first-countable space is sequential.
We conclude with some definitions that will help us to avoid confusion in Section A.3.1.
Definition A.2.6. Let O1, O2 be two topologies on a general topological space S. We say that
O1 is coarser (or weaker) than O2, if O1 ⊆ O2.
Definition A.2.7. A set A ⊂ S is said to be dense in S, if for any point x ∈ S and for any neigh-
bourhood O of x, O∩A 6= /0.
A.3 Properties of Banach spaces
The content of this section is used in Section 4.4; in particular, many facts we outline below are
necessary to prove Lemma 4.4.16.
A.3.1 Weak topologies
Let E be a Banach space with a norm || · ||. Denote by E∗ the dual space of E, that is, the space
of all continuous linear functionals on E. For F ∈ E∗, the dual norm is defined by
||F ||E∗ = sup
x∈E:||x||≤1
F(x).
The space E∗ with this norm is Banach.
The topology on E generated by the norm || · || is often referred as strong topology. There is
another topology on E defined as follows.
Definition A.3.1. The topology on E is called the weak topology σ(E,E∗), if it is the coarsest
topology on E such that all the maps {F : E 7→ R}F∈E∗ are continuous in this topology.
The weak topology exists and is unique for any Banach space E by (Brezis, 2010, Lemma
3.1). In fact, for any collection of maps from a set to a general topological space, the coarsest
topology such that these maps are continuous exists and is unique (recall e.g. Section 3.1.3 and
the weak topology on the set A◦ defined via the functional Nr). However, in Chapter 4, we use
specifically the weak topology σ(E,E∗), and therefore we focus on this topology in the sequel.
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Remark A.3.2. By definition of the space E∗, all its elements are continuous in the strong topol-
ogy, and therefore the weak topology is weaker than the strong topology. In other words, sets
that are open in the weak topology σ(E,E∗) are always open in the strong topology. It implies,
for example, that if (xn) in E converges to x in the strong topology, then (xn) converges to x in
the weak topology (Brezis, 2010, Proposition 3.5.ii).
For brevity, we often say “weakly open/closed/compact” instead of “open/closed/compact in
the weak topology”, and use the terms “strongly open/closed/compact” in a similar way.
In general, strongly open/closed sets are not necessarily weakly open/closed (Brezis, 2010,
Section 3.2, Remark 2). For convex sets, however, there is the equivalence.
Theorem A.3.3. (Brezis, 2010, Theorem 3.7) Let C be a convex subset of E. Then C is weakly
closed if and only if it is strongly closed.
Finally, we say a few words about reflexive spaces. Note that, given x ∈ E, the mapping
Jx : F 7→ F(x) is a continuous (with respect to the norm || · ||E∗) linear functional on E∗, i.e. an
element of (E∗)∗.
Definition A.3.4. Let Jx be as above. The mapping J : E 7→ (E∗)∗ defined as J(x) = Jx is called
a canonical injection. If, additionally, J(E) = (E∗)∗, the space E is called reflexive.
We will use the following property of reflexive spaces.
Theorem A.3.5 (Kakutani). (Brezis, 2010, Theorem 3.17) Let E be a Banach space. Then E is
reflexive if and only if the unit ball
BE = {x ∈ E : ||x|| ≤ 1}
is weakly compact.
A.3.2 Lp-spaces
Let (S,Σ,µ) be a measure space. For p ∈ [1,∞), by Lp(S,Σ,µ) (or simply Lp when no ambiguity
arises) we denote the space{









Note that the functions that coincide µ-a.e. are indistinguishable in this space: indeed, the || · ||Lp-
norm of their difference is zero by definition. Therefore, elements of an Lp-space are actually
equivalence classes of functions. In this sense, one can speak of a function-representative of an
element of Lp-space.
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Theorem A.3.6. (Brezis, 2010, Theorems 4.7-4.8) Lp with the norm || · ||Lp is a Banach space.
By Lp-convergence we mean convergence in the || · ||Lp-norm. More precisely, for (Fn),F ∈
Lp, we say that Fn→ F in Lp if ||Fn−F ||Lp → 0 as n→ ∞.
Sometimes, it is more convenient to deal with µ-a.e. convergence than with the Lp-convergence.
Theorem A.3.7. (Brezis, 2010, Theorem 4.9.a) Let (Fn),F ∈ Lp be such that Fn→ F in Lp. Then,
there exist a subsequence (Fnk) such that Fnk → F µ-a.e. on S.
Finally, let us draw a link between this section and Section A.3.1. A corollary of so-called
Riesz representation theorem (Brezis, 2010, Theorem 4.11) is that the dual of an Lp space can be
identified with Lp
′
for a certain p′.
Theorem A.3.8. Let p ∈ (1,∞), and let p′ be such that 1p +
1





In particular, the dual of L2 space is (isometric to) itself.
Corollary A.3.9. L2 is a reflexive space.
A.4 Functional analysis and measure theory
A.4.1 Functions on a linear topological space
In this section, we give definitions from Sion (1958) necessary to understand conditions of Sion’s
theorem (Theorem 3.5.3), which is a very important tool we use to obtain results of Chapter 4.
An overview of its proof is carried out in Section 3.6.
Definition A.4.1. A linear space S (in this thesis, over R) is called a linear topological space,
if it is endowed with a topology such that the vector addition and the scalar multiplication are
continuous functions (in the product topologies on S×S and R×S).
For example, every Banach space with the strong topology is a topological vector space, and
therefore (see Remark A.3.2) every Banach space with the weak topology is.
Let A be a subset of a linear topological space S.
Definition A.4.2. A function F : A→R is called quasi-concave, if {x∈ A : F(x)≥ a} is a convex
set for any a ∈R. A function F : A→R is called quasi-convex, if {x ∈ A : F(x)≤ a} is a convex
set for any a ∈ R.
123
A.4 Functional analysis and measure theory
Definition A.4.3. A function F : A→ R is called upper semicontinuous, if for any sequence




A function F : A→R is called lower semicontinuous, if the function−F is upper semicontinuous.
Remark A.4.4. Definition A.4.2 can be given for any linear space S. Definition A.4.3, on the
other hand, can be given for any topological space S. Thus, the concept of linear topological
space allows to study functions that are quasi-convex/quasi-concave and upper/lower semicon-
tinuous — in particular, to state Sion’s theorem (Theorem 3.5.3).
There is an equivalent definition of upper and lower semicontinuity involving the level sets.
Theorem A.4.5. (Bourbaki, 1998, Propositions IV.6.2.1 and IV.6.2.3) A function F : A→ R is
upper semicontinuous if and only if the sets {x ∈ A : F(x) ≥ a} are closed for any a ∈ R. A
function F : A→ R is lower semicontinuous if and only if the sets {x ∈ A : F(x)≤ a} are closed
for any a ∈ R.
Finally, we state an extension of the extreme value theorem (Theorem A.2.4).
Theorem A.4.6. (Bourbaki, 1998, Theorem IV.6.2.3) An upper semicontinuous (lower semicon-
tinuous) real-valued function defined on a compact space is bounded from above (from below)
and attains its supremum (infimum).
A.4.2 Convergence theorems
For convergence of integrals, we often use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem. We refer
to it as “dominated convergence theorem”, or we say “by dominated convergence”.
Theorem A.4.7 (Dominated convergence). Let (Fn)n∈N be a sequence of real-valued measur-
able functions on a measure space (S,Σ,µ). Suppose that the sequence converges µ-a.e. to a
measurable function F, and is dominated by some integrable function G, i.e. for all n ∈ N and
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Sometimes, we use the following theorem instead.
Theorem A.4.8 (Monotone convergence). Let (Fn)n∈N be a non-decreasing sequence of real-
valued integrable functions on a measure space (S,Σ,µ). Suppose that the sequence converges









Another imporant fact about convergence of integrals is Fatou’s lemma.
Lemma A.4.9 (Fatou’s lemma). Let (Fn)n∈N be a sequence of real-valued non-negative inte-











The following corollary is a version of Fatou’s lemma and is often called the same.
Corollary A.4.10. Let (Fn)n∈N be a sequence of real-valued integrable functions on a measure
space (S,Σ,µ), and let G be an integrable function on the same space such that Fn ≥G µ-a.e. for







Proof. Follows immedeately by applying Fatou’s lemma to non-negative functions F̂n := Fn−G
and to F̂ := F−G.
Corollary A.4.11 (Reverse Fatou’s lemma). Let (Fn)n∈N be a sequence of real-valued integrable
functions on a measure space (S,Σ,µ), and let G be an integrable function on the same space













Proof. Follows by applying Fatou’s lemma to non-negative functions F̂n := G−Fn and to F̂ :=
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Finally, we state an important theorem concerning integrals of functions of two variables.
Theorem A.4.12 (Fubini–Tonelli theorem). Let F be a real-valued measurable function on a

















If, additionally, any of the above integrals is finite, then the same equality holds for integrals of
F (without the absolute value).
The theorem often goes by a shorter name of Fubini’s theorem.
A.4.3 Functions of finite variation
In the sequel, we focus on real-valued functions on a real interval [t1, t2], rather than on an arbi-
trary measure space. Most of the presentation is due to Revuz & Yor (1999).
Let F : [t1, t2] 7→ R be a right-continuous function. For s ∈ [t1, t2] and a subdivision Ξ of the










The finite function S is sometimes called the total variation of F on [t1,s].
Proposition A.4.14. (Revuz & Yor, 1999, Proposition 0.4.2) Any function of finite variation is
the difference of two non-negative non-decreasing finite functions.
The converse is also true, since, if we are given two non-negative non-decreasing finite func-
tions, the total variation of their difference is bounded by the sum of total variations of the two
functions, and is therefore finite. Hence, Proposition A.4.14 can be used as an equivalent defini-
tion of a function of finite variation.
Let F : [t1, t2] 7→R be a finite non-decreasing right-continuous function. Recall that we asso-
ciate to it the (positive) Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure µF by putting
µF((u,v]) = F(v)−F(u) for t1 ≤ u < v≤ t2
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and extending µF to the whole σ-algebra B([t1, t2]) by Caratheodory’s extension theorem (Athreya
& Lahiri, 2006, Theorem 1.3.3). To a right-continuous function of finite variation F : [t1, t2] 7→R,
we associate the (signed) Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure in the same way. This correspondence is
one-to-one (Revuz & Yor, 1999, Theorem 0.4.3).
Finally, we state a property of the set of discontinuities (jumps) of a function of finite varia-
tion.
Proposition A.4.15. (Rudin, 1976, Theorem 4.30) Let F : [t1, t2] 7→ R be a monotone function.
Then the set of its discontinuities is at most countable.
Note that Proposition A.4.15 implies, in particular, that the set of jumps of a monotone func-
tion has Lebesgue measure zero. Same holds true for a function of finite variation due to Propo-
sition A.4.14.
A.4.4 Measure induced by Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral
Let F : [t1, t2] 7→ R be a finite non-decreasing function, and let H : [t1, t2] 7→ R be a bounded





Then, G inherits the properties of F : G is finite, and, since µF is a positive measure, G is non-
decreasing. It is also right-continuous. Indeed, consider the decomposition F(t) = Fc(t) +
∑u∈[t1,s]∆F(u), where F







where the first term is continuous, and the second term is right-continuous. We additionally see
that the set of discontinuities of G is contained in the set of discontinuities of F .
Since G is non-decreasing and right-continuous, there exists the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure
µG. By its definition, for any u,v ∈ [t1, t2] we have∫
(u,v]
H(s)dF(s) = G(v)−G(u) = µG((u,v]).
The Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral with respect to G is then linked to the Lebesgue–Stieltjes integral
with respect to F as follows.
Proposition A.4.16. (Obłój, 2017, Proposition 6.1.8) For F and G as above and for any bounded
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A.4.5 Absolute continuity
In this section, we follow Athreya & Lahiri (2006) to introduce absolute continuity of functions
and measures.
Definition A.4.17. A function F : [t1, t2] 7→ R is called absolutely continuous, if
∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 : ∀{ui,vi}Ni=1 : t1 ≤ u1 ≤ v1 ≤ u2 ≤ v2 ≤ . . .≤ uN ≤ vN ≤ t2
with ∑
i
(vi−ui)< δ we have ∑
i
|F(ui)−F(vi)|< ε.
The definition can be straightforwardly extended to functions on an open or a semi-open interval.
There is an important equivalent definition of absolute continuity.
Theorem A.4.18. (Athreya & Lahiri, 2006, Theorem 4.4.1) A function F : [t1, t2] 7→ R is abso-
lutely continuous, if and only if there exists a Borel measurable function α : [t1, t2] 7→ R, called





for every s ∈ [t1, t2], where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [t1, t2].
Definition A.4.19. A measure µ on the interval [t1, t2] equipped with the Borel σ-algebra B([t1, t2])
is called absolutely continuous, if it is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue mea-
sure λ, i.e.
∀A ∈B([t1, t2]) such that λ(A) = 0 we have µ(A) = 0.
Theorem A.4.20. (Athreya & Lahiri, 2006, Theorem 4.4.3) The absolute continuity of a non-
decreasing function F is equivalent to the absolute continuity of the associated Lebesgue–Stieltjes
measure µF .
Lemma A.4.21. Let F : [t1, t2]→ R be a Lipschitz continuous function. Then F is absolutely
continuous.
Proof. Let L be the Lipschitz constant of F . For arbitrary ε > 0, take δ = εL . Then, for any





L|ui− vi| ≤ Lδ = ε.
Thus, F is absolutely continuous.
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A.5 Projections and processes of finite variation
In this section, we follow (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Section VI.2) to introduce optional and
previsible processes and projections, and provide a decomposition for a piecewise-constant pro-
cess of finite variation.
A.5.1 Optional and previsible processes and projections
Definition A.5.1. Given a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], the sigma-algebra on [0,T ]×Ω generated by
càdlàg (Ft)-adapted processes is called the optional sigma-algebra. The sigma-algebra on
(0,T ]×Ω generated by left-continuous (Ft−)-adapted processes, where Ft− :=∪s<tFs, is called
the previsible sigma-algebra. A process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is called Ft-optional (Ft-previsible), if the
mapping (t,ω)→ Xt(ω) is measurable with respect to the optional (previsible) sigma-algebra.
It is immediate from the definition above that càdlàg Ft-adapted processes are Ft-optional. It
is used in Chapter 4, where effectively all the processes we study are càdlàg and adapted.
Theorem A.5.2. (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Thm VI.43) Let (Xt) be a bounded (or unbounded
but positive) measurable process. Then, there exist a unique optional process (Yt) and a unique
previsible process (Zt) such that
E[XηI{η<∞}|Fη] = YηI{η<∞} P-a.s. for all stopping times η;
E[XηI{η<∞}|Fη−] = ZηI{η<∞} P-a.s. for all previsible stopping times η.
Definition A.5.3. Processes (Yt) and (Zt) from Theorem A.5.2 are called, respectively, Ft-optional
and Ft-previsible projection of (Xt).
A.5.2 Decomposition of a piecewise-constant process
In the literature (e.g. (Rogers & Williams, 2000, Definition IV.7.2)), a stochastic process of finite
variation is often defined as a stochastic process (Yt) whose trajectories t 7→Y (t,ω) are functions
of finite variation (in the sense of Definition A.4.13) for all ω ∈ Ω. Further, it is a standard
convention to only consider (Ft)-adapted and right-continuous finite variation processes. We
will use the following definition from (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, p.115), which is equivalent
due to Proposition A.4.14.
Definition A.5.4. We say that a process (Yt) is of finite variation, if it is a difference of two
(Ft)-adapted, non-decreasing, finite, right-continuous processes.
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Definition A.5.5. We say that a non-decreasing process (Yt)t∈[0,T ] is integrable, if EYT < ∞.
We say that a process (Yt) is of integrable variation, if it is a difference of two (Ft)-adapted,
integrable, non-decreasing, finite, right-continuous processes.
Clearly, processes of integrable variation are a subclass of processes of finite variation.
Theorem A.5.6. (Dellacherie & Meyer, 1982, Theorem VI.52 and Remark VI.53.a) Let (Yt) be
a finite (Ft)-adapted non-decreasing process with Y0− = 0. Then, there exist a continuous non-
decreasing process (Y ct ), (Ft)-stopping times (ηk)k≥1, and non-negative Fηk-measurable random
variables Xk, k ≥ 1, such that





We apply this result in a specific set-up as follows.
Corollary A.5.7. Let (Yt) be a bounded (Ft)-adapted piecewise-constant process of finite varia-
tion with Y0−= 0. Then, there exist (Ft)-stopping times (ηk)k≥1, and non-negative Fηk-measurable






The alternating terms in (A.1) come from interweaving sequences for the two non-decreasing
processes (Y+t ) and (Y
−
t ) from the decomposition Yt = Y
+
t −Y−t (Definition A.5.4). This is for
notational convenience and resulting in no mathematical complications as the infinite sum is
absolutely convergent.
A.6 Weak convergence of non-decreasing functions
The convergence (4.15) from the proof of Proposition 4.4.11 is similar to weak convergence of
random variables and of the corresponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) (Billings-
ley, 1995, Theorem 25.8), the biggest difference being that the integrators ρn(ω), ρ(ω) in (4.15)
may not be CDFs.
Instead of normalisation (4.16) that enabled us to prove (4.15), we could refer to the extended
notion of weak convergence of Shiryaev (1996). Indeed, one can define the weak convergence
for arbitrary bounded right-continuous non-decreasing functions (not necessarily CDFs), and for
arbitrary finite measures (not necessarily probability measures).
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Definition A.6.1. A sequence of bounded right-continuous non-decreasing functions Fn : R 7→R
converges weakly to a function F : R 7→R (denoted Fn w→ F), if, for any continuous and bounded






Similarly, a sequence of finite measures µn on R converges weakly to a measure µ on R (denoted






Note that, by definition of Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure, the convergence Fn w→F is equivalent
to µF
n w→ µF of the corresponding measures.
For convergence of functions, another (equivalent, as we will see shortly) definition is often
more convenient.
Definition A.6.2. A sequence of bounded right-continuous non-decreasing functions Fn : R 7→R
converges in general to a function F : R 7→ R (denoted Fn⇒ F), if, for any point t of continuity
of F,
Fn(t)→ F(t).
A sequence of finite measures µn on R converges in general to a measure µ on R (denoted µn⇒ µ),
if, for any set A with µ(∂A) = 0 (where ∂A denotes the boundary of A),
µn(A)→ µ(A).
Note that, unlike with Definition A.6.1, the equivalence between convergence in general of
functions and of corresponding Lebesgue–Stieltjes measures is not immediate. But the equiva-
lence does hold by the following theorem.
Theorem A.6.3. (Shiryaev, 1996, Theorem III.1.2 and Remark III.1.2) Let Fn,F : R 7→ R be
bounded right-continuous non-decreasing functions. If µF
n







d) Fn w→ F
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Remark A.6.4. In Propositions 4.4.11, we assume that (omitting the dependence on the fixed
ω ∈ Ω0, P(Ω0) = 1) ρnT → ρT , i.e. that µρ
n
([0,T ]) = µρ
n
(R)→ µρ(R). We also assume that
ρn⇒ ρ. Therefore, we could use Theorem A.6.3 to see that ρn w→ ρ, and then the convergence
(4.15) for continuous (Xt) follows from Definition A.6.1 of weak convergence.
A.7 Stochastic differential equations
In this section, we follow (Karatzas & Shreve, 1991, Chapter 5) to outline certain aspects of
theory of stochastic differential equations and their solutions. The theory relies on a process
known as Wiener process (or Brownian motion). We refer to (Karatzas & Shreve, 1991, Chapter
2) (particularly (Karatzas & Shreve, 1991, Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.5.1)) for the properties and the
construction of a Wiener process.
Fix d,r ≥ 1. Consider Borel-measurable functions bi(t,x), σi j(t,x) from [0,∞)×Rd to
R, where 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ r. Define the (d × 1) drift vector b(t,x) = {bi(t,x)}1≤i≤d and
the (d× r) dispersion matrix σ(t,x) = {σi j(t,x)}1≤i≤d,1≤ j≤r. Fix a filtered probability space
(Ω,F,(Ft)t∈[0,∞),P), where the filtration (Ft) satisfies the usual conditions. Let (Wt) be an r-
dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process. Consider the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXt = b(t,Xt)dt +σ(t,Xt)dWt . (A.2)
Definition A.7.1. Let (Xt)t∈[0,∞) be a continuous Rd-valued (Ft)-adapted stochastic process. We
say that the process (Xt) is a strong solution to the SDE (A.2) relative to (Wt) with the initial
condition x0 ∈ Rd , if







for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s., X0 = x0, P-a.s., and∫ t
0
|bi(s,Xs)|+σ2i j(s,Xs)ds < ∞ (A.4)
for all t ∈ [0,∞), 1≤ i≤ d, 1≤ j ≤ r, P-a.s.
Definition A.7.2. Let the coefficients b, σ be fixed. Assume that, for any filtered probability
space (Ω,F,(Ft),P), any r-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process, any x0 ∈ Rd , and any two strong
solutions (Xt), (X̂t) of the SDE (A.2), (Xt) and (X̂t) are indistinguishable. Then we say that
strong uniqueness holds for the pair (b,σ).
The following condition guarantees existence of a strong solution and strong uniqueness.
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Theorem A.7.3. (Karatzas & Shreve, 1991, Theorems 5.2.5 and 5.2.9) Let (Ω,F,(Ft),P) be a fil-
tered probability space with (Ft) satisfying the usual conditions, and let (Wt) be an r-dimensional
(Ft)-Wiener process. Let x0 ∈Rd . Suppose that the coefficients b, σ satisfy the (global) Lipschitz
and linear growth conditions
||b(t,x)−b(t,y)||+ ||σ(t,x)−σ(t,y)|| ≤ K||x− y||,
||b(t,x)||2 + ||σ(t,x)||2 ≤ K2(1+ ||x||2),
for some K > 0 and every t ∈ [0,∞), x,y ∈ Rd . Then, there exists a continuous (Ft)-adapted
process (Xt) which is a strong solution to the SDE (A.2) with the initial condition x0. Moreover,
the strong uniqueness holds for the pair (b,σ).
We note that existence and strong uniqueness hold, in particular, in case when the coefficients
b, σ are bounded and Lipschitz-continuous, as in e.g. Section 3.4.1.
The notion of strong solution of an SDE assumes that we fix a filtered probability space
(Ω,F,(Ft),P) and a Wiener process (Wt). We now introduce a different notion that requires to
fix neither.
Definition A.7.4. A weak solution of the SDE (A.2) is a triple ((Xt),(Wt),(Ω,F,(Ft),P)) such
that
• (Ω,F,(Ft),P) is a filtered probability space, and (Ft) satisfies the usual conditions,
• (Xt) is a continuous (Ft)-adapted Rd-valued process, (Wt) an r-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener
process,
• (A.3), (A.4) are satisfied.
Clearly, if a strong solution exists, then a weak solution exists with the same process (Xt).
A weak solution also exists under weaker regularity conditions on the coefficients b, σ; we omit




B.1 Decomposition of a randomised stopping time
In this section, we study a decomposition of a randomised stopping time with respect to a filtra-
tion enlarged by a sigma-algebra generated by a random variable. A similar decomposition is
provided in (Esmaeeli & Imkeller, 2018, Proposition 3.3) for pure stopping times.
On a discrete probability space (Ωs,Fs,Ps), consider a random variable I taking values in
{1, . . . , I}. Consider another probability space (Ωp,Fp,Pp) with a filtration (Fpt ) satisfying the
usual conditions. On the probability space (Ω,F,P) := (Ωp×Ωs,Fp ∨Fs,Pp⊗Ps), consider
another filtration FIt := F
p
t ∨σ(I).
We start with a decomposition for generating processes: it turns out that elements of A◦(FIt )
(recall (2.4)) can be decomposed into a sum of elements of A◦(Fpt ).








for every t ∈ [0,T ], where (ξ1t ), . . . ,(ξIt ) ∈A◦(F
p
t ).
Proof. For i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, let ωi ∈Ωs be such that I(ωi) = i. For ωp ∈Ωp, t ∈ [0,T ], let us define
ξit(ω
p) := ξt((ωp,ωi)). Then, for every ωp ∈ Ωp, ωs ∈ Ωs, t ∈ [0,T ], (B.1) holds. Further, for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, the process (ξit) is càdlàg, non-decreasing with ξi0−(ωp) = 0, ξiT (ωp) = 1
for all ωp ∈ Ωp, since these properties hold for the process (ξt(·,ωi))t∈[0,T ]. Finally, for every
t ∈ [0,T ], the random variable ξt(·,ωi) is Fpt -measurable. Thus, (ξit)∈A◦(F
p
t ) for every i, which
finishes the proof.
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where τ1, . . . ,τI ∈ TR(Fpt ), with generating processes (ξ1t ), . . . ,(ξIt ) ∈ A◦(F
p
t ) and a common
randomisation device Z.
Proof. Let (ξt) ∈ A◦(FIt ) be the generating process and Z the randomisation device of τ. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, let (ξit) ∈ A◦(F
p
t ) be as in Lemma B.1.1. Define τi = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ξit > Z}. By
Lemma B.1.1, τi ∈ TR(Fpt ). Further, for every ωp ∈Ωp, ωs ∈Ωs, t ∈ [0,T ], setting i0 to be such






p) = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : ξi0t (ωp)> Z}= τ(ωp,ωs),
which proves (B.2).
B.2 Various technical lemmata
Lemma B.2.1. Let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of non-decreasing functions [0,T ] 7→ [0,1] that is non-
decreasing in n. Assume that for some t ∈ R the limit limn→∞ limu↑t ρn(u) exists. Then the limit
































since the sequence (supu<t ρ
n)n≥1 is non-decreasing, which follows from the fact that (ρn(u))n≥1













B.2 Various technical lemmata
Further, observe that for any n ≥ 1 the mapping t 7→ supu<t ρn(u) is non-decreasing, since the












































which, combined with (B.4), (B.5), finishes the proof.
Lemma B.2.2. Let χ : [0,T ] 7→ [0,1] be a right-continuous non-decreasing function, and (ρn)n≥1
be a sequence of non-decreasing right-continuous functions [0,T ] 7→ [0,1] that is non-decreasing




(1−χ(s−))dρn(s), n≥ 1. (B.6)
Then the sequence (Rn)n≥1 is non-decreasing in n.







Observe that the mapping t 7→ (1−χ(t)) defines a negative measure, and recall that 1−χ(t)≥ 0.










Thus, Rn+1(t)≥ Rn(t), which finishes the proof.
136
B.2 Various technical lemmata
Lemma B.2.3. Let (Ft) be a filtration satisfying the usual conditions. For any filtration (Gt) ⊆
(Ft), the sets A(Gt) and Aac(Gt) defined in Section 4.4 are convex in S.
Proof. Let us denote A(Gt) =A for brevity. Take ρ,χ ∈A with càdlàg representatives ρ̂, χ̂, and
let α,β ∈ [0,1] : α+β = 1. For 0≤ t ≤ s≤ T we have
αρ̂t +βχ̂t ≤ αρ̂s +βχ̂s,
0≤ αρ̂t +βχ̂t ≤ α+β = 1,
αρ̂T +βχ̂T = α+β = 1.
(B.7)
Moreover, the process αρ̂+βχ̂ is càdlàg, because the processes ρ̂, χ̂ are.
Let ρ̃, χ̃ be some (not necessarily càdlàg) representatives of ρ,χ. Observe that the S-norm of
the difference αρ̃+βχ̃− (αρ̂+βχ̂) equals zero, because the S-norms of the differences ρ̃− ρ̂
and χ̃− χ̂ both equal zero by definition of a representative of an element of S. Thus, the process
αρ̂+ βχ̂ is a càdlàg representative of αρ+ βχ. Then, by (B.7), we have αρ+ βχ ∈ A, which
proves the convexity of A.
The proof of convexity of the set Aac(Gt) is analogous, the only difference is that it addi-
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